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I. INTRODUCTION
Gail Lewis Daniels, the only African-American on a Georgia capi-
tal jury that sentenced William Henry Hance, a black defendant, to
death in 1984, later said she never voted for death during delibera-
tions.' According to Ms. Daniels, she voted for death when she was
polled by the judge only because her fellow jurors had intimidated
her into doing so. Her account of the jury's sentencing decision was
reported in The New York Times as follows:
"We were all inclined to give a life sentence," she said. "However, the
prosecutor had talked about how Mr. Hance might be dangerous in the
future, and we were concerned that he might get out ofjail in just a few
years."
The jurors sent a note to the judge asking what a "life sentence"
meant. The judge declined to answer. Ms. Daniels said the jurors were
frustrated and a number of them "began advocating for a death penalty"
as the only way to insure that Mr. Hance would never be released.
Several secret votes were taken and each time there were fewer votes
for a life sentence. But Ms. Daniels did not change her mind. The other
jurors reminded her that she had sworn in court that she "could" impose
the death penalty and "implied that I could get in trouble if I continued
to hold out. One of the jurors said that we needed to go ahead and get it
over with because the next day was Mother's Day."
As the pressure against her mounted, Ms. Daniels stood up and said,
"You do what you have to do, but I won't vote for a death sentence." She
refused to participate in further votes.
The remaining jurors then came up with an astounding solution to
the apparent deadlock. According to Ms. Daniels: "The other jurors de-
cided to go and tell the judge that we had voted for a death sentence.
The foreman told a bailiff that we had reached a verdict." All of the ju-
rors, including Ms. Daniels, filed into the courtroom. "I was scared to
death," Ms. Daniels said.
Afraid that she could be charged with perjury for having said that she
could vote for a death sentence, and afraid that she would get in trouble
for not participating in the jury's final votes, Ms. Daniels said yes - 'Just
like all the others" - when the jurors were polled on their verdict.
That was how Mr. Hance was sentenced to death.3
A white juror in the Hance case confirmed Ms. Daniels's account
and added that another Hancejuror described the defendant as 'Just
one more sorry nigger that no one would miss."
4
How anomalous is the story of Gail Lewis Daniels? Do black jurors
Bob Herbert, In America: Mr. Hance's 'Perfect Punishment,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, § 4
(The Week in Review), at 17.
2 d
Id
4 Bob Herbert, jury Room Injustice, N.Y. TvIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at A15.
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view a crime or its appropriate punishment differently than their
white counterparts? Are their perspectives influenced by the race of
the defendant or victim? Are blacks on white-dominated capital ju-
ries intimidated or coerced into voting for the death penalty, as Ms.
Daniels's account suggests? Is Ms. Daniels's experience a rare excep-
tion to generally equitable treatment of black jurors by their white
counterparts in capital cases? Whatever the answers, they a provide
no consolation to William Henry Hance, who uras executed in 1994
shortly after Ms. Daniels's revelation.
A. Historical Background
Race has a nefarious history in capital punishment in the United
States.5 Under slavery, certain crimes against whites were punishable
by death for black offenders but not for white ones," and blacks were
prohibited from testifying in their own defense and from serving on
juries.7 Since the Civil War, blacks have been executed for lesser
crimes, at younger ages, and more often without appeals than whites;"
and over this period they have been disproportionately executed for
crimes against whites.9 Most conspicuous in this respect is the use of
the death penalty to punish rape. Even after World War II, the use of
the death penalty against blacks convicted of raping whites was vastly
disproportionate to its use against other offender-victim racial com-
binations in rape cases." Virtually all juries that sentenced blacks to
5 See generally WILLJI J. BOTRS, EXECLrOS IN AIMERICA 56120 (1974) [hereinafter
BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA] (documenting the disproportionate executions of blacks
over the period 1864-1967 in the United States); WILLILAMJ. BOWERS, LEGA tL HOMICIDE 67-102
(1984) [hereinafter BOWERS, LEGAL HoMICIDE] (examining how offender race and victim race
impact capital sentencing after 1972). For a general review of the role ofAmerican law in per-
petuating the differential treatment of black and white defendants. see R,,A'DA.LL KNEDY.
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76-135 (1997); Douglas L Colbert, Challengrig the Chalkng Tan.
teenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peirmptors Challengi, 76 CORTLL L REV.
1,13-101 (1990).
6 In Virginia, for example, over seventy crimes were punishable by death if the perpetrator
was black, compared to only one for whites. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE, supra note 5. at 139-40;
KENN,EDY, supra note 5, at 77; cf Stephen B. Bright. Discrimination, Death, and Dernak The Toaer.
ance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalt., 35 S..'r CLAR% L REV. 433, 439
(1995) (citing Georgia law providing that "the rape of a white female by a black man *shall be'
punishable by death, while the rape of a white female by anyone else was punishable by a prison
term").
7 Colbert, supra note 5, at 13-32.
SSee BoWTRS, EXECUTtONS IN AM, ERIC , supra note 5, at 78-96.
See Harold Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intraracial Homizadts. 27 SOC. FORCES 369,
374-77 (1949) (showing at successive stages of the criminal justice process that black homicide
suspects whose victims were white were more likely than other homicide suspects to advance to
the next stage of the process); see also Guy B. Johnson. The Negro and Crz, 217 A'x.ts AM.
ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 93, 103-04 (1941) (concluding that black offenders were treated more
severely than white offenders).
10 See eg., Marvin E. WolIgang & Marc Riedel, Raw, Judicial Discrrtion, and the Death Penalty,
407 ANNALS 119, 125 (1973) (concluding that black men accused of raping white women were
eighteen times more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants); Marvin E. Wolf-
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death throughout this period were all white and all male."
During the Reconstruction Era, the Supreme Court recognized in
Strauder v. West Virginia2 that black defendants were entitled to pro-
tection from all-white juries and struck down a law excluding blacks
from jury service as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 13  Yet Strauder's promise went unrealized. State
legislatures devised various ways to prevent black citizens from serving
on juries, using such means as poll taxes and highly subjective voter
registration criteria.1 4 Federal courts raised few objections during this
period.' 5 Even after the Supreme Court ruled against such measures
in Norris v. Alabama, prosecutors preserved the all-whitejury by using
peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks at jury selection. 7  Theju-
risprudence since Strauder has made it virtually impossible to success-
gang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA,
supra note 5, at 109, 117 tbls.4-2 (showing the disproportionate use of the death penalty for
rape against black men convicted of raping white women in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, South Carolina, and Tennessee, between 1945 and 1965); Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc
Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 667 (1975)
(analyzing rape convictions in Georgia between 1945 and 1965 and finding that the most sig-
nificant variable in the differential imposition of the death penalty was the combination of a
black defendant and white victim).
1 See generally Colbert, supra note 5 (reviewing the history of all-white tribunals in the United
States, describing the extensive efforts of state and local officials to exclude black citizens from
jury service, and analyzing the use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges).
12 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
1lId. at 308. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to ajury composed of persons hav-
ing the same legal status that he holds in society-to ajury of his neighbors, fellows, and associ-
ates. Id. The Court declared that denying blacks the rights granted them in the Civil War
Amendments, particularly the right to participate in the administration of laws, branded them
as inferior and stimulated prejudice. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Strauder, see Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality
and the Ideal ofRepresentativeJuries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 327, 333-50 (1994).
See Coke, supra note 13, at 334 (discussing the pervasive use of various techniques to ex-
clude blacks from participating in the administration ofjustice).
i See id. (noting that these methods went largely unchecked until the Civil Rights move-
ment).
16 294 U.S. 587, 596-99 (1934) (holding that the longstanding practice of excluding blacks
from jury service through the use of subjective juror qualifications violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
17 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611,
1656-69 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence] (reviewing the use of racially selective
peremptory challenges); NancyJ. King, Postconviction Review ofJury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects ofJuror Race onJury Decision, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75-100 (1993) (examining the impact of
jury discrimination on jury verdicts); Coke, supra note 13. Evidence ofjury discrimination has
been gathered by numerous empirical studies. See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI ETAL., RACE AND THE
JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 70 (1993) (noting that
prosecutors are more likely than defense attorneys to direct peremptory challenges at racial
minorities); Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenge
35 WVt. & MARY L. REv. 21, 71 n.358 (1993) (identifying cases in which there was a pervasive use
of peremptory challenges against black jurors); Steve McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias Per-
vades Jury Selection: Prosecutors Routinely Bar Blacks, Study Finds, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9,
1986, at Al (reporting the results of newspaper's investigation of 100 Dallas County trials over a
twelve-month period and revealing that prosecutors struck 405 of 467 black venire persons, ive
times the strike rate of white jurors).
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fully challenge the strikes of black jurors.' Even now, following Bat-
son v. Kentucky,"' it is agreed that all but the most egregious mce-based
strikes of black jurors are unlikely to be reversed."
In 1972 the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia' that the
imposition of capital punishment under existing statutes w-s so arbi-
trary and wanton as to violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment." Racial discrimination or
bias in the application of the death penalty was cited by some justices
in their concurring opinions,- but it was not common to the opinions
of the five-Justice plurality. In the w%-ake of Funnan, states rewrote
their capital statutes so as to curb arbitrary and discriminatory influ-
ences on the exercise of sentencing discretion. Yet, not long after the
Supreme Court endorsed the "guided discretion" form of post-
Furman capital statutes in Gregg v. Georgid and companion cases,
studies of the application of these rewritten statutes showed contin-
ued disparities in the use of the death penalty by race of defendant
and especially by race of victim 24 The most rigorous of these studies,
conducted in Georgia by David Baldus and colleagues," specifically
la See Colbert, supra note 5, at 65-128 (revieing in depth the Supreme Court's post-Strauder
jurisprudence on jury composition,jury selection, and race).
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (requiring state attorneys to justify uith a race-neutral reason their
strikes of blackjurors whenever a discriminatory pattern of exclusion appeared ian individual
case). Ironically, the Batson decision represented a shift in tie Court's analhsis front guarding
the defendant's right to equal protection to guarding the prospective juror's right to be repre-
sented onjuries.
-0 See Coke, supra note 13, at 336-50 (describing the limitations of Batson and suhsequent
decisions).
21 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (declaring that the imposition of the death penalt% under
Texas and Georgia statutes, which were typical of those in most states at tie time, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and Fourteetnth .mnendments in part
because these statutes permitted juries to administer the death penaltv in an arbitran and ca-
pricious manner).
2 Id at 250 n.15 (DouglasJ., concurring) (noting studies suggesting racial biasl; td. at 364
(Marshall, J., concurring) (same). But see ii. at 310 (Stewart, J.. conctitng) ("But racial dis-
crimination has not been proved...").
428 U.S. 153, 20607 (1976) (upholding state's new post-Funran capital statute because it
included procedures intended to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalts ; Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (same); Proffitt v. Florida. 428 US. 2142, 259-60 (1976)
(same).
24 See, Pg., William J. Bowers & Glenn L Pierce. Arbtrannesm and Daswr-natwn under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRI.IME & DELINQ. 563. 62,-30 (1980) (finding continuing disparities
in capital sentencing based on the race of offender and race of victim under the capital statutes
approved by the Supreme Court in Grg, Proffil, and Jurd); S,%It EL R. GROss & RoBERT
MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN C.%PITAL SIENT" I. 35-9-1 (1989)
(examining sentencing under post-Furman death penalty laws in eight states from 1976 to 1981)
and finding significant racial disparities). For a review and evaluation of this bods of research,
see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PEN.ALTY SENTENCING: RELS.R.II I\DICATES
PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in TilE DE\rII PEN.AL Y 1. ASIERI(.%, at 268
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
2YSee DAvID C. BALDUS ET AL, EQCALJUSTICE AND THE DE\TH PENAL Y: A LEIAL AND
EMPIRIC. ANALYSIS 80-228 (1990) (using data collected during the 1970's to assess tile ffec-
tiveness of Georgia's post-Furman capital statute in curbing the arbitrariness proscribed it Fur-
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demonstrated that the decisions of jurors at the sentencing stage of
the process make a sizable and statistically significant contribution to
the overall racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty."
In 1986 the Court explicitly acknowledged the danger that racial
attitudes might influence jurors' sentencing decisions in capital cases,
especially when the defendant is black and the victim is white. In
Turner v. Murray" the Court singled out black defendant/white victim
cases as the ones in which jurors' racial sentiments are especially apt
to confound the sentencing decision, and it ruled that "a capital de-
fendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective
jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue
of racial bias." 8 The Court declared that this judgment was "based
on... the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence,
the broad discretion given the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and
the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital
case." 29 A year later, however, in McCleskey v. Kemp,30 when the Court
was confronted in a black defendant/white victim case with the Bal-
dus study's strong evidence of racial bias, it narrowly affirmed (5-4)
the constitutional acceptability of McCleskey's death sentence."
22 Baldus has replicated these findings from Georgia in later studies conducted in New Jer-
sey and Pennsylvania. For a discussion of these studies, see David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimi-
nation and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent
Findingsfrom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial Dis-
crimination and the Death Penalty].
476 U.S. 28 (1986).
28 Id. at 37.
Id. at 37-38. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text for a further exposition of the
Court's view of the danger that "subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes" might influence
jurors' capital sentencing decisions.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
31 Perhaps the McCleskey Court believed that its decision in Turner would thereafter remedy
the racial disparities demonstrated by Baldus. The special jury selection procedures required by
Turner were supposed to ensure that jurors would no longer be racially biased in cases like
McCleskey's.
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B. Empirical Context
The public, and hence jurors, are often exposed to race-linked
thinking about violent crime, especially from the popular media
where the black criminal is often cast as an incorrigible and danger-
ous predator.2  A substantial body of research demonstrates the in-
fluence of racial stereotypes in attributions of criminality," and opin-
ion polls show that the public identifies blacks as more prone to
criminality than other racial groups.' Indeed, whites view certain vio-
lent offenses-muggings and assaults-as "black crimes.' ' This "ra-
cialization" of criminality appears to promote generalized mistrust of
blacks on the part of whites,3 and doubtless helped to foster the
Charles Stuart and Susan Smith hoaxes in which white murderers
first alleged that their victims had been killed by blacks." Among
whites, especially white males, racial stereotypes and mistrust are
linked to punitiveness,3 including support for the death penalty."
For example,John IM. Sloop, based on his analysis of over 600 articles published in popu-
lar magazines such as U.S. News and Iib'dd Report, The Nation, and Pyiodik Today, has demon-
strated the prevalence of racial stereotypes in American media coverage of prisoners and pun-
ishment. JOHN M. SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON: DISCOURSE, PRISONERS, AND PUNISHMENT
(1996). He found that, compared to white prisoners, black prisoners are more often depicted
as "irrational, incorrigible, predatory, and dangerous criminals with %warped personalities." Id.
at 116. See generallyJACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME MORALAND SE.NSU'ALATTRcTIONs IN
DOING EVIL (1988) (describing the image of the dangerous black male as reproduced in street-
level interactions).
3See. eg.,JULAAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTrAJ. STAIANS, PUBLIC OPINION. CRI.ME, AND CR'I.tINAL
JusTIcE 113-14 (1997) (discussing public opinion surveys and other empirical studies that have
found widespread attribution of criminality to racial minorities).
See, eg., Racial Overtones Evident in Americans 'Attitudes About Crie, GALLUP POLL MOsT1HLY;
Dec. 1993, at 37, 38 (showing that 37% of those surveyed perceive blacks as "more tikelYW than
other groups to commit crimes, in contrast to 30% for Hispanics. 15% for Asian Americans. and
6% for whites).
See Michael Sunnafrank & Norman E. Fontes, General and Cnr.e Rdlated Raaal Stereotpes
and Influence on juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELLJ. Soc. REL 1, 10 (1983) (finding strong evidence
in a sample of college students of crime-related racial stereotyping, such as perceiving blacks as
more likely than whites to commit assault, mugging, and assault of a police officer and perceiv-
ing whites as more likely to commit embezzlement, child molestation. counterfeiting. fraud,
and rape).
See Racial Overtones Evident, supra note 34, at 39 (finding, for example, that 55% of whites
agree that a taxi driver should be permitted to deny service to an African-American customer
and 42% agree that store owners should be permitted to deny African-Anericans entry at
night).
For an inventory of such hoaxes, see KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME:
RAcIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLAcK PROTEcTIONISM. POucE HARASS.MENT, AND OTHER
MACROAGGRESSIONS 69-93 (1998).
39 SeeS.F. Cohn et al., Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminal Racial Conscnsus or Raaal Conflict?,
38 Soc. PROBS. 287, 294 (1991) (concluding from data collected in the 1987 General Social
Survey that whites' racial prejudice is related to their punitive attitudes toward criminals).
Death penalty support, as reflected in public opinion polls, is far stronger among wvhites
than blacks. A 1999 Harris poll shows 77% of whites and 39% of blacks support the death pen-
alty. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI..JL'STICE
STATISTICS 133 tbl.2.60 (2000), available at hup://ww-w.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/
pdf/t260.pdf A 2000 Gallup poll found that 70% of whites and 43% of blacks favor the death
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Unconsciously perhaps, whites as jurors carry into the jury box and
the jury room this cultural baggage of the dangerous black male
predator and the need for punitiveness. Prosecutors seek to take ad-
vantage of this cultural paraphernalia at the sentencing stage of
death penalty trials by making arguments that embody negative racial
imagery and stereotypes. 0
Not surprisingly, the perspectives of blacks on crime and the
criminal justice system diverge widely from those of whites. Blacks
are more likely to believe that decisions to bring criminal charges, to
convict on such charges, and to impose capital punishment are
tainted with racial bias. Whites, on the other hand, are more likely to
see the criminal justice system as excessively lenient and rigged in fa-
vor of defendants' rights.4' Blacks have less confidence than whites in
the courts42 and are far less approving of the police. 3 Underlying
blacks' mistrust of the police is their shared experience of discrimina-
tion in formal and informal law enforcement settings.44 Furthermore,
though discrimination frequently occurs at the hands of police and
penalty. Id. at 136 tbl.2.63. white approval of capital punishment has been linked to racial
stereotyping. Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and Support for the Death Penalty
by Whites, 31 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 202, 206 (1994) (providing evidence based on the 1990
General Social Survey that white support for capital punishment is associated with prejudice
against blacks). Enthusiasm for the death penalty is especially pronounced among white males
who have experienced "vicarious victimization" (i.e., knowing someone who was a homicide
victim within the past 12 months). MarjariJ. Borg, Vicarious Homicide Victimization and Support
for Capital Punishment: A Test of Black's Theoy of Law, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 537, 562-63 (1998) (show-
ing a greater support for the death penalty among white vicarious victims in general and white
male vicarious victims in particular).40
See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 19, 27-30 (1993) (examining the rhetorical strategies used by prosecutors in the
capital trial of an African-American male to invoke negative racial stereotypes).
4' See SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 61 (1999) ("Since many
in the black community believe that the courts are stacked against minority defendants, it is
probable that blacks would not be as likely as whites to be in favor of a court system tougher on
defendants."); see also John Hagan & C. Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Jnjts-
tice in America, 88 AM.J. SOC. 329 (1982).
42 See, e.g., BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAl,
JUSTICE STATISTICS 124 (1996); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, How TIlE PUBLIC VIEwS
THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 22 (1999), available at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/
PTC/results/results.pdf.
43 See W.S. Wilson Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public Attitudes To-
ward the Police, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME ANDJUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 31,
32-33 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (citing a 1993 USA To-
day/CNN/Gallup poll showing that 74% of whites, but only 48% of blacks, rated their attitude
toward the police as good); J.R. Lasley, The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes
Toward Police; 3 POLICING & SoC'y 245 (1994) (finding that African-Americans' perception of
police fairness after the beating of Rodney King decreased much more than did that of other
racial groups); P.A.J. Waddington & Quentin Braddock, "Guardians" or "Bullies?" Perceptions of
the Police Amongst Adolescent Black, White and Asian Boys; 2 POLICING & SOC'Y 31 (1991).
44 See Coke, supra note 13, at 354 n.149 ("[T]he single most dominant factor from today's
urban black experience that sets him apart from his white counterpart is contact with the po-
lice... [which is] the chief complaint of all black communities, and resonant with overtones of
brutality. This chief component of black experience, the white American, whether racist or not,
does not and cannot share.").
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security guards, it also occurs when blacks come into contact with
storekeepers, landlords, and cab drivers. As Tanya Coke has ob-
served, "rare is the African-American who cannot relate a tale of hav-
ing been stopped by police in an affluent neighborhood or followed
closely at the heels around a clothing store. As one black law profes-




The divergent experiences and perspectives of black and white
Americans have implications for their service as jurors. Whites are
apt to make pro-prosecution interpretations of evidence, especially
when defendants are black and particularly on highly determinative
issues such as e ewitness identification,4 probable cause," and resis-
tance to arrest. Blacks may be more critical in their interpretation
of factual questions presented at trial,* particularly when police tes-
timony is involved. And in capital cases, blacks may be more sympa-
thetic than white jurors to mitigating evidence presented by a black
defendant with whom they may be better able to identify and empa-
thize, and whose background and experiences they may feel they un-
derstand better than do their white counterparts."'
Indeed, studies of mock jurors in simulated cases show patterns of
Coke, supra note 13, at 354-55 (citing Ellen Goodman, Simpson Case Duwid Us by Race,
BOSTON GLOBE,July 10, 1994, at 73 (quoting Professor Charles Ogletree)).
See, ag., Sheri LynnJohnson, Cross-Radal Idintifiration Errors in Cnrininal Casm 69 CORNEL
L. REv. 934, 939-40 (1984) (observing that elderly white subjects in a 1979 study erred in identi-
fing people of color at tmice the mean recognition rate than when identif)ing whites).
4, See, eg., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Pracical Implications of Psycha&,al Reswarch on
Juror and Jury Dedsionmadng 16 PERSONALM'& Soc. PSICHOL BU:LL 90, 97 (1990) (noting re-
search that shows wealthier jurors inferred that a defendant who carried a knife had culpable
intent, while jurors from poorer neighborhoods were more willing to infer the defendant car-
ried the knife for protection).
48 This -%as a central issue in the Rodney King beating trial. White jurors interviewed after
the verdict explained that they believed the beating wasjustified because the officers reasonably
perceived King's movements as menacing. See e g., Juror Defewds Verdicts, Says King Was "In Con-
tro/, ST. Louts POST-DISPATcH, May 1. 1992, at 5C (quoting one juror who defended the ac-
tions of the arresting officers).
4 See, e.g.,JoYcEE. WVILLIA.MS & KAREN A. HOLMES. TlE SECOND ASSAULT: RA.FE AND PL'BUC
ATrTruDES 167 (1981) (noting that mockjury studies have resealed that both blacks and whites,
but particularly blacks, who have experienced discrimination are less willing to convict defen-
dants accused of rape).
A survey of 800 former jurors found that 42 of whites, but only 25% of blacks, believed
that, given conflicting testimony between a law enforcement officer and a defendant, the police
officer should be believed. See Coke, supra note 13. at 355 (citing Racal Dnzde Affects Blae,
White Panelists, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S8, S8-S9). Coke observes: "In criminal cases, of
course, it is often [the] shadowy gap between trust and skepticism of police testimony where
reasonable doubt grows best." I& at 356-57.
51 See Martin L Hoffman, Interaction of Affecd and CGoVilion in Er patk, in E.IOTIOss.,
COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 103, 114 (Carroll E. Izard et al. eds.. 1984) (arguing that 'empathy
may be unlikely when the observer and the model are ... from different cultures7); id. at 124
(observing that empathy "may apply only when the other's plight is (perceived as] beyond his
or her control"). See generally SOCIAL IDErrm" AND lNTERGROUP RELTIONS (Henri Tajfel ed.,
1982) (discussing ingroup favoritism).
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race-linked guilt and punishment decision making." The research
findings are far from consistent, but they appear to support the fol-
lowing generalizations. First, white mock jurors are more likely to
judge black defendants than white defendants as guilty,' 3 and to im-
pose more severe punishment on black than on white defendants.'
Second, white jurors are more likely to convict when the victim is
white, and black jurors are more likely to convict when the victim is
black, regardless of the defendant's race.55 Third, race-linked dispari-
52 SeeJohnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at 1625-43 (reviewing this research from a legal
perspective). For more recent reviews and commentaries on this research literature, again
from a legal perspective, see King, supra note 17, at 75-76, and Coke, supra note 13, at 351.
Most of this research on simulated or "mock" juries deals with the decision about guilt rather
than about punishment and is not specific to the capital jury's life or death sentencing decision.5s See, e.g., Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Ji-
rors'Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOL 47, 49 (1982) (finding white mock jurors more likely to find a
black defendant than a white defendant guilty); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL 1367 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom] (showing
that white mockjurors more often convict black than white defendants when race of the defen-
dant is known but not made salient in the experiment and that such differences of treatment
are diminished and not statistically significant when the experimental manipulation makes race
of defendant salient); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, 14teJurors' Bias: An Investi-
gation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, PSYcFHOL PUB. POLy' & L.
(forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, White Jurors'Bias] (same).See, e.g., Brandon Applegate et al., Victim-Offender Race and Support for Capital Punishment: A
Factorial Design Approach, 18 Am.J. CRIM.JuST. 95, 105-07 (1993) (showing that defendant race
was most influential in mid-range cases (i.e., where the decision could go either way)); Hubert
S. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors'Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant,
and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 261 (1979) (finding that jurors in rape trials gen-
erally treated a black defendant more harshly than a white defendant); Mona Lynch & Craig
Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death
Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349 (2000) (finding white mock jurors more likely to im-
pose the death penalty on a black defendant than on a white defendant); cf Dolores A. Perez et
al., Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLED SOc. PSYCIOL.
1249 (1993) (findings that white juries are more lenient in sentencing toward white defendants
than toward Hispanic ones); id. at 1256 (finding that Hispanic mock jurors were no more likely
to convict a white defendant than a Hispanic defendant). Studies have also found that in cases
where both the victim and the defendant are black, black jurors are more predisposed than
whites to convict. See, e.g., Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What
Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64JUDICATURE 22, 27 (1980-81). Intolerance among mi-
nority group members of violence by minority perpetrators may be due to their greater victimi-
zation by perpetrators from their own minority group. RobertJ. Sampson & DawnJeglum Bar-
tusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial
Differences, 32 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 777, 777 (1998) ("Contrary to received wisdom, we find that
African Americans and Latinos are less tolerant of deviance-including violence-than
whites."). Adelbert H. Jenkin notes that a black individual's evolution of identity in the black
community may include identification with whites and "the tendency to see Blacks in the same
stereotyped way that racist Whites do." Adelbert H. Jenkin, TURNING CORNERS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 177-81 (1994). In this connection, Justice Marshall ob-
served that "members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by
attempting to distance themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's
negative attitudes towards the minority." Castaneda v. Parteda, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Mar-
shall,J., concurring).
5 See e.g., Marina Miller &Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function ofJuror-Victim Ra-
cial Similarity, 105J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 159, 160 (1978). In this study, Miller and Hewitt presented
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ties in sentencing are most pronounced when the defendant is black
and the victim is white; in such cases the defendant is doubly disad-
vantaged.i5
Among mock jury studies that focused specifically on capital sen-
tencing, Mona Lynch and Craig Haney have found that white mock
jurors were more likely to impose the death penalty on a black de-
fendant than on a white defendant 57 They showed that this tendency
is fostered by white jurors' failing to give effect to mitigating circum-
stances when the defendant is black, and that the tendency increases
in black-defendant cases as jurors' level of comprehension of the ju-
dicial instructions decreases. 8 The authors note that jurors men-
tioned "stereotype-consistent" reasons for their sentencing verdicts
(i.e., negative qualities of the black defendants) and appeared less
able or willing to empathize with black defendants (as manifested by
the tendency to write significantly less overall in explaining their sen-
tencing decision and significantly less about the black defendant spe-
cifically) .9 Related research has demonstrated that white mock jurors
interpret aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently as a
function of the defendant-victim racial character of the case. An-
other experimental study of decision making by mock capital jurors
showed that defendant race was most influential in mid-range cases
(i.e., where the decision could go either way). In these mid-range
cases, black defendants were more likely to be given death sentences
black and white mockjurors with a rape case involving a black defendant. Some subjects were
told the victim was white and others that she was black. For both black and white subjects, there
was a greater tendency to vote for a conviction when the victim was racially similar to the mock
juror. Id. White mock jurors reported that they would have voted to convict the black defen-
dant of raping the black victim only 32% of the time, while black mock jurors would have con-
victed that defendant 80% percent of the time. Id.
56 A meta-analysis of experimental studies on racial bias in criminal sentencing found that
both the race of the defendant and that of the victim influenced white mock jurors' sentencing
decisions across a range of cases, resulting in a pauern that most negatively affects black defen-
dants whose victims are white. Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney. The hirflue of Race on Senten-
ing; A Meta-AnalyticRevieu of Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. So. & L 179 (1992).
Lynch & Haney, supra note 54, at 349.
Id. at 352.
r Id. at 341.
60 See, eg., Graig Haney, CommonsenseJustice and Capital Punishinrt: Prov.ernatrrzng the Will of
the Peope, 3 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L 303, 331 (1997) (describing the results of a simulation
study of race and death sentencing). Haney writes:
we found that our participants (all of whom were non-Black college students) were sig-
nificantly less willing or able to verbalize the reasons for the verdict choices in the condi-
tion in which both the defendant and the ictim were Black. In addition, they made sig-
nificantly more frequent and more positive references to the defendant and more
references to mitigating circumstances in the conditions in which the defendant was
White as opposed to those in which he was Black. They were also more likely to find the
defendant's drug usage to be mitigating and to single out the lack of a past criminal rec-
ord in reaching a life rather than death verdict in the case of a W'hite, but not a Black de-
fendanL This suggests the racially discriminatory pattern of death sentencing may be a
function of jurors' inability to empathize with or enter the subjective world of victims
and defendants who are racially different from them.
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than were white defendants.6' Generally, the studies of mock jury
capital sentencing have shown that white mock jurors have the
strongest tendency to impose death as punishment in cases where the
defendant is black and the victim is white.
Other mock jury studies report only qualified race-linked findings.
Racial disparities appear to be more pronounced when the crime is
serious, such as murder or rape, and when guilt or acquittal is a close
call . Jury deliberations appear to have different effects on black and
white mock jurors. 3 Experimental studies have also found that white
mock jurors demonstrate racial prejudice only in the face of incrimi-
nating, inadmissible evidence against a black defendantC" or primarily
in the artificial setting of the psychology laboratory where judicial in-
structions65 and deliberation are typically omitted. Still other re-
search reveals no evidence of white prejudice at all, 7 and this body of
research has been faulted for inattention to black mock jurors.
Critics have stressed the limitations of mock jury studies in gener-
alizing about the influence of race on the decision making of real ju-
rors. Such experiments, they argue, typically lack realism or similarity
to real-life situations. These studies usually use written descriptions
of the accused instead of permitting the jury to see the defendant as
they would in a trial (e.g., trial transcripts vs. re-enactments).
6 9
61 See Applegate et al., supra note 54.
62 Professor Bodenhausen and his colleagues have shown that ethnic stereotypes exert a
relatively stronger influence on the process when information processing demands are high
and the decision-making task is complex. See Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Ef-
fects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 48J. PERSONALuTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 267 (1985). Archival studies show a similar pattern, in which racial disparities are
particularly pronounced for the least-aggravated to mid-range cases. See, e.g., Jonathon R.
Sorenson & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the Issue of Racial Dis-
parity, 13 BEHAV. SCi. & LAv 61 (1995) ("[1]n less serious cases, extra-legal factors such as race
of offender and victim are likely, albeit perhaps unconsciously, to enter into consideration.").
63 SeeJ.L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and that ofJurors in Determining
Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 109 (1979) (finding a "pronounced tendency" for mock
jurors to shift their votes toward acquittal as a result of group discussion, but noting one excep-
tion: white jurors who found the black defendant guilty on their first ballot tended to hold to
this decision and not be influenced by group discussion).
64 See, e.g., J.D. Johnson et al., Justice is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure
to Inadmissible Evidence 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995).
61 See, e.g.,Jeffrey E. Pfeifer &James R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern
Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713 (1991).
66 See, e.g., N.L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and MockJurorJudgments, 19 LAwv & HUM.
BEHAV. 545 (1995).
67 In their meta-analysis of twenty-nine studies, Mazzella and Feingold concluded that black
defendants were no more likely than white defendants to be found guilty. R. Mazzella & A.
Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants
and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315
(1994).
68 See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 53 ("[T]he few experi-
ments that do include both white and black participants suffer from methodological and con-
textual difficulties.").
19 In their review of mockjury studies, Sweeney and Haney established thatjurors who could
see rather than merely read about the race of the accused were particularly likely to succumb to
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Moreover, mock jury studies typically use students asjurors instead of
individuals who more accurately reflect the character and composi-
tion of realjuries
Yet these are criticisms that suggest jury simulation studies may ac-
tually tend to underestimate the extent of racial bias in correspond-
ing real-life settings. Since students are typically more lenient and
more enlightened with regard to racial stereotyping than members of
the community at large, their use as mock jurors should tend to un-
derrepresent the degree to which race influences actual jurors'
judgments. And, since simulations ith more realistic enactments of
trials show greater evidence of racial bias, shortcomings in verisimili-
tude should also tend to underestimate the influence of race in mock
jury studies.
Moreover, recent research by Sommers and Ellsworth has demon-
strated a tendency among white mock jurors to curb adverse treat-
ment of black defendants when race is a salient or prominent feature
of the experimental manipulation. Differential treatment of black
and white defendants is evident, however, when the race of defen-
dant and victim is known to mock jurors but is not prominent in the
experiment.7' If the "politically correct" suppression of racially biased
judgments is unknowingly induced in many experimental situations,
as this research suggests, then it, too, will cause the balance of evi-
dence from mock jury studies to underestimate the influence of race
in the real-world ofjuror decision making. We do not know for how
long or to what extent this experimentally induced tendency to su-
press racial differences has been present in mock jury studies,' and
more importantly, we do not know the extent to which it is an adapta-
tion that jurors make in experiments but do not make in the real
world ofjury decision making."
the influence of race in their assessments of the defendant's guilt. Sweenev & Hani, supra
note 56, at 191.
10 See Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 65, at 1714, 1722.
71 See Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 53; Sommers & Elisorth, It7ite
Jurors'Bias, supra note 53.
2 See Sweeney & Haney, supra note 56, at 190-91 (finding no evidence that discrimination in
mock jury studies has lessened over time).
1 In its capitaIjurisprudence, the Supreme Court has resolved such anbiguities by discount-
ing the findings of mockjury studies and affirming its faith in the trustworthiness of real jurors.
In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the Court asserted that the behavior of mock jurors
is no substitute for knowing how real jurors will behave when deciding actual case The Court
complained that the trouble with the empirical studies cited by te parties was that the study
participants "were not actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to tihe facts of an actual
case involving the fate of an actual capital defendant. [Tie Court has] serious doubts about tie
value of these [mock jury] studies in predicting tie behavior of actual jurors." Id. at 171. By
contrast, in its jurisprudence on jury size in criminal cases, the Court in Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223 (1978), relied on mock jury studies in declaring a five-person criminal juny unconstitu-
tional. Id at 235-39. The Court stated on the basis of the jury studies that smaller juries are less
likely to engage in effective group deliberation or to produce accurate results. hL at 232-34.
For a critical view of the Court's stand on mock jury research in LoPddart. see Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, To Tell Mhat e Know or Wait for Godot?, 15 L,, & Hm't. BmLW. 77, 78-79 (19911;
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How well do these patterns of racial bias in mock jury experiments
hold for real jurors on real juries in real cases? Do they hold for the
jurors who actually make the life or death sentencing decisions in
capital cases? There is relatively little hard evidence about the expe-
rience or influence of black or white jurors on real, typically white-
dominated juries. There are some accounts in the academic litera-
ture based on interviews with jurors" and survey data from trial
judges;' and there are, of course, journalistic reports." Of these,
most conspicuous are news stories about jurors in high-profile trials
such as the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King cases, where the racial
makeup of the jury is thought to have been critical.77
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on Capital
Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACI IES
177 (Kenneth C. Haas &James A. Inciardi eds., 1988).
74 See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 21-22 (1965). Broeder
discusses interviews with jurors in four criminal trials that involved black defendants. The inte r-
views reveal that racial prejudice influenced the jury deliberations in all four cases, including
the one case in which the defendant was acquitted. Moreover, several jurors explicitly argued
during deliberations that the defendant should be convicted simply because he was black. Id. at
23. Many otherjurors expressed unsolicited derogatory views of blacks to the interviewer. Id. at
24. Broeder also reports that a black juror serving on a case with a black defendant became
"the jury's expert on Negro culture."
She provided the jury with information concerning the incidence of crime and juvenile
delinquency among Negroes, Negro living conditions, the Negroes' attitude toward the
law, and the probable fear that a young Negro like the defendant would entertain over
the prospect of an arrest by white policemen (an important point since the defendant
had fled when faced with apprehension).
Id. at 30.
75 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). This classic study is
based on data collected from a national sample ofjudges who reported on 1136 of their jury
trials. The presiding judge was asked to explain the jury's behavior when he or she disagreed
with the jury's verdict. In certain cases in which the jury voted to convict when the judge would
have acquitted, the judge saw substantial evidentiary problems and explained the jury's verdict
as prompted by the jurors' antagonism toward the defendant's involvement in interracial sex.
Id. at 398. At least three of these cases involved a black defendant. Id. Judges also observed
that juries tended to give undue leniency in black defendant/black victim assault cases. Id. at
340-41. Although judges thought that jurors often acquitted guilty defendants due to their
sympathy for the defendant, black defendants were much less likely than white defendants to be
the recipients of such leniency because they were viewed as extremely unsympathetic. Id. at
343-44.
76 See, e.g, Herbert, supra note 1 (describing one black juror's account of her experiences on
a capital jury that sentenced a black defendant to death despite her voting for life imprison-
ment).
77 O.J. Simpson's jury was composed of nine black jurors, two white jurors, and one Hispanic
juror. Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial
Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191, 214 n.150 (1996) (Simpson's jury had nine blacks and one white);
Paul Butler, Racially Based Juy Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice Systen 105 YALE LJ.
677, 721 n.225 (1995) (Simpson's jury had two whites and one Hispanic). Mistrust of the po-
lice, in particular of officer Mark Fuhrman, apparently made its way into the jury room. Id.
Black motorist Rodney King's jury, which was composed often white jurors, one Hispanicjuror,
one Asian juror, and no black jurors, acquitted four white police officers charged with using
excessive force to restrain him. Warshawsky, supra, at 214 n.150 (King's jury had ten white ju-
rors and no blacks). A year later, a federal jury with two black members convicted two of the
four officers of intentionally violating Rodney King's constitutional rights. See Seth Mydans,
Verdict in Los Angeles; 2 of 4 Officers Found Guilty in Los Angeles Beating, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1993,
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The foremost systematic research on the role of race in the deci-
sion making of real jurors in noncapital cases wras carried out by Gary
LaFree and colleagues on Indianapolis rape trials." The), conducted
courtroom observation and post-trial interviews with some 360 actual
jurors (306 whites and 54 blacks) from 38 sexual assault trials." The
study revealed that the largely middle-class white jurors harbored
stereotypes about female black victims. The jurors iewed such com-
plainants as likely to have consented to sex or to be sexually experi-
enced and therefore less likely to have suffered harm by the assault.""
White jurors were also less willing than their black counterparts to be-
lieve the testimony of black complainants."'
Furthermore, Christy Visher's statistical analysis of the Indianapo-
lis juror interview data revealed that the confidence of both black and
white jurors about the guilt of a defendant decreased as the number
of blacks on the jury increased, regardless of the strength of the ei-
dence? Visher also showed that individual black jurors were less
likely than their white counterparts to find the defendant guilty, re-
gardless of the defendant's race. The stud) found further that black
males were least, and white males most, likely to find the defendant
guilty, with the females of both races falling in between. Visher con-
cluded, " [t]hus the impact of the jury's racial composition on jurors'
final judgments may be related to either the proportion of black ju-
rors on the jury or possibly the influence of an) black males."" She
noted that black jurors "may be predisposed to support the defense
and sympathize with the defendant .... These attitudes appear to in-
fluence other jurors as the proportion of black jurors on the jury in-
§ 1, at 1.
'8 GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CR.MINALJUSTICE TiiE SOCud. Co. Tsmicno OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 154-55, 200-01 (1989).
'9 Christy Ann VisherJurors' Decisions in Criminal Trials: Individual and Group Influences
(1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University). Interviews were conducted % ith
331 differentjurors. Twenty-ninejurors served on two of the thirty-eight sample trials and were
interviewed twice, once about each case. Hence, the sample of 360 juror interviews was com-
prised of 302jurors who served on one trial and twenty-nine who served on two trials.
so Id. at 220. For eample, one juror argued for acquittal in a case involving the rape of a
young African-American girl, on the grounds that a girl her age from -that kind of neighbor-
hood probably wasn't a virgin anyway."
Id. One white juror told researchers: "Negroes hale a w-w of not telling the truth.
Th e've a knack for coloring the story. So you know you can't believe ever hing they say.'
I& at 180 thl.5.5 (finding that the confidence ofjurors in the guilt verdict %as highest in
juries with eleven or twelve whites, lower in juries with nine or ten whites, and lower still when
onlseven or eight of thejurors were white).
Id. at 161. Visher observed: 'The difference in jurors' judgments on juries %ith more or
fewer blacks probably reflects racial differences in attitudes about crime, sexual-assault, and the
criminaljustice system. Blackjurors are less likely to believe the victim (r - -. 17). view rape as
less serious (r = -.19), and believe that our criminal justice system is often too harsh on the de-
fendant(r=-.14)." Id.
Id. at 162 ("Unfortunately, these data do not allow a condusive interpretation of the racial
composition effect.").
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creases." 5 Notably, the relatively small number of black jurors in the
Indianapolis sample, and the fact that only two of the 38 trials in-
816volved interracial rapes, meant that the investigators were not able
to examine the influence of jury racial composition with respect to
the especially volatile black-defendant/white-victim cases.
For capital sentencing, the influence ofjurors' race has been stud-
ied by David Baldus and his colleagues with systematic data on Phila-
delphia capital juries. They examined some 252 defendants and 41
co-defendants in Philadelphia capital trials (62 B/W cases, 266 B/B
cases, and 49 W/W cases) over the period 1984-1994. Baldus found,
as in Indianapolis rape cases, that jury racial composition influences
sentencing outcomes; in particular, death sentences are less likely
when black jurors are more numerous. He found further that the
influence of jury racial composition was greater for black than for
white defendants: "Preliminary findings from our analysis of jury ra-
cial composition in Philadelphia capital cases suggest that black de-
fendants are treated less punitively vis-a-vis nonblack defendants as
the proportion of blacks on the juries increases."" The further work
of Baldus and associates, reported in this Issue," shows that the ten-
dency for black defendants to be treated more harshly than white
ones as the number of whites on the fry increases holds especially
for black-defendant/white-victim cases. This research also indicates
that the tendency for black defendants to be treated more harshly is
curbed, especially when young black males and middle-aged black
females are better represented on the jury."9'
Both mock and real jury studies reveal race-linked guilt and pun-
ishment decision making, and there is reason to believe that mock
jury studies tend to understate the extent of such racial differences."
The studies of real juries have dealt mostly with the effects of jury ra-
cial composition on jury-level decisions. Both the Indianapolis and
SId. Visher commented:
Black jurors on juries with nine or more white jurors may feel intimidated by being in a
racial minority and be convinced by the white jurors' arguments. Having few other
blacks on the jury would offer black jurors little support for their opinions. But injuries
where the racial composition is more balanced with four or five black jurors, the atti-
tudes of black jurors may [sic] sufficient strength to influence other members of thejury,
at least to the extent that they question of [sic] the majority's conclusions. Hence, all ju-
rors express considerably more uncertainty about the defendant's guilt and are more
likely to believe that the defendant is innocent.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 110 n.2 (noting that two of the thirty-eight trials were black defendant/white victim
cases).
87 David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Use of Peremptory Chad-
lenges].
See Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty, supra note 26, at 1721 n. 159.
89 Baldus et al., Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 87.
90 Id at tbl.8.
91 Id. atfig.10.
See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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Philadelphia studies of actual cases found that tie likelihood of a fa-
vorable verdict for the defendant was influenced by the number of
blacks and whites on the jury. The Indianapolis study collected data
on individual jurors but had too few interracial rape trials and too few
black jurors to explore differences in decision making between black
and white jurors within cases of differing defendant-victim racial
combinations. The Philadelphia study, xith very limited data on in-
dividual jurors but sizable samples of B/W, B/B, and W/W trials, wvas
able to establish that the influence of jury racial composition was
most pronounced in black-defendant/white-victim capital cases-as
the Turner Court might have supposed.
In this Article we assess the role of both juror race and jury racial
composition in capital sentencing, and we do so separately for cases
that represent the principal defendant-victim racial combinations:
black defendant/white victim killings (B/W cases), white defen-
dant/white victim killings (W/W cases), and black defendant/black
victim killings (B/B cases). For this purpose, we draw upon the data
of the Capital Jury Project (cJP) to examine the interview responses
of a large sample of individual jurors, large enough to permit reliable
comparisons of black and white jurors who have served on B/W,
W/W, and B/B cases. The data are not confined to distinctively ur-
ban settings such as Indianapolis and Philadelphia but drawn to rep-
resent capital cases in fourteen states across the country.
C. The CapitalJuiy Project
Interviewers in the Capital Jury Project, a national stud) of capital
jurors' decision making, have conducted interviews with 1,155 capital
jurors from 340 trials in fourteen states, including 113 black capital
jurors (9.8% of the entire sample) from eighty-three of these cases.
The interviews are designed to chronicle the jurors' experiences and
decision making over the course of the trial, to identify' points at
which various influences may come into play, and to reveal the w-ays
in which jurors reach their final sentencing decisions. Jurors are
asked both structured questions with designated response options
and open-ended questions seeking detailed narrative accounts of
their experiences as capital jurors.
93 The database employed here consists of all inteniews conducted to date b% CJP mastiga-
tors. It includes some 239 interviews from eight)ythree capital trials not aailable or not used in
earlier analyses.
Capital jurors were selected for interviews in a three-stage sampling procedure. First.
states were chosen to reflect the principal -ariations in guided discretion capital statut-s. Sec-
ond, within each state, twenty to thirty full capital trials conducted since 198 were selected to
represent both life and death sentencing outcomes. Third, for each trial. a target sample of
four jurors ias systematically selected for three-to-four-hour personal intervievs. For further
details of the sampling design and data collection procedures, see WillianJ. Bowiers. The Capital
Jugy Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Eady Findings, 70 IND. U.J. 1043. 1080 nn.200-03
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To explore the role ofjurors' race in capital sentencing, in Part II
we examine statistical indications of how the racial composition of
the jury and the race of the individual juror might affect the jury's
decision-making process. We analyze the role ofjurors' race in three
distinct types of cases: B/W, W/W, and B/B cases. Our analysis con-
siders (a) how the racial composition of the jury affects the jury's
capital sentencing decision; (b) how the race of an individual juror
influences the stands that he or she takes on the defendant's pun-
ishment over the course of the trial; (c) how ajuror's race affects the
considerations that he or she deems important in his or her punish-
ment decision; and (d) how black and white jurors view the decision-
making process and their roles in it. Our statistical analysis concludes
with a closer look at the interracial B/W cases to see (e) how the
combination of jurors' race, jurors' gender, and the racial composi-
tion of the jury influence the thinking and experience of capital ju-
rors.
In Part III we turn to jurors' narrative accounts of the decision-
making process for further insights about the influence of race. We
present jurors' reports, in their own words, of how the jury reached
its sentencing decision and of the role race played in that determina-
tion. In Part IV we summarize our principal findings and consider
the implications of this research for capital jurisprudence.
II. STATISTICAL PATTERNS
The current CJP sample of 340 capital cases includes 165 (48.5%)
white-defendant/white-victim (W/W) cases; 74 (21.8%) black-
defendant/ white-victim (B/W) cases; and 60 (17.6%) black-
defendant/black-victim (B/B) cases. 95 The remaining 41 (12.1%)
cases include killings with white defendants and black victims, killings
with Hispanic defendants or victims, or killings in which the race or
ethnicity of the defendant and victim could not be determined. 6
The defendant-victim racial combination of the crime is associ-
ated with the racial composition of the jury.97 Blacks are more likely
(1995). The juror interviews obtained data on a core set of some 700 variables through struc-
tured questions used in all states. See id at 1082 n.206 (further information on the interview
questions and methods used).
95 The race of defendants and victims was determined from jurors' responses to a question
asking them to provide information on the defendants and victims. Such information was pro-
vided for up to four defendants and up to six victims. See infra App. A (further details on the
classification of the sample cases in terms of defendant and victim race).
For this determination we made a detailed examination of the responses of all jurors from
the case in question. See infra Appendix A.
97 The racial composition of the jury in a given case was determined by first asking all of the
jurors interviewed from that case to indicate, to the best of their memory, how many of the
twelve jurors were men and how many women. The interviewed jurors were then asked to iden-
tify, within each gender, how many of the jurors were white, black, Hispanic, or other (includ-
ing jurors identified as Asians, Native Americans, etc.). Where the recollections or estimates of
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to be jurors when the defendant is black and especially when both
the defendant and the victim are black." Two-thirds of the W/W
cases (66.9%) had at least one black juror, as did four-fifths of the
B/W cases (80.6%) and almost nine-tenths of the B/B cases (88.3%).
The average (median) number of black jurors by type of case w%-as one
in W/W cases, two in B/W r cases, and three in B/B cases.' Although
blacks were represented on most capital juries, they were almost al-
ways in the minority. In only five cases were the majority of jurors
black, and all five were black-defendant cases. In another fifteen
cases, the number of black and whitejurors was evenly divided.
A. Jury Composition and the Sentencing Decision
Does a jury's racial composition influence its decision-making
process? Are all-white juries less sympathetic to black defendants
than racially-mixedjuries? Is this true across the board, or only when
the victim is white? How do the number of black or white jurors and
the number of male or female jurors of each race influence the sen-
tencing outcome? Our data provide answers.
Table 1 shows the percentage of capital trials ending ith a death
sentence by the number of white males, white females, black males,
and black females on the jury.'°0 These percentages are shown sepa-
the jurors from a given case did not agree, the mean of their estimates uas used, unless its stan-
dard deviation exceeded 1.00. In such a case, the responses of all jurors from the case were ex-
amined for consistency, and typically the median of the estimates in question %as adopted. The
median was rounded up when it fell midway between two integers.
"S The association between blacks as defendants and/or victims and the number of blacks
on the jury surely reflects the location of these cases in places where blacks are more numerous.
99 The full distribution of W/W, B/1, and B/B cases by number of black jurors appears be-
low.
No. of W/W Cases B/W Cases B/B Cases
BlackJurors
# % # %C #
Zero 53 33.1 14 19.4 7 11.7
One 40 25.0 20 27.7 9 15.0
Two 35 21.9 15 20.8 8 13.3
Three 16 9.7 3 4.1 19 31.7
Four 8 5.0 6 8.3 2 3.3
Five 6 3.8 7 9.7 4 6.7
Six+ 2 1.3 7 9.7 11 18.3
(No. of (160) (72) (60)
cases)
Missing Data (5) (2) (0)
100 Because whites typically oumumbered blacks on these juries, the "No. of Jurors" break-
down is different for the two races in Table 1. For white males and females, the breakdown is 0-
3, 4, 5, and 6+. For black males and females, the breakdown is 0. 1, 2, and 3+. Within these
breakdowns, the median number of jurors for each race and gender fell into one of ie two
intermediate ("No. of Jurors") categories, with one exception: in W/W cases, the median
number of black male and black female jurors %-as zero, and hence no intermediate category
was available.
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rately for W/W cases, B/W cases, and B/B cases, respectively, in Pan-
els A, B, and C of Table LY"
TABLE 1: Percent of capital trials in which jurors impose death by
number of white male, white female, black male, and
black female jurors for selected defendant/victim racial
combinations: (a) white kills white, (b) black kills white,
and (c) black kills black'02
Defendant/Victim Racial Combinations
No. of White White No. of Black Black
Jurors Males Females Jurors Males Females
A. White Kills White (W/W)
0-3 69.6 (23) 65.2 (23) 0 60.4 (91) 61.7 (81)
4 56.7 (30) 66.7 (24) 1 65.1 (43) 65.1 (43)
5 61.8 (23) 55.3 (47) 2 60.9 (23) 68.2 (22)
6+ 61.0 (77) 62.3 (69) 3+ - (2/4) 35.7 (14)
B. Black Kills White (B/W)
0-3 35.3 (17) 54.2 (24) 0 71.9 (32) 55.5 (27)
4 23.1 (13) 50.0 (10) 1 42.9 (21) 61.9 (21)
5 63.2 (19) 61.5 (13) 2 36.4 (11) 60.0 (10)
6+ 78.3 (23) 52.0 (25) 3+ - (3/8) 35.7 (14)
C. Black Kills Black (B/B)
0-3 62.5 (24) 64.3 (14) 0 66.7 (18) 64.3 (14)
4 - (0/4) 50.0 (22) 1 42.9 (21) 57.1 (14)
5 50.0 (14) - (4/6) 2 42.9 (14) 50.0 (14)
6+ 64.7 (17) 52.9 (17) 3+ - (6/7) 50.0 (18)
Jury composition had a pronounced two-fold impact on sentenc-
ing in the interracial B/W cases. We refer to these two patterns as a
"white male dominance" effect and a "black male presence" effect.
They appear in Table 1, Panel B, Columns 1 and 3. Both patterns
101 A word of caution is in order about interpreting differences across defendant/victim ra-
cial combinations. The percentages of death sentences in corresponding categories of W/W,
B/W, and B/B cases are not strictly comparable, because no effort was made in sampling to
equate cases in terms of aggravation of the crime across defendant/victim racial categories.
There is evidence, for example, that prosecutors tend to bring B/W killings to trial as capital
offenses that are less aggravated than W/W killings that they do not bring to trial as capital of-
fenses. See, e.g., BALDUS ETAL., supra note 25, at 182.
102 When the base figure for a percentage is below 10 cases, we treat it as too unreliable for
comparisons. In these instances, we show (in parentheses) the number of death sentences and
the base figure separated by a forward slash, "/".
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were highly significant by statistical standards in this sample of 74
B/W cases.03 Moreover, these patterns appear to reflect "thresholds"
where changes in the number of black and white male jurors substan-
tially altered the likelihood of a death sentence. These effects may be
summarized as follows.
1. The Dominance Of White Male Jurors was Strongly Associated
with the Imposition of a Death Sentence in B/Il Cases.
The presence of five or more white males on the jury dramatically
increased the likelihood of a death sentence in the B/W cases. There
was a forty-point difference in the likelihood of a death sentence be-
tween cases with four and those with five white male jurors (23.1% vs.
63.2%). The difference rose only slightly, to forty-one points when
the comparison was between four or fewer, and five or more, white
malejurors (30% vs. 70.7%).
2. The Presence of Black Male Jurors was Strongly Associated
with the Imposition of a Life Sentence in B/W cases.
The presence of black male jurors in these B/W cases, by contrast,
substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence. The critical
twenty-nine-point difference came between the absence and the pres-
ence of one black male juror. In the absence of black male jurors,
death sentences were imposed in 71.9% of the cases,' as compared
to 42.9% when one black male was on the jury. The difference rose
to thirty-four points when the comparison was between none and one
or more black malejurors (71.9% vs. 37.5%).
Moreover, white male dominance and black male presence ap-
peared to be independent effects in B/W cases."" In the absence of
1 The two patterns of association between jury composition and sentencing outcomes were
statistically significant well beyond the conventional p = .05 probability level. Indeed. die prob-
ability is less than one in one thousand (p = .0002) that the white male dominamce effect might
have occurred by chance, and less than one in one hundred (p = .0055) that the black male
presence effect might be due to chance. The next lowest probability level for amy of the other
ten associations in Table 1 was p = .388. The probability levels associated wvith Kendall's au b
were used to test the significance of these patterns. Se generally .Alan Agresti, The Effeet of Cate-
go? Choice on Some Ordinal asures of Association. 71 J. Amt. STAT. ASSN' 49 (1976).
Notably, all-whitejuries imposed a death sentence in 75 of B/W cases.
105 The independence of these two effects is demonstrated in the following tabulation. %hIch
shows the percentage of death sentences according to the number of %%hite mtle jurors (4-. 5.
6 or more) and the number of black male jurors (0. 1. or 2 or more). (Most of the entries in
this tabulation do not include percentages because the base figures fall below ten cases, the
point we have set for omitting percentages as too unstable for comparisons.
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white male dominance (i.e., when there were four or fewer white
male jurors), the presence of one black male juror yielded a death
sentencing rate of 30%, and the presence of two or more black male
jurors yielded a rate of 21.4%. Both rates were below the correspond-
ing levels of 42.9% and 36.8% drawn from Table 1. Likewise, in the
absence of black male jurors, the presence of six or more white males
brought the percentage of death sentences (87.5%) above the level
in Table 1 (78.3%).
In B/W cases, the death sentencing level was also lower in the
presence of three or more black female jurors (Table 1, Panel B, col-
umn 4). Yet this apparent reduction in the likelihood of a death sen-
tence is spurious. A closer examination of the data reveals that the
24.3-point difference in the likelihood of a death sentence between
cases with two or fewer and those with three or more black femalej u-
rors disappeared when the presence or absence of black males was
taken into account. In effect, juries in B/W cases with three or more
black females were less likely to impose death sentences because they
were also likely to have one or more black males.
In contrast with the B/W cases, jury composition had little dis-
cernable influence in the intraracial W/W or B/B cases. In fact, of
the fifteen percentages for W/W cases in Table 1, Panel A, all but one
fall within a fifteen-point range (between 69.6% and 55.3%): twelve
of the percentages are in the sixties, two are in the fifties, and only
the one for three or more black female jurors is substantially below
the rest. The tendency for death sentences in W/W cases to be less
common when there were three or more black female jurors, unlike
the similar pattern in B/W cases, is not a spurious product of other
components of jury composition.10 6 However, the small number of
these cases (n = 14) means that the 35.7% death outcomes is not sta-
tistically reliable as an estimate in these W/W cases.
0 7
In the B/B cases, as compared to the W/W cases, there was
Percentage of cases ending in death sentences by
number of white male and black male jurors in B/W cases.
# White Male No Black One Black Two or More
Jurors MaleJurors MaleJuror Black MaleJu-
rors
0-4 - (3/6) 30.0 (10) 21.4 (14)
5 - (5/9) - (4/6) - (2/5)
6+ 87.5 (16) - (3/4) - (1/2)
The strong inverse association (gamma = -.639) between these two variables (each trichoto-
mized as above) is of course responsible for the many cells of the table with too few cases for
percentages.
106 The lack of variation in percentage of death sentences by the number of white males, of
white females, and of black males means that these variables cannot account for the variation in
death sentencing exhibited by the number of black females.
107 The probability associated with Kendall's tau b for this pattern is a statistically insignificant
p= .388.
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slightly more variation in death sentencing by jury composition.
Again, most of the percentages (ten of thirteen) fall ithin a fifteen-
point range (from 65% to 50%). Black males are the exception here.
The presence of one or two black male jurors brought death sentenc-
ing outcomes down by twenty-four percentage points (from 66.7% to
42.9%), though including the small number of cases ith three or
more black males somewhat dampened the overall reduction. Al-
though the presence of two or more black female jurors was associ-
ated with a modest reduction in death sentencing, this reduction ap-
pears, as in B/W cases, to reflect the greater presence of black males
in such cases.0'a
In sum, these data indicate that the race and gender composition
of juries had a decisive effect on capital sentencing in B/W cases.
The presence of five or more white male jurors dramatically in-
creased the likelihood of a death sentence in B/W cases, but not in
W/W or B/B cases. Having a black male on the jury substantially re-
duced the likelihood of a death sentence in B/W cases, less so in B/B
cases, and not at all in W/W cases. By contrast, the number of black
or white female jurors was largely unrelated to sentencing outcomes.
Only in the fourteen W/W cases with three or more black female ju-
rors was death sentencing reduced. The number of white female ju-
rors was unrelated to sentencing outcomes in all three defendant-
victim categories of cases.
The fact that jury racial composition effects were concentrated in
the B/W cases may come as no surprise. Recall that the Turner
Court identified these particular cases as especially vulnerable to the
conscious or unconscious racial biases ofjurors and granted that dur-
ing jury selection, prospective jurors in B/W cases could be explicitly
questioned about their racial attitudes.'" The historical legacy of
such crimes is that they go beyond the fact of murder to the issue of
racial boundary-crossing. It is apparently the boundary-crossing
character of these crimes that releases or activates the race-linked
punitive response not evident in B/B cases or among female jurors.
Perhaps when the jury is dominated by white males, the interpersonal
dynamics of decision making is distinctive. 0
10S The overall reduction was only fourteen points, much of it dependent upon the tenuous
64.3% estimate (n = 14) for cases with no black femalejurors. As in the B/W cases, when the
presence or absence of black male jurors uas taken into account, the modest reduction in death
sentencing where there were two or more black female jurors in B/B cases proed illusory.
When there were black male jurors but no black female jurors or only one black female juror.
the percentage of cases that ended in a death sentence is 50% (n = 16). That percentage drops
to 36.4% (n = 11) when the number of black female jurors increased to two, but the percentage
rises to 60% (n = 15) with three or more black female jurors. There were too few B/ B cases
where there were no black male jurors (n = 18) for reliable comparisons of sentencing out-
comes between numbers of black female jurors.
10 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
110 Research shows that in mixed gender groups men typically talk more than woomen, inter-
rupt women, and use conversation to exercise control. The more numerous men are on ajury
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Black males, in turn, are the chief targets of the cultural narrative
that sanctions death for boundary-crossing murder. Their presence
as jurors in B/W cases is likely to bring with it a quite different per-
spective on this kind of crime and on the appropriate punishment.
Whether their presence provided a distinctive perspective and voice
against the imposition of the death penalty in such cases, or whether
it simply inhibited the rhetoric or persuasiveness of those who may be
advancing the boundary-crossing cultural narrative, black males ap-
peared to be especially effective in opposing the sentencing stands of
their white fellow jurors in these cases. Why it is that the number of
black women or white women on the jury did not appreciably affect
the likelihood of a death sentence is uncertain at this point? There is
ample evidence that women behave differently in group interaction
and group decision settings and that they are more reserved and less
confrontational than men."2 But whatever female jurors add to the
dynamics ofjury deliberations, it did not appear to influence the sen-
tencing outcomes significantly toward death or life.
As the racial composition of the jury so decisively influenced the
sentencing outcomes of capital trials in B/W cases, we might expect
to find that in these, as compared to W/W and B/B cases, black and
white jurors differ most in how they think about the crime and the
defendant, in the considerations they deem important in making
their sentencing decisions, and indeed in how soon they take a stand
on the punishment to be imposed. We turn next to the patterns of
individual jurors' punishment decision making and to the factors that
jurors take into consideration in making the punishment decision in
W/W, B/W, and B/B cases.
the more likely they may be to pursue gender-linked agendas that emphasize male role con-
cerns. For evidence of greater male activity and control in mixed gender situations, groups,
and juries, see John E. Baird, Sex Differences in Group Communication: A Review of Relevant Re-
search, 62 QJ. SPEECH 179, 181 (1976) ("Males used more words, talked more often, and, in
mixed groups, interrupted females more frequently than females interrupted them.");
DEBORAH TANNEN, YouJusT DON'T UNDERSTAND 77 (1990) (arguing that men use conversation
as a means of maintaining status in a "hierarchical social order," whereas women see conversa-
tion as a way of establishing rapport).
I For instance, some research indicates that people different in attitude and/or in other
social characteristics may be either discounted or given special credence in group decision mak-
ing. See generally Serge Moscovici, Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior, 13 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 209 (1980). Thus, a black holdout on a largely white jury who
argues that a black defendant's troubled childhood mitigates the defendant's responsibility may
be discounted by the majority for lacking objectivity, or may be credited with unique insight.
1 For research on the differences between men and women in these respects, see supra note
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B. Jurors' Race and Punishment Decision Mahing
Our focus now shifts from jury racial composition to the race of
individual jurors. The procedure adopted by the CJP for sampling
jurors within cases called for a randomly selected target sample of
four jurors from each trial jury."3  Because whites far outnumber
blacks on most capital juries, the samples of jurors drawn for CJP in-
terviews often include no black jurors even when blacks were on the
jury. The chances of not selecting a blackjuror obviously increases as
the number of blacks on the jury declines. Therefore, comparing
white and black jurors in W/W, B/W, or B/B cases would mean
comparing whites from cases with relatively few black jurors against
blacks from cases with relatively many such jurors--cases with quite
different decision making dynamics when the defendant is black and
the victim is white, as shown in Table 1.
To minimize the possibility that the differences we observe in the
responses of black and white jurors are due to differences in the cases
on which they served, we confined this anal)sis to those cases from
which both black and white jurors have been interviewed."4  This
yielded a sample of black and white jurors more nearly equal in
numbers and matched in trial experience, albeit from cases with
more than the average number of black jurors." This sample of ju-
rors from the same cases permitted us to avoid the fallacy of attribut-
ing observed differences between black and white jurors to the race
ofjuror when they may actually be due to variations in the cases from
11 See Bowers, supra note 94, at 1081 n.205. Of the 1155 capital jurors interviewed by CJP
investigators, 113 are black: fortone of these jurors served on V/' cases, thirty-six on B/W
cases, and twenty-three on B/B cases. The remaining tirteen black jurors served on cases that
did not fall into the W/W, B/W, or B/B categories. See itfa Appendix A.
114 Restricting the analysis to cases with intervieus from both black and white jurors yields the
following distributions of WV/W, B/NV, and B/B cases:
Number of
BlackJurors W/W Cases B/IV Cases B/B Cases
# % # 7 C
One 7 21.2 3 12.5 2 15.4
Two 9 27.3 5 20.8 - 0
Three 6 18.2 1 4.2 6 46.2
Four 4 12.1 6 25.0 - 0
Five 5 15.2 6 25.0 - 0
Six or more 2 6.1 3 12.5 5 38.5
Missing
(Total # of cases) (33) (24) (13)
The requirement that both black and white jurors be interviewed eliminated only a small num-
ber of cases and relatively few blackjurors: one WV/V case represented by one black juror, one
B/W case represented by two black jurors, and four B/B cases each represented by one black
juror.
115 In this subsample of cases, the median number of blacks on te jury rises from one to
three in W/W cases and from two to four in B/WV cases, but it remains at three in B/B cases
For more exacting comparisons, see the tabulations. supra notes 99 and 114.
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which the samples of black and white jurors were drawn."6 The data
for this analysis thus came from black and white jurors who served on
the same thirty-three W/W cases, twenty-four B/W cases, and thirteen
B/B cases.117
To learn about the punishment decision making of individual ju-
rors over the course of the penalty proceeding, we asked them what
they thought the defendant's punishment should be at three points
in the sentencing process, in addition to their final vote on the de-
fendant's punishment. These questions chronicled each juror's
stand on punishment (a) after the guilt decision but before the sen-
tencing stage of the trial, (b) after the judge's sentencing instructions
but before sentencing deliberations, (c) at the first jury vote on pun-
ishment, and (d) at the final punishment vote. At the first three
points, jurors could answer that they thought the punishment should
be "a death sentence" or "a life (or the alternative) sentence," or that
they were "undecided."
8
Do black and white jurors follow the same patterns of decision
making on punishment? If not, do their stands on punishment over
the course of the trial depend upon the race of the victim or the de-
fendant? Table 2 provides answers to these questions. This table
shows, for W/W, B/W, and B/B cases, the percentage of jurors who
were for death, for life, and undecided at three points during the
trial ((a)-(c) above), and the percentage of jurors whose final votes
were for life or for death.
116 Restricting the analysis to cases from which both black and white jurors were interviewed
greatly reduced, but did not altogether eliminate, differences in the trial experiences to which
black and white jurors in this subsample of cases were exposed. Because blacks were more
likely to be interviewed the greater their number on ajury, the black jurors even in this sample
of cases with interviews from jurors of both races still came disproportionately from cases in
which blacks were more numerous as members of the jury, and correspondingly, the whites in
this subsample came disproportionately from cases with fewer black jurors. We tested for the
possible effects of this disparity of representation on our findings of divisive punishment con-
siderations between black and white jurors in Appendix B.
1:7 See supra note 114.
18 The precise wording of these three questions was:
(a) After the jury found [the defendant] guilty of capital murder but before you heard
an), evidence or testimony about what the punishment should be, did you then think
[the defendant] should be given ... "a death sentence," "a life (or the alternative) sen-
tence," or were you "undecided"?; (b) After hearing all the evidence and the judge's in-
structions to the jury for deciding on the punishment, but before you began deliberating
with the other jurors, did you then think [the defendant] should be given ... "a death
sentence," "a life (or the alternative) sentence" or were you "undecided?"; (c) when the
first jury vote was taken on the punishment to be imposed, did you vote for a... "death
sentence," "life (or the alternative) sentence" or were you "undecided?"
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TABLE 2: Stands on punishment of white and black jurors in capital
murder cases"' at four points in the trial process for se-










l qi. Bl. Al Cases
Stand on Punishment
A. At Guilt Phase of Trial
Death 30.0 22.2 42.3
Undecided 5.0 58.3 42.3
Life 25.0 19.4 15.4
(No. ofjurors) (80) (36) (52)
B. At Sentencing Instructions
Death 44.2 20.5 58.5
Undecided 32.6 43.6 20.8
Life 23.3 35.9 20.8
(No. ofjurors) (86) (39) (53)




(No. ofjurors) (86) (40)
D. At Final Punishment Vote
Death 51.7 45.0
Life 48.3 55.0
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58.2 67.6 51.7 57.9 53.3

































119 These data are drawn from 83 of the 340 trials in which both whitc and black jurors were
interviewed-
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1. In the B/W Cases, Black and White Jurors Became Polarized on
Punishment: Whites for Death and Blacks for Life
Over the Course of the Trial.
A conspicuous pattern emerged in decision making in the B/W
cases, reflecting progressive polarization between black and white ju-
rors as the trial proceeded. Even before the punishment stage of the
trial, black and white jurors' punishment stands diverged more in
B/W than in W/W or B/B cases. As the trial proceeded this differ-
ence became considerably more pronounced. At the guilt phase,
whites were three times more likely than blacks to take a pro-death
stand on punishment (42.3% vs. 14.7%), and after sentencing in-
structions they were four times more likely to do so (58.5% vs.
15.2%). By the first vote on punishment, the differential between
white and black jurors on death reached more than seven to one
(67.3% vs. 9.1%).
In these B/W cases, the white jurors were quicker to take a stand
on punishment than their black counterparts. Although well over
half of the whites thought the punishment should be death at the
time of sentencing instructions, it was not until the jury's first pun-
ishment vote that most black jurors believed the punishment should
be life. By that time whites and blacks were far apart. Two out of
three whites (67.3%) said their first vote was for death, and virtually
as many blacks (69.7%) said their first vote was for life imprisonment.
The stage was thus set for a showdown between black and white jurors
over the final punishment verdict, a showdown that, according to the
data in Table 1, turns out quite differently depending upon the com-
position of the jury.
120 Much of this escalating polarization appears to reflect the successive movement of tinde-
cided white jurors to pro-death stands at each step of the decision-making process. The per-
centage of white jurors who were undecided dropped from 42.3% at the guilt phase to 20.8% at
the sentencing instructions and to 5.8% at the first jury vote on punishment. Among black ju-
rors the most sizable reduction in the percentage who were undecided came between sentenc-
ing instructions and the first jury vote on punishment (from 45.5% to 21.2%), when stands in
favor of life imprisonment showed the greatest increase. There are, however, too few black and
white jurors in this sample to examine the full complement of changes (turnover) from one
point to the next in punishment stands between successive stages of the process. For an exam-
ple of such a turnover analysis, see William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default:
An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605,
657-58 tbl.4 (1999).
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2. In W/Wand B/B Cases the Decision-Making Pattem was
Quite Different Jurors of the Same Race as the Defendant and Victim were
More Likely to take a Pro-Death Stand on Punishment Over the Course of the
Trial than were their Other-Race Counterparts.
The decision-making patterns in W/W and B/B cases were similar
to one another but different from that in B/W cases. In the W/W
and B/B cases, jurors of the same race as the defendant and victim
were more likely to take early stands on punishment, whether in favor
of death or of life imprisonment.' 2  Perhaps some jurors identified
with the victim of their owkn race and felt the need for more severe
punishment, while others identified with the defendant of their own
race and believed that punishment should be less severe. In any case,
when the perpetrator and victim were of the jurors' oxwn race, jurors
apparently came to believe more quickly that they understood the
situation and that it called for one or the other punishment. Perhaps
the killing fit a more familiar schema or scenario of crime causation
and responsibility.'2
Over the course of the trial, there were further similarities be-
tween jurors' decision-making processes in B/B and W/W cases. The
greater tendency of same-race jurors to take a stand on punishment
than their other-race counterparts at the guilt stage of the trial per-
sisted through sentencing instructions and the first jury vote on pun-
ishment. Other-race jurors were more often undecided at each of
these stages of the process. Same-race jurors were more likely, rela-
tive to their other-race counterparts, to take pro-death stands in W/W
and B/B cases. By the first vote on punishment, black and white jt-
rors diverged in pro-death stands by 25.5 points in W'V cases and by
16.7 points in B/B cases. But they diverged by less than three points
in pro-life-imprisonment stands in both types of cases. Hence, con-
trary to the pattern in the B/W cases, jurors in these intraracial cases
121 The early decision making found in these cases uith CJP intervicws from both black and
white jurors reflected patterns found in the entire sample. At least half of the jurors in each
defendant/victim racial category (disregarding differences byjurors' race) belie vd that the)
knew what the punishment should be during the guilt stage of the trial, before heaning the evi-
dence, arguments, and instructions for deciding punishment. Research based on the full sam-
ple demonstrates that most jurors who take such early stands professed to be 'absolutely con-
vinced" of their position on the defendant's punishment and tended to remain constentv
committed to their stands over the course of the trial, contrary to the constitutional require-
ment, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). that jurors remain open and giv effect to
aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at the penalty stage of the trial in making their
sentencing decisions. SeeWilliamJ. Bowers, Maria Sands, & Benjamin D. Steiner, Faredaied n,
partiality in Capital Sentencing. Jurors' Prcdispositions, Guilt-Trial Fprnzwe, and Parature Dswon
Making 83 CoRNE.L L. RE%. 1476 (1998).
122 See Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J. Lurigio, Laj' and Profeonals Bdefs Al'ul Cnrzr and
Criminal Sentencing. A Aeedfor Theoa', Pediaps Sdiwna Thai, 17 CRI%.JtST. & BEI Lx. 333. 34647
(1990) (arguing that jurors' prior experience iith the substantive aspects of the eidence pre-
sented at trial, whether direct, through media portrayals, or from some other source, forms the
lens through which theyv iew such evidence).
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may, over the course of the trial, have come to see defendants of their
own race as more threatening to themselves and their community."2
Jurors' final punishment votes are often the product of accom-
124modation during jury deliberations. Since unanimity is required
for a sentencing recommendation of death in all but one of our sam-
ple states,125 these accommodations are typically changes from a first
ballot vote for death to a final vote for life. Little such accommoda-
tion occurred in W/W cases, where the percentage of white jurors for
death dropped only 8.8 points between the first and final votes on
punishment. There was more accommodation in B/B cases, where
the percentage for death among black jurors dropped 19.0 points.2 6
The greatest change, however, came in B/W cases where the per-
centage of white jurors in favor of a death sentence dropped 25.5
points between the first and final punishment votes. 2 7 Thus, it was
late in punishment deliberations, between the first and final ballots
on punishment, that the greatest changes occurred in life and death
stands in the turbulent B/W cases. White jurors often change to a fi-
nal verdict in favor of life imprisonment in these cases, owing per-
haps to steadfast opposition to a death sentence by one or more black
male jurors. These changes may well have involved tension, conflict,
and hostility across racial lines.
The progressive divergence in B/W cases of black and white ju-
rors' stands on punishment raises the question of what it is that they
may have seen differently in these cases, and how such differences
may have become exacerbated over the course of the trial. We have
observed in Table 1 that the dominance of white males and the pres-
123 See supra notes 53-54 (documenting mock jurors' greater likelihood of convicting an of-
fender whose victim is of the same race as that of the mock juror and providing evidence of the
tendency of minorityjurors to be equally or more punitive toward offenders of their own race).124 The slight white-black differences in final punishment votes (6.7% in W/w, 9.4% in B/W,
and 6.2% in B/B cases) may seem anomalous, because these are cases in which juries reached
unanimous punishment decisions (except, as we note, in Florida cases where the jury's non-
binding sentencing recommendations need not be unanimous). These slight differences are
consistent, however, with the fact that (a) even in this sample of cases (with interviews from
both black and white jurors) the black jurors tend to come disproportionately from cases in
which more blacks served as jurors and whites from cases with fewer black jurors, and that (b)
death sentences tend to be less common in cases with larger numbers of black jurors (black
males in B/W and B/B cases, and black females in W/W cases). See supra tbl.1.
12 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2), (3) (West 2000) (stating that the sentencing jury ren-
ders an advisory opinion and that the judge considers the "recommendation of a majority of the
U72lThis reduction in the percentage of black jurors in favor of death between the first and
final votes in B/B cases is a relatively unstable estimate for two reasons. First, this reduction
reflects a shift in the votes of only three black jurors from eighteen cases. Second, one of the
black jurors whose final vote was for life imprisonment did not answer the first ballot question.Votes for life imprisonment actually doubled among white jurors in B/W cases between
the first and final votes with virtually no change among blackjurors. (This is a change factor of
2.16 for whites and 0.96 for blacks). In the W/W and B/B cases, life votes increased only by
about half among both whites and blacks. (Here the change factors are 1.48 for whites and 1.57
for blacks in W/W cases, and 1.39 for whites and 1.49 for blacks in B/B cases).
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ence of black males on the jury had opposing effects on the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. But we have yet to learn about black and
white jurors' perspectives on the crime, the defendant, and the pun-
ishment that should be imposed. We have yet to learn how these per-
spectives might have come into play as the trial advanced, or how
these perspectives might have been affected by "white male domi-
nance" and "black male presence." In the follouing section, there-
fore, we examine the different perspectives of black and white jurors
that may shape their thinking about the punishment to be imposed.
C. Divisive Punishment Considerations
The CJP data reveal differences of perspective between black and
white jurors in three kinds of punishment considerations: (1) the ju-
rors' lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt, (2) their impres-
sions of the defendant's remorsefulness, and (3) their perceptions of
the defendant's future dangerousness. In Tables 3 through 5, we
show the responses of black and white jurors to questions addressing
these three kinds of considerations in W/W, B/W, and B/B cases
where black and white jurors have been exposed to the same crime,
defendant, evidence, and arguments. '
1. Lingering Doubts About the Defendant's Guilt
Lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt is not a constitution-
ally authorized mitigating consideration in capital sentencing,"" but
when it exists, it is perhaps the strongest "operative" impediment to
capital jurors' imposition of a death sentence.'"" In this section we
12 This analysis of race ofjuror is based on a subsample of the CJP data. The separation of
cases by defendant/victim racial combinations further subdivides the sample. As a coas-
quence, the statistical patterns in the data are based on relatively small numbers of jurors, and
for that reason are less statistically reliable than those based on the full sample ofjurors. In par-
ticular, black jurors in B/B cases are consistently below tw'enty in number, hence, percentages
vary by more than five points with the chance movement of a single juror from one response
category to another. Moreover, black-white differences within W/AV. B /W. or B/B cases nua be
the product of factors other than race-such as the jurors' education, income, or socioeco-
nomic status (SES)-that are correlated with race. To evaluate the possibiliti of such con-
founding effects, we have conducted tests of the independent effects of juror race on measurcs
of lingering doubt, impressions of remorse, and perceptions of dangerousness. uhich are pre-
sented in Appendix B.
' The Model Penal Code gives the trial judge the authority to denv dte possibilitv of a capi-
tal sentence on the strength of residual doubt about the defendant's guilt. Sre MODEL PL',,L
CODE § 210.6(1)(f) (1985) (requiring the judge to refuse death eligibility if the evidence. al-
though sufficient "to sustain the verdict,.., does not foreclose all doubt respecung the defen-
dan's guilt"). So far, however, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize the right of a capital
defendant to ask the jurors to consider residual doubt in the calculus of their sentencing deci-
sions: "This Court's prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional
right to have such [residual] doubts considered as a mitigating factor." Franklin %. Lyiaaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988) (opinion of WhiteJ.).
IS An earlier analysis of the CJP data identified lingering doubt, among some thirtN-nine fac-
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first examine the importance to black and white jurors of lingering
doubt in their punishment decision making. We then consider the
roots of such doubt at the guilt stage of the trial and the forms it
takes during punishment deliberations (Table 3, Panels A-C).
tors, as the strongest barrier to a death vote that may make jurors more or less likely to vote for
the death penalty. See Bowers et al., supra note 121, at 1533. Lingering doubt was also identi-
fied as the most significant "operative" factor in jurors' decisions to vote for life rather than
death in a study based on interviews with fifty-four Florida capital jurors from five death and five
life cases. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Opera-
tional Factors in Ten Forida Death Penalty Cases; 15 Am.J. GRIM. L. 1, 28-34 (1988).
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TABLE 3: Black and white jurors' (a) feelings of lingering doubts
about the defendant's guilt, (b) doubts about the capital
murder verdict, and (c) thoughts about guilt when con-




Jurors' Race Jurors' Race Jurors' Race
White Black White Black Wh1ite Black All Cases
A. Feelings of Lingering Doubt about the Defendant's Guilt
1. Importance of lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt for you in de-
ciding on punishment
Very 4.7 12.8 5.7 23.5 0.0 16.7 8.9
Fairly 3.5 12.8 3.8 20.6 0.0 0.0 6.6
Not very 12.9 15.4 7.5 8.8 17.2 11.1 12.0
Not at all 78.8 59.0 83.0 47.1 82.8 72.2 72.5
(No. ofjurors) (85) (39) (53) (34) (29) (18) (258)
2. Importance of doubt that the defendant was the actual ller for you in
deciding on punishment
Very important 2.4 7.7 5.9 24.2 3.7 5.6 7.1
Fairly important3.6 2.6 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 3.6
Not important 0.0 2.6 0.0 6.1 0.0 5.6 1.6
Not a factor 94.0 87.2 94.1 54.5 96.3 88.9 87.7
(No. ofjurors) (84) (39) (51) (33) (27) (18) (252)
B. Doubts about the Capital Murder Verdict at the Guilt Trial and Delibera-
tions
1. After the judge's guilt instructions, but before deliberations did you think
[the defendant] was...
Guilty/
Capital Murder 67.9 65.8 81.8 50.0 59.3 42.1 65.3
Guilty/
Lesser Charge 9.0 13.2 1.8 14.7 14.8 26.3 10.8
Not guilty 0.0 2.6 0.0 5.9 3.7 0.0 1.6
Undecided 23.1 18.4 16.4 29.4 22.2 31.6 22.3
(No. ofjurors) (78) (38) (55) (34) (27) (19) (251)
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2. When the first jury vote was taken, how did you vote?
Guilty/
Capital Murder 94.4 81.6 90.6 57.6 76.0 88.9 84.1
Guilty/
Lesser Charge 2.8 10.5 5.7 12.1 12.0 11.1 7.5
Not guilty 1.4 0.0 1.9 9.1 0.0 0.0 2.1
Undecided 1.4 7.9 1.9 21.2 12.0 0.0 6.3
(No. ofjurors) (72) (38) (53) (33) (25) (18) (239)
3. During guilt deliberations, were you or any jurors reluctant to go along
with the majority?
Yes 9.2 18.4 11.3 41.2 19.2 10.5 16.7
No 27.6 31.6 39.6 26.5 19.2 26.3 29.7
No reluctance 63.2 50.0 49.1 32.4 61.5 63.2 53.7
(No. ofjurors) (76) (38) (53) (34) (26) (19) (246)
C. Thoughts about Guilt when Considering Punishment
1. When considering punishment, did you think the defendant might be al-
together innocent, a case of mistaken identity?
Yes 4.7 12.5 0.0 17.6 0.0 0.0 5.7
No 95.3 87.5 100.0 76.5 100.0 100.0 93.5
Not sure 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.8
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (29) (18) (261)
2. When considering punishment, did you think the defendant definitely
had planned or intended to kill the victim, but might not be the one who did
so?
Yes 11.6 10.0 5.6 23.5 6.9 16.7 11.5
No 88.4 80.0 94.4 67.6 93.1 83.3 85.8
Not sure 0.0 10.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 2.7
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (29) (18) (261)
3. When considering punishment, did you think the defendant definitely
killed the victim, but might not have planned, intended, or wanted to do so?
Yes 48.8 52.5 46.3 73.5 41.4 61.1 52.1
No 50.0 47.5 48.1 17.6 58.6 38.9 45.2
Not sure 1.2 0.0 5.6 8.8 0.0 0.0 2.7
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (29) (18) (261)
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4. When considering punishment, did you think the defendant might not be
the one most responsible for the killing?
Yes 8.1 22.5 7.4 47.1 6.9 11.1 15.3
No 91.9 77.5 90.7 47.1 89.7 88.9 83.1
Not sure 0.0 0.0 1.9 5.9 3.4 0.0 1.5
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (29) (18) (261)
a- Lingering Doubts
i. Doubts about the capital murder verdict and doubts that the de-
fendant was the actual killer were especially important as punishment
considerations among black jurors in interracial B/W cases.
We asked jurors questions about the role of two types of doubts in
their thinking about punishment. The first question encompassed
lingering doubts of any kind about the defendant's guilt. We asked:
"How important were the following considerations for you in decid-
ing on what [the defendant's] punishment should be?" One of the
responses from which jurors could chose was "lingering doubts about
[the defendant's] guilt." The second question focused more nar-
rowly on the possibility that the defendant was not the actual killer.
We presented jurors with the following statement: "Although the
evidence was sufficient for a capital murder conviction, did you have
some lingering doubt that [the defendant] was the actual killer?" We
then asked jurors whether this was a factor in the case, and if so, how
important it was in their punishment decision.'"' Black and white ju-
rors' responses to these questions in the W/W, B/W, and B/B cases
appear in Table 3, Panel A.
Black jurors in B/W cases were far and away the most likely to
have lingering doubts and to regard such doubts as important in
making the punishment decision. More than half of them (52.9%)
acknowledged at least some doubts about the capital murder ver-
dict,' 2 and almost half (45.5%) thought it wras possible that the de-
fendant might not be the actual killer (although they conceded that
the evidence was sufficient for a capital murder conviction).'" In
fact, almost a quarter of the black jurors in these B/W cases regarded
such doubts as "very important" in their punishment decisions
,s1 This statement ims included in a list of some thirt)ynine factors that might have been im-
portant in making the sentencing decision. Jurors' responses to the two questions, asking
whether this doubt was a factor and if so how important, were combined here to form a four-
category variable indicating that lingering doubt was "'vry important" 'fairly important.- 'not
imjortant " or "not a factor" in their punishment decision making. Sre supra tbl.3. Panel .42.
See supra thl.3, Panel A.1 (stating the percentages answering "'ery important." 'fairly im-
portant," and "not important").
,33 See supra thl.3, Panel A.2 (stating the percentages answering very important." "fairly im-
portant," or "not important").
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(23.5% and 24.2%, respectively). Whitejurors in the same cases were
much less likely to acknowledge such doubts (17% and 5.9%, respec-
tively) or to say that they were very important in their decision mak-
ing (5.7% and 5.9%, respectively).
Black jurors in B/B and W/W cases were also more likely than
their white counterparts to have lingering doubts about the defen-
dant's guilt, though not specifically about whether the defendant was
the actual killer. The black-white differences in these cases were less
pronounced than in the B/W cases. In other words, black jurors had
more doubts than white jurors about the defendant's guilt not only in
B/W cases and B/B cases, but even in W/W cases. Such doubts on
the part of black jurors may reflect a more general or diffuse mistrust
of the criminal justice process, a mistrust most prominent in, but not
confined to, the B/W cases.'3
b. Roots of Doubt
i. In the guilt stage of the trial, black jurors in B/W cases were the
least likely to vote guilty of capital murder on the first ballot and the
most reluctant to join the final capital murder verdict; white jurors in
B/W cases were the most likely to favor a capital murder verdict be-
fore guilt deliberations.
Since lingering doubt has its roots in the guilt stage of the trial,
misgivings about the defendant's guilt should be evident in the guilt
decision making of those jurors who say lingering doubt was impor-
tant in deciding on punishment. Early in the interviews, the ques-
tioning focused on how jurors made the decision about guilt. They
were asked about (1) their stance on the defendant's guilt after the
judge's instructions to the jury but before jury deliberations; (2) the
votes they cast at the jury's first ballot on guilt; and (3) whether they
were reluctant to go along with the final capital murder guilty verdict.
Jurors' responses to these questions appear in Table 3, Panel B.
Reluctance at the guilt stage of the trial about a capital murder
verdict was concentrated among black jurors in B/W cases, and this
reluctance remained evident over the course of the jury's decision-
making about guilt. Black jurors were far less inclined than their
white counterparts to support a capital murder verdict after the
judge's guilt instructions (by 31.8 points) and at the first jury vote on
guilt (by 33.0 points), and they were more reluctant to go along with
the capital murder verdict (by 29.9 points).'35 Before guilt delibera-
tions, the black-white difference in B/W cases was due as much to
13 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
13 The black-white differences in readiness to reach a capital murder verdict in B/W cases
are consistent with the findings of a large body of mock jury studies of the guilt decision. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 3:1
DEATH SE2frIENCING IN BLACK .AND lllflh
white jurors' favoring a capital murder verdict as to black jurors' op-
posing it: the percentages diverged equally from the sample-wide
figure.' 6  During deliberations on guilt, this difference %%as due
largely to the reservations of black jurors on the first jury ballot and
to their reluctance to join the majority on the final capital conviction
(their percentages departed the greatest from the sample-wide fig-
ure). Note in Table 3, Panel B.3, that whites in B/W cases were more
likely than their black counterparts (by 16.7 points) to den) that ju-
rors were reluctant to join the majority on the capital murder verdict.
Apparently, black jurors who had misgivings about a capital murder
verdict kept those doubts to themselves, or whites chose to discount
or ignore the expressed misgivings of black jurors.'r
3 SeeBowers et al., supra note 121, at 1516 tbl.10 (shoing that the tendecri to favor a capi-
tal murder verdict prior to deliberating about the defendant's guilt is sinptomatic of taking a
premature pro-death stand on punishment and results from a predisposition to fasor the death
penalty that citizens bring with them to jury service). The evidence in Table 2. supra. suggests
that what activates white jurors' pro-death predisposition may differ depending on the defen-
dant/victim racial character of the crime; the interracial nature of B/W cases may encourage
white jurors to make a pre-deliberation "rush to guilt" as a precursor to taking a pro-death stand
on punishment. The data in Table 2. Panel A. confirm that white jurors in B/W cases are
among the ones most apt to take an early pro-death stand.
3-1 Some of this black-white difference in perceived reluctance might also reflect bargaining
in guilt deliberations for a capital murder verdict in exchange for a life sentence. See Bowers et
al., supra note 121, at 1491. In such an exchange, what black jurors experience as reluctance,
white jurors may interpret as conciliation.
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ii. Misgivings about the defendant's motivation and involvement in
the crime, especially the possibility that he was not the one most re-
sponsible for the killing, were most common among black jurors in
B/W cases.
To learn more specifically what kinds of doubt might have influ-
enced the punishment decision, we asked jurors whether they
thought, when considering punishment: (1) that the defendant
might be altogether innocent-a case of mistaken identity; (2) that
he definitely had planned or intended to kill the victim, but might
not be the one who did so; (3) that he definitely killed the victim, but
might not have planned, intended, or wanted to do so; and (4) that
he might not be the one most responsible for the killing. Most com-
mon overall (52.1%) were doubts about the defendant's intent or
motivation for the killing (Table 3, Panel C.3); less frequent (15.3%)
were doubts about the defendant's primary responsibility for the kill-
ing (Table 3, Panel C.4); and least common (11.5% and 5.7%, re-
spectively) were questions about his actual involvement in the crime
(Table 3, Panels C.2 and C.1, respectively).
All four of these thoughts about the defendant's guilt were most
common among black jurors in B/W cases. Blacks and whites dif-
fered most over the possibility that the defendant was not the one
most responsible for the killing (by 39.7 points), suggesting that,
where relevant, blacks in B/W cases were especially leery about in-
criminating testimony of accomplices. There were also sizeable dif-
ferences in black and white misgivings about the defendant's motiva-
tion or intent (27.2 points), his actual involvement apart from his
motivation (17.9 points), and the possibility of mistaken identity
(17.6 points). Expressed as ratios, in B/W cases, blacks were six times
more likely than whites to think that the defendant might not be the
one most responsible for the killing (Table 3, Panel C.4) and four
times more likely to think that he might not have been involved de-
spite his motivation (Table 3, Panel C.2). Six blacks, but no whites
thought the defendant might be altogether innocent (Table 3, Panel
C.1).
Black jurors' misgivings about guilt were not confined to the B/W
cases. In W/W cases black jurors were several times more likely than
their white counterparts to think the defendant might be altogether
innocent or at least not the one most responsible for the killing.
And, in B/B cases blacks, more than their white counterparts,
thought the defendant might have planned or intended to kill with-
out doing so or that he killed without planning or intending to do so.
Thus, blacks were generally more likely than whites to harbor misgiv-
ings about a defendant's guilt, especially in B/W cases. The kinds of
misgivings that most distinguished black from white jurors in B/W
cases were those regarding the defendant's responsibility or motiva-
tion for the killing, rather than his actual involvement in the crime.
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These doubts suggest that black jurors in these cases are wary when
the felony murder rule may be used as a basis for a capital murder
verdict." In turn, these are the kinds of doubts that would appear to
make the defendant's expressions of remorse credible with jurors.'
In sum, black jurors reported being generally less willing to be-
lieve that the capital sentencing process is free from error, and they
were more concerned than their white counterparts about the possi-
bility that the jury will make mistakes in the punishment decision.
And they were far more wary of this possibility in interracial than in
intraracial cases. These doubts arose during the guilt stage of the
trial and were most strongly manifest in jurors' thinking about the
defendant's responsibility and motivation for the crime when they
were deciding his punishment in B/W cases. The overall pattern is
consistent with other studies showing that blacks are far less likely
than whites to trust the criminal justice system.3t8 Given the sordid
history in the United States of lynchings, sheriffs posses, and all-white
juries associated with black-on-white killings, it is not surprising to
find that B/W cases are the locus of the most concentrated black mis-
trust of the legal system.
2. The Defendant's Remorsefulness
The defendant's apparent remorsefulness or sorrow for the crime
is seldom explicitly articulated as a mitigating consideration in capital
sentencing,' but it has been linked in the CJP data and elsewhere
with jurors' receptivity to arguments of mitigation and their willing-
ness to grant mercy. 12 Apparent lack of remorse, on the other hand,
may be taken asjustification for condemning the defendant to death.
We first examine the extent of black-white differences in the per-
133 Blackjurors may be especially sensitive to the possibility that a black defendant whose vic-
tim is white might be singled out for a capital murder charge in a case where he had not in-
tended or wanted to kill, or in a case where an accomplice may have been the triggerperson.
1 An examination of the 152 California CJPjurors indicates that it is such doubts about the
motivation or responsibility for the killing, rather than claims that the defendant was not pres-
ent or took no part in the crime, that tended to make the defendant's expressions of remorse
credible tojurors. More specifically, the analysis indicated that claiming the defendant %as not
the perpetrator when the evidence to the contrary is strong may well undermine a remorse de-
fense. On the other hand, claiming that a comiction for capital, versus non-capital. murder is
possibly mistaken appears to be a condition under which a penalty phase defense of remorse is
especially effective. See genera/ly Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJuay and Absolution: The Intmerion
of Trial Strateg), Remorse and the Death Penalt, 83 CORNELL L REV. 1557 (1998).
140
141 Seesupra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
SeeJames R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In Fairness and Merye: Statutoq MitlgatmgFadon Mr
Capital Punishment Laws, 30 CRLM. L. BULL. 299 (1994) (finding no state in which the defen-
dants remorse is explicitly included as a statutory mitigating considerations); Theodore Eisen-
berg et al., But Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentening 83 CORNELL L REV. 1599,
1604-05 & n.20 (1998) (reviewing case law on the role of remorse as mitigator).
1 SeeSundby, supra note 139; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 141, at 1610 (arguing that
jurors' belief that a defendant is remorseful noticeably lessens the sentence that he receiv-s,
provided thatjurors do not think the crime in question was extremely vicious).
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ceived remorsefulness of the defendant. We then explore sensitivity
to remorsefulness in jurors' identification with the defendant and his
situation and the implications of perceived remorsefulness forjurors'
feelings that the defendant should be accorded mercy. These data
are shown in Table 4, Panels A-C.
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TABLE 4: Black and white jurors' (a) impressions of the defendant's
remorsefulness, (b) identification with the defendant, (c)




Jurors' Race Jurors' Race Jurors' Race
White Black White Black White Black All Cases
A. Impressions of the Defendant's Remorsefulness
1. How wel does "Sorry for what s/he did" describe the defendant?
Verywell 11.9 25.6 13.5 38.2 3.8 31.6 18.4
Fairly well 21.4 12.8 3.8 26.5 7.7 5.3 14.5
Not so well 31.0 23.1 36.5 11.8 30.8 5.3 26.3
Not at all 35.7 38.5 46.2 23.5 57.7 57.9 40.4
(No. ofjurors) (84) (39) (52) (34) (26) (19) (255)
2. Did the defendant appear sorry for what s/he had done during the trial?
Yes 27.6 44.4 14.8 52.9 7.4 26.3 28.4
No 72.4 55.6 85.2 47.1 92.6 73.7 71.6
(No. ofjurors) (87) (36) (54) (34) (27) (19) (257)
3. When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that [the de-
fendant] was truly sorry for the crime?
Yes, sure def.
was sorry 8.4 17.5 3.9 14.7 3.6
Yes, think def.




show 18.1 7.5 17.6 14.7 0.0
No, def. acted
sorry, but was
a show 8.4 12.5 13.7 5.9 7.1
No, def. didn't
even pretend to
be sorry 51.8 47.5 60.8 35.3 85.7
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B. Identification with the Defendant
1. Did the defendant remind you of someone or make you think about any-
one?
Yes 17.4 22.5 7.3 29.4 6.9 15.8 16.7
No 82.6 77.5 92.7 70.6 93.1 84.2 83.3
Not Sure 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(No. ofjurors) (87) (40) (55) (34) (29) (19) (264)
2. Did you imagine being like the defendant?
Yes 5.8 10.3 14.5 29.4 6.9 10.5 11.8
No 94.2 89.7 85.5 70.6 93.1 89.5 88.2
(No. ofjurors) (86) (39) (55) (34) (29) (19) (262)
3. Did you imagine yourself in the defendant's situation?
Yes 23.3 20.0 27.3 41.2 24.1 26.3 26.2
No 76.7 80.0 72.7 58.8 75.9 73.7 73.8
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (55) (34) (29) (19) (263)
C. Remorse and Other Grounds for Mercy
1. The defendant deserved mercy because he was sorry
Very true 3.7 5.1 1.9 15.6 0.0 6.3 4.8
Fairly true 7.4 12.8 1.9 15.6 0.0 0.0 6.8
Not very true 11.1 23.1 11.1 28.1 21.4 6.3 16.0
Not true 77.8 59.0 85.2 40.6 78.6 87.5 72.4
(No. ofjurors) (81) (39) (54) (32) (28) (16) (250)
2. The defendant deserved mercy because you felt s/he would try to make
up for what s/he did
Very true 3.6 5.0 1.9 6.1 0.0 11.8 3.9
Fairly true 9.5 10.0 5.6 24.2 3.6 0.0 9.4
Not very true 15.5 15.0 11.1 18.2 10.7 0.0 13.3
Not true 71.4 70.0 81.5 51.5 85.7 88.2 73.4
(No. ofjurors) (84) (40) (54) (33) (28) (17) (256)
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3. The defendant deserved mercy because other people wanted to see
him/her have another chance
Very true 1.2 2.5 0.0 6.1 0.0 11.8 2.4
Fairly true 14.3 17.5 9.4 27.3 21.4 0.0 15.3
Not very true 19.0 25.0 20.8 15.2 17.9 17.6 19.6
Not true 65.5 55.0 69.8 51.5 60.7 70.6 62.7
(No. ofjurors) (84) (40) (53) (33) (28) (17) (255)
4. Did you imagine yourself in the defendant's family's situation?
Yes 57.5 52.5 38.2 61.8 48.3 42.1 51.1
No 41.4 47.5 54.5 32.4 51.7 57.9 46.2
Not sure 1.1 0.0 7.3 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.7
(No. ofjurors) (87) (40) (55) (34) (29) (19) (264)
a. Remorse
i. Beliefs that the defendant was remorseful for the crime were more
common among black than white jurors and most common among
black jurors in B/W cases; white jurors were least likely to see black
defendants as remorseful.
We asked three questions about the defendant's remorse or sor-
row for the crime. The first, posed early in the interview, asked for a
personal characterization of the defendant: "In your mind, how well
do the following words describe [the defendant]." Of interest would
be a characterization by the juror of "Sorry for what s/he did." The
second question asked about the defendant's appearance during the
trial: "How did [the defendant] appear to you during the trial?"
Again, of interest was the description, "Sorry for what s/he had
done." The third question focused on the juror's impression when
deciding on punishment: "When you were considering the punish-
ment, did you believe that [the defendant] wvas truly sorry for the
crime?" The responses of black and white jurors in W/W, B/W, and
B/B cases to these three questions appear in Table 4, Panel A.
Jurors' responses to each of these questions told essentially the
same story. Black jurors were more likely to believe that the defen-
dant in B/W cases was remorseful, far more likely than white jurors in
these cases. The differences on these questions were all approxi-
mately forty percentage points: 47.4 points on the characterization of
the defendant as sorry (combining the "very" and "fairly well" re-
sponses); 38.1 points on the appearance of remorse during the trial;
and 36.3 points when considering punishment (combining the two
"yes" responses). Whites were much more likely than blacks to claim
that the black defendant "didn't even pretend to be sorry," by a dif-
ference of 25.5 points. Evidently, black jurors in B/W cases were par-
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ticularly sensitive to indications of remorse, perhaps because these
kinds of cases are especially likely to evoke identification and empa-
thy with the defendant. White jurors, on the other hand, were un-
likely to see the defendant as remorseful or even as pretending to be
sorry for the crime.
In the W/W and B/B cases, as well, more black than white jurors
saw the defendant as remorseful in response to each of the three
questions. In these cases, however, the black-white differences were
not as pronounced and were largely confined to the categories ex-
pressing the strongest affirmation of sorrow (Table 4, Panels A.1 and
A.3). Additionally, in black defendant cases (both B/W and B/B
cases), as compared to white defendant cases (W/W cases), white ju-
rors were especially likely to see the defendant as lacking remorse. At
most, only about half as many whites in B/W and B/B as in W/W
cases saw the defendant as remorseful in response to each question." 3
And in B/B as well as B/W cases, white jurors were especially likely to
deny that the defendant even pretended to be sorry. Here the impli-
cations are twofold: black jurors are generally more likely than their
white counterparts to see a defendant as remorseful, and white jurors
are especially unlikely to see black defendants as remorseful. Perhaps
white jurors are especially insensitive to the remorse of a black de-
fendant because they do not identify with him or his situation and do
not imagine themselves in the shoes of the defendant or his family.
b. Identification and Empathy
i. Identification with the defendant, his situation, and that of his fam-
ily was most common among black jurors in B/W cases. White jurors
in B/W cases were unlikely to be reminded of someone by the defen-
dant and to identify with the situation of the defendant's family.
Early in the interviews, we asked jurors questions intended to de-
tect whether they may have personally identified with the defendant
or his family. Specifically, we asked them to characterize their think-
ing about the defendant in terms that included (1) whether the de-
fendant reminded them of anyone; (2) whether they imagined being
like the defendant; (3) whether they imagined themselves in the de-
fendant's situation; and (4) whether they imagined themselves in the
situation of the defendant's family. Half of the jurors (51.1%) imag-
ined themselves in the situation of the defendant's family (Table 4,
Panel B.4), a quarter (26.2%) imagined themselves in the defen-
dant's situation (Table 4, Panel B.3), and fewer (11.8% and 16.7%,
respectively) imagined themselves like the defendant or were re-
14s Again, these comparisons of white jurors across N/W, B/W, and B/B cases are not as reli-
able as those between black and white jurors within W/W, B/W, and B/B cases in which blacks
and whites were drawn from the same cases. See supra note 101.
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minded of someone by the defendant (Table 4, Panels B.2 and B.1).
In the racially sensitive B/W cases, black jurors showed the high-
est level of identification according to each of the four indicators.
More than whites in these cases, and more than blacks or whites in
W/W and B/B cases, black jurors in B/W cases were reminded of
someone by the defendant, were prompted to see themselves like the
defendant, and tended to imagine themselves in the same situation as
the defendant and his family. These black jurors were most distinc-
tive in "defendant-specific identification;" that is, in imagining them-
selves like the defendant and in imagining themselves in the defen-
dant's situation (17.6 and 15.0 points above the sample-wide
percentages, respectively). For their part, whites in these B/W cases
were unlikely to be reminded of someone by the defendant or to
imagine themselves in the situation of the defendant's family (8.5
and 12.9 points below the sample-wide percentages, respectively).
Apart from the B/W cases, jurors' identification ith the defen-
dant was not race specific. That is, in the intraracial cases, white ju-
rors did not identify more with white defendants and black jurors
more with black defendants. In fact, in both the W/W and B/B
cases, black and white jurors did not differ by even ten percentage
points in response to any of the four identification questions. White
jurors did seem less likely to be reminded of someone by black de-
fendants than by white defendants. Only 7.3% of white jurors in
B/W cases and 6.9% in B/B cases said that the defendant reminded
them of someone; 17.4% of white jurors said this in W/1W cases.
This failure of white jurors to be reminded of someone by black de-
fendants may be an ingredient in the corresponding failure of white
jurors to believe the defendant felt remorse in black defendant cases
(Table 4, Panels A.1-A.3).
c. Grounds for Mercy
. The defendant's remorse was the strongest rationale for mercy
among black jurors and the weakest among white jurors in B/W
cases. Other rationales for mercy, such as "the defendant would try
to make up for what he did" and "other people wanted to see him
have another chance," were also stronger among blacks than whites
in B/W cases.
Jurors who believe that the defendant w-as sorry for what he has
done may feel that he deserves to be spared execution. We asked ju-
rors about the role of mercy in their capital sentencing decisions. Ju-
rors were asked how true it was in their decision making that the de-
1 Again, these comparisons across defendanr-ictim racial combinations are less reliable
than those between black and white jurors within WgW, B/'V, and B 'B cases. Sr supra note
101.
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fendant deserved mercy: (1) "because he was sorry," (2) "because
you felt s/he would try to make up for what s/he did," and (3) "be-
cause other people wanted to see him/her have another chance."
Few jurors accepted all of these rationales for mercy, and the defen-
dant's remorse was no more widely accepted as a justification for
mercy (27.6%) than his likely recompense (26.6%) or others' desires
to give him another chance (37.3%) . Jurors' responses to these
three items appear in Table 4, Panel C.
The defendant's remorse was the foremost grounds for mercy
among black jurors in B/W cases. These jurors were two-and-a-half
times more likely to say it was "very true" that "the defendant de-
served mercy because he was sorry" than to endorse either of the
other two rationales for mercy as emphatically (15.6% for Table 4,
Panel C.1 versus 6.1% for Table 4, Panels C.2 and C.3). Moreover,
the 44.6-point difference between black and white jurors in accepting
sorrow, at least to some extent,4 6 as grounds for mercy outstrips the
corresponding differences of 29.9 and 18.4 points, respectively, for
the other two rationales in B/W cases. Most decisive, perhaps, is that
black jurors were eight times more likely than white jurors in B/W
cases to say that it was "very" or "fairly" true that the defendant de-
served mercy because he was sorry (31.2% compared with 3.8%).
All three of the rationales for mercy separated blacks and whites
more in the B/W cases than in the B/B and W/W cases. The differ-
ences between blacks and whites in saying "true," at least to some ex-
tent, in the B/W cases were not rivaled in the W/W or B/B cases.
Moreover, the differences are due chiefly to blacks in these cases ris-
ing above the levels in the rest of the sample saying the defendant de-
serves mercy.
Jurors' impressions of the defendant's remorsefulness, their per-
sonal identification with the defendant, and their feelings that the
defendant deserved mercy were interrelated. Black jurors' greater
identification with the defendant and his situation in B/W cases may
make them sensitive to subtle indications of his sorrow or remorse.
Believing that the defendant is sorry may, in turn, encourage black
jurors to feel that the defendant deserves mercy. By contrast, the
tendency of white jurors not to be reminded of someone by a black
defendant and not to imagine themselves in the situation of a black
defendant's family may make them less sensitive to such indications,
and hence less willing to grant mercy to a black defendant on
grounds of remorse.4 7 These tendencies among black and white ju-
rors in B/W cases might also be implicated in their perceptions of the
defendant's dangerousness--the issue to which we now turn.
145 These percentages are based on responses other than "not true" (i.e., on combining "very
true," "fairly true," and "not very true" responses).
46 This percentage combines "very true," "fairly true," and "not very true" responses.
147 See supra note 60.
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3. The Defendant's Future Dangerousness
Jurors' judgments of the defendant's future dangerousness have
become an integral part of the legally authorized grounds for impos-
ing a death sentence in some states,"s and a prerequisite for the
death penalty in Texas"' and Oregon."J Such judgments may be
challenged as arbitrary on the grounds that they are unreliable,"' and
as discriminatory on the grounds that they incorporate racial stereo-
types into the sentencing process."2 In effect, culturally rooted racial
stereotypes may tend to demonize and dehumanize blacks accused of
lethal violence by portraying them as especially dangerous. In this
section, we examine (a) jurors' impressions that the defendant is
dangerous and their concern about his return to society; (b) jurors'
reports of the role of dangerousness and the possibility of earl), re-
lease in sentencing deliberations; and (c) jurors' reported reliance
on their perceptions of the defendant's future dangerousness in mak-
ing the punishment decision. These data are presented in Table 5,
Panels A-C.
148 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. ti. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2
(Mfichie 1977); IWO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (Michie 1977); ef. James R. Acker & C. S.
Lanier, Parsing This Lexican of Death Aggravating Factors in Capital SentrnngStatutes. 30 CRIM. L
BULL. 107, 118-19 (1994) (discussing the statutory vriations in the definition of dangerousness
in Idaho, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, Tex,%as. and Wyoming).
14 SeeTEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
150 See OR. REV. SrAT. § 163.150 (1999).
151 SeeJonathan R Sorensen & James W. Marquart. Prosecutoral md Jul Drmum.lMarng m
Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CMANGE 743. 748-49 nnA5-49
(1990/1991) (collecting studies that discuss the unreliability of such predictions); see aLhJ %tES
NW. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR. AND THE NEEDLE: C.prrAL PUNLSli.ILT IN
TEXAS, 1923-1990, 175 (1994);James NV. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crital Balk Can Jurors
Accuratdy Predict Dangerousness in Capital Casesw 23 LUw & Soc'Y REV. 449 (1989). On the objec-
tive dangerousness of murderers sentenced to death, see James w. Marquart & Jonathan R.
Sorenson, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Asswing the Threat to Stery from
Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A. L REV. 5 (1989); and for their dangerousness relative to noncapi-
tal murderers, see Jonathan R. Sorenson & Rocky L Pilgrim. An Actuanal RL Asssnn of t~o-
lence Posed by Capital MurderDefendants, 90J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1251 (2000).
152 For evidence that criminality, violence, and dangerousness are especially characteristic of
the racial stereotypes of blacks held by whites, seeJohnson, supra note 17. at 1645-1646. See alo
supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 5: Black and white jurors' (a) perceptions of the defendant's
dangerousness, and (b) reports of Dangerousness as top-




Jurors' Race Jurors' Race Jurors' Race
White Black White Black White Black All Cases
A. Perceptions of the Defendant's Likely Dangerousness
1. "Dangerous to Other People" describes the defendant...
Very well 47.1 43.6 58.2 35.3 58.6 63.2 49.8
Fairly well 28.7 25.6 30.9 44.1 31.0 21.1 30.4
Not so well 14.9 10.3 5.5 5.9 10.3 10.5 10.3
Not at all 9.1 20.5 5.5 14.7 0.0 5.3 9.1
(No. ofjurors) (87) (39) (55) (34) (29) (19) (263)
2. The evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous in the fu-
ture
Yes 72.1 67.5 85.2 67.6 86.2 82.4 75.8
No 22.1 25.0 3.7 20.6 10.3 17.6 16.9
Undecided 5.8 7.5 11.1 11.8 3.4 0.0 7.3
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (29) (17) (260)
3. When considering the punishment, you were concerned that [the defen-
dant] might get back into society someday, if not given the death penalty
Yes, greatly
concerned 32.9 30.0 55.8 32.4 34.5 38.9 37.6
Yes, somewhat
concerned 23.5 30.0 17.3 23.5 31.0 22.2 24.0
Yes, but only
slightly
concerned 8.2 12.5 5.8 8.8 10.3 5.6 8.5
No, not at all
concerned 35.3 27.5 21.2 35.3 24.1 33.3 29.8
(No. ofjurors) (85) (40) (52) (34) (29) (18) (258)
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4. How long do you think someone not given the death penalty for capital
murder in this state usually spends in prison?
<10 years 14.9 21.9 24.3 7.4 36.4 8.3 18.8
10-19 years 44.8 46.9 40.5 44.4 27.3 41.7 42.1
20+ years 40.3 31.3 35.1 48.1 36.4 50.0 39.1
(No ofjurors) (67) (32) (37) (27) (22) (12) (197)
B. Focus of Punishment Deliberations
1. The need to prevent him/her from ever killing again
Great deal 36.5 25.6 61.1 57.6 35.7 66.7 44.7
Fair amount 29.4 30.8 20.4 15.2 32.1 11.1 24.9
Not much 9.4 25.6 9.3 12.1 25.0 5.6 13.6
Not at all 24.7 17.9 9.3 15.2 7.1 16.7 16.7
(No. ofjurors) (85) (39) (54) (33) (28) (18) (257)
2. The defendant's dangerousness if ever back in society
Great deal 28.2 35.9 56.6 48.5 35.7 61.1 41.0
Fair amount 36.5 30.8 26.4 36.4 28.6 16.7 31.3
Not much 20.0 12.8 11.3 3.0 25.0 5.6 14.5
Not at all 15.3 20.5 5.7 12.1 10.7 16.7 13.3
(No. ofjurors) (85) (39) (53) (33) (28) (18) (256)
C. Reliance on Dangerousness in the Punishment Decision




for death 36.1 25.8 42.9 8.0 22.2 41.7 31.5
Slightly more
likely to vote
for death 26.4 45.2 14.3 12.0 38.9 25.0 26.0
Slightly less
likely to vote
for death 1.4 0.0 2.4 8.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Not more or
less likely to
vote fore death 36.1 29.0 40.5 72.0 38.9 33.3 40.5
(No. ofjurors) (72) (31) (42) (25) (18) (12) (200)
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a. Dangerousness and Release from Prison
i. Belief that a defendant would be dangerous in the future and con-
cern about his possible return to society divided black and white ju-
rors in B/W cases. White jurors appeared to believe that black de-
fendants are more dangerous than white defendants, and black jurors
appeared to believe that defendants who kill blacks are more danger-
ous than those who kill whites.
We asked two types of questions pertaining to the defendant's
perceived future dangerousness. The first type explicitly used the
term "dangerous." One question asked, "How well do the following
words describe the defendant?" and one of the responses from which
jurors could choose was, "Dangerous to other people." The other
question of this type asked, "After hearing all of the evidence [at the
penalty trial], did you believe it proved that... the defendant would
be dangerous in the future?"
The second type of question pertaining to the defendant's per-
ceived future dangerousness addressed the defendant's possible re-
turn to society. One question asked, "When you were considering the
punishment, were you concerned that [the defendant] might get
back into society someday, if not given the death penalty?" The other
question of this type asked, "How long did you think someone not
given the death penalty for a capital murder in this state usually
spends in prison?" Although dangerousness is not explicitly men-
tioned in these two questions, its implication is palpable.0
3
Jurors' explicit judgment of the defendant's dangerousness, as re-
flected in the first type of question, contrasted with their judgment of
the defendant's remorsefulness and with their lingering doubt about
guilt in two respects. First, a majority rather than a minority of capi-
tal jurors judged the defendant to be dangerous.' v Second, white ju-
rors were more likely than black jurors in B/W cases to make that
judgment. Jurors' responses are shown in Table 5, Panel A.
In B/W cases, the defendant's "dangerousness" was the watch-
word of whitejurors. More white jurors than black jurors saw the de-
fendant as "dangerous" in B/W cases by about twenty percentage
points (differences of 22.9% and 17.6% in Table 5, Panels A.1 and
A.2, respectively). The two questions about release from prison
153 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 120, at 657 (reviewing CJP data demonstrating an associa-
tion betweenjurors' estimates of how long a defendant would serve in prison if not sentenced
to death and their punishment decision making).
154 In this sample, five out of ten jurors (49.8%) said "dangerous to other people" described
the defendant "very well," and another three in ten (30.4%) said "fairly well." See supra tbl.5,
Panel A-1. Fully three quarters (75.8%) said that "the evidence proved that the defendant
would be dangerous in the future." See supra tbl.5, Panel A.2. And six out of ten (61.6%) were
"greatly" or "somewhat" concerned that the defendant might get back into society someday if
not given the death penalty. See supra tbl.5, Panel A.3.
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showed similar differences in B/W cases (differences of 23.4% points
saying "greatly concerned" in Table 5, Panel A.3, and 16.9% saying
released in "less than ten years" in Table 5, Panel A.4). On three of
these indicators of dangerousness (A.1-A3), the differences between
black and white jurors' perceptions were essentially confined to the
B/W cases. Overall, in the B/W cases, where blacks were more likely
to perceive the defendant as remorseful and to have lingering doubts
about his guilt, whites were more apt to see him as dangerous and to
be concerned about his possible return to society.
It appeared further that white jurors saw black defendants as more
dangerous than white defendants, and that black jurors saw defen-
dants who killed blacks as more dangerous than those who killed
whites. 55 In response to the two questions that explicitly asked about
the defendant's "dangerousness" (Table 5, Panels A-1 and A.2), white
jurors said that defendants are more dangerous in black defendant
(B/W and B/B) than in white defendant (W/W) cases,' and black
jurors said defendants are more dangerous in black victim (B/B)
than in white victim (W/W and B/W) cases.,57 Responses to the ques-
tion about the timing of release from prison (Table 5, Panel A.4)
were consistent with the first of these patterns; white jurors said re-
lease would come sooner when the defendant was black, and black
jurors said it would come sooner when the defendant -as white. ju-
rors' concerns about the defendant's possible return to society (Table
5, Panel A.3) were not, however, fully consistent with these patterns.
Regardless of race, jurors in B/B cases were among the most likely to
see the defendant as dangerous and yet were among the least con-
cerned about his return to society. Black jurors might have believed
that the defendant would spend a relatively long time in prison; white
jurors might have believed that the danger he posed, at least as indi-
cated by the race of his victim, would not be to whites.
5 As noted above, these comparisons across type of case are not as reliable as those wuithin
cases of a given type. See supra note 101.
15 Of white jurors, 58.2% and 58.6% perceived black defendants as 'dangerous to other
people," whereas only 47.1% of white jurors characterized white defendants as a danger to oth-
ers. See supra thl.5, Panel A-1. In comparison, 85.2% and 86.2% of white jurors believed black
defendants would be dangerous in the ftiture. However, only 72.1% of white jurors believed
white defendants would be dangerous in the future. See supra thl.5, Panel A.2.
1 When black defendants killed black victims, 63.2% of black jurors characterized black de-
fendants as "dangerous to other people." But when black defendants killed %'hite victims, the
percentage of blackjurors who perceived the defendant as dangerous dropped to 35.3%. And
when white defendants killed white victims, 43.6% of black jurors perceived the defendants as
dangerous to others. See supra thl.5, Panel A.1.
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b. Dangerousness as the Focus of Punishment Deliberations
i. According to both black and white jurors, discussion during pun-
ishment deliberations of the defendant's dangerousness if he were
ever released back into society and of the need to prevent him from
ever killing again was most common in B/W cases.
When the interviews turned to the jury's punishment delibera-
tions, we first asked jurors to tell us in their own words how the jury
reached its punishment decision, including how its discussion began;
what topics it discussed and in what order; whether there were any
major disagreements; and how they were resolved. We then listed a
number of topics and asked how much the discussion among the ju-
rors focused on each topic. The following two topics of discussion
bear on the defendant's dangerousness: (1) "the defendant's
dangerousness if ever back in society" and (2) "the need to prevent
him/her from ever killing again." Jurors' responses by defen-
dant/victim racial combination appear in Table 5, Panel B.
Here we asked jurors about their common experiences rather
than about their own personal views. We might, therefore, expect
black and white jurors from W/W, B/W, and B/B cases to agree on
how much discussion such topics received, regardless of how much
their own views on such matters diverged. In fact, more jurors of
each race indicated that dangerousness received a great deal more
attention in B/W than in W/W cases. In response to both questions,
the differences between W/W and B/W cases for jurors of each race
were greater than the differences between black and white jurors
within B/W and W/W cases.5 In the B/B cases, however, there was
disagreement between black and white jurors about the amount of
discussion during deliberations that was dedicated to the defendant's
dangerousness. Perhaps the fact that white jurors in these cases ex-
pressed their estimates of earlier release dates prompted black jurors
to feel that dangerousness and release from prison received a great
deal of attention in deliberations.5 9
Despite the greater discussion of dangerousness during jury de-
liberations on punishment in the B/W than in the W/W cases, black
15 The differences between black and white jurors within B/W and W/W cases are 10.9 and
3.5 points, respectively, as contrasted with differences of 24.6 and 32.0 points between B/W and
W/W cases for black and white jurors, respectively. See supra tbl.5, Panel B.1. The correspond-
ing differences in Table 5, Panel B.2 are 7.7 and 8.1 between blacks and whites within B/W and
W/W cases, as contrasted with differences of 28.4 and 12.6 between B/W and W/W cases for
black and for white jurors. For a discussion of comparisons between black and white jurors
from cases of a given defendant/victim racial combination versus comparisons between cases of
different defendant/victim racial combinations forjurors of a given race, see supra note 101.
159 This difference of perspective on the substance ofjury deliberations occurred among the
least well represented jurors in our study. The small number ofjurors, especially black jurors,
in the thirteen B/W cases makes the statistics based on their responses less reliable.
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jurors in B/W cases were not persuaded of the defendant's
dangerousness (as noted above, fewer blacks than whites in B/W
cases saw the defendant as dangerous). Perhaps, instead, these juries
discussed this topic heavily during deliberations as a result of black
and white jurors' having divergent views of the defendant's
dangerousness. That is, jurors' disputes over the defendant's
dangerousness may have occurred in response to the white jurors' ef-
forts to persuade blackjurors of their view.
c. Reliance on Dangerousness in the Punishment Decision
i. In B/W cases, white jurors were the most likely, and black jurors
the least likely, to report that the defendant's future dangerousness
made them much more likely to vote for the death penalty in B/W
cases.
We asked jurors a series of questions about the role of various fac-
tors in their punishment decisions. One question focused on the
possibility of the defendant's future danger to society. Specifically,
we presented jurors with the following statement: "There is a possi-
bility that the defendant would be a danger to society in the future,"
and then we asked them whether this factor did (or would) '_' make
them "much more likely," "slightly more likely," "slightly less likely,"
"much less likely," or "just as likely" to vote for death. Black and
white jurors' responses to this question in the W/W, B/W, and B/B
cases appear in Table 5, Panel C.
Jurors' perceptions of the defendant's dangerousness appear to
have had a very different effect on the sentencing decisions of black
and white jurors in B/W cases. Whites in these cases were the most
likely of any group (42.9%) to say that dangerousness did or would
make them "much more likely" to vote for death. Among black ju-
rors, by contrast, fewer than one in ten (8%) answered that they were
or would be "much more likely," and only one in five (20%) that they
were or would be "much" or "somewhat" more likely to vote for death
because they believed the defendant to be dangerous. Blackjurors in
these cases were far more likely than white jurors to reject
dangerousness as a ground for making the punishment decision; 72%
of blacks, as opposed to 40.5% of whites, said the defendant's possi-
ble dangerousness did or would make no difference in their punish-
160 K in response to an earlier question,jurors indicated that future dangerousness %%as not a
factor in their decision making, they were asked, if it were a factor, would it hae tmade them
more or less likely to vote for death. In these cases, 73.8% of the jurors indicated that the de-
fendant's likely dangerousness was a factor in the case; hence, the responses shown in Table 5.
Panel C.1 are largely assessments of the role dangerousness actually did pla in their punish-
ment decisions. In this sample ofjurors from cases 'ith interniew from both black and %thite
jurors, there were too few jurors who said it %as not a factor to permit a comparison of those
who answered this as a hypothetical question ith those who reported on actual experience.
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ment decisions.
The defendant's future dangerousness is one of the most uncer-
tain and illusory judgments that jurors may be asked to make."" This
perception is subject to mistaken claims and rhetorical arguments. 2
In B/W cases, in which white jurors were more likely than their black
counterparts to see the defendant as dangerous, both black and white
jurors reported that a great deal of discussion during punishment de-
liberations focused on the defendant's likely dangerousness. It would
appear that in B/W cases, white jurors were especially likely to stress
the defendant's dangerousness as a reason for the death penalty.
Perhaps this fact underscores white jurors' belief that in the absence
of a death sentence, such defendants will usually be back on the
streets far sooner than black jurors believe. For their part, black ju-
rors were less willing to concede that the defendant was dangerous
(Table 5, Panels A.1 and A.2), to believe that such offenders soon re-
turn to society if not given the death penalty (Table 5, Panel A.4), or,
indeed, to be concerned about the defendant's release from prison
(Table 5, Panel A.3). Black jurors were conspicuous in rejecting this
consideration of a defendant's dangerousness in deciding to vote for
life or death (Table 5, Panel C. 1). Perhaps black jurors' renunciation
of dangerousness as a ground for death is a reaction to the pressure
that they feel from white jurors to make dangerousness the rationale
for a final death verdict.
D. The Character ofJury Decision Making
The differences between black and white jurors in their lingering
doubt, their perceptions of remorse, and their beliefs about future
dangerousness are contrasts between jurors who typically differ
greatly in their numbers or representation on the jury and quite pos-
sibly in their prominence or influence in jury decision making.
Moreover, these differences of perspective were most pronounced in
the B/W cases, where black and white jurors' initial stands on pun-
ishment were most divergent and became progressively more polar-
ized over the course of the trial. For these reasons, black and white
jurors may perceive jury deliberations on punishment quite differ-
ently, especially in the B/W cases. Such differences in jurors' experi-
ences may be reflected in their responses to questions about (a) the
161 See Mark D. Cunningham & ThomasJ. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate Data in Violence Risk As-
sessments at Capital Sentencing 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 71 (1998).
162 Research has shown that jurors grossly underestimate how long the defendant will usually
spend in prison if not sentenced to death. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 120, at 645; Benja-
min D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early
Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAW & Soc'" REv. 461, 472 (1999). In each of
the eleven states studied, mostjurors believed that the defendant would usually be out of prison
even before the laws of those states made them eligible for parole if sentenced to a term in
prison rather than the death penalty. Id at 475 tbl.2.
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character of jury deliberations on punishment, and (b) the juror's
own experience as a member of the jury. Jurors' responses to such
questions are shown in Table 6, Panels A and B, respectively.
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TABLE 6: Black and white jurors (a) characterizations of the jury's
decision making on punishment, and (b) personal expe-




Jurors' Race Jurors' Race Jurors' Race
White Black White Black White Black All Cases
A. Characterizations of the Jury's Decision Making on Punishment
1. Closeminded, intolerant of disagreement
Very well - 2.6 - 2.9 - - 0.8
Fairly well 5.8 15.8 7.4 26.5 14.3 16.7 12.0
Not so well 27.9 23.7 25.9 32.4 25.0 33.3 27.5
Not at all 66.3 57.9 66.7 38.2 60.7 50.0 57.9
(No. ofjurors) (86) (38) (54) (34) (28) (18) (258)
2. Too quick to make a decision, in a hurry
Very well 2.3 - - 8.8 3.6 5.9 2.7
Fairly well 5.8 7.7 3.7 8.8 3.6 - 5.4
Not so well 23.3 23.1 16.7 23.5 25.0 11.8 21.3
Not at all 68.6 69.2 79.6 58.5 67.9 82.4 70.5
(No. ofjurors) (86) (39) (54) (34) (28) (17) (258)
3. Dominated by a few strong personalities
Very well 10.6 5.3 5.6 26.5 11.1 22.2 11.7
Fairly well 31.8 18.4 16.7 20.6 14.8 16.7 22.3
Not so well 24.7 21.1 20.4 23.5 22.2 16.7 22.3
Not at all 32.9 55.3 57.4 29.4 51.9 44.4 43.8
(No. ofjurors) (85) (38) (54) (34) (27) (18) (256)
B. Personal Experience as a Capital Juror
1. You felt like an outsider
Very well 2.3 7.7 - 8.8 - - 3.1
Fairly well 1.2 - 1.9 2.9 - - 1.2
Not so well 1.2 5.1 1.9 8.8 7.1 - 3.5
Not at all 95.3 87.2 96.3 79.4 92.9 100.0 92.3
(No. ofjurors) (86) (39) (54) (34) (28) (18) (259)
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2. Were you among...
Most talkative 48.8 52.5 44.4 20.6 25.9 33.3 41.3
Least talkative 4.7 17.5 7.4 11.8 18.5 22.2 10.8
In between 46.5 30.0 48.1 67.6 55.6 44.4 47.9
(No. ofjurors) (86) (40) (54) (34) (27) (18) (259)
3. Do you wish you had done anything different?
No 86.2 92.1 96.3 76.5 93.1 94.7 89.3
Yes 13.8 7.9 3.7 23.5 6.9 5.3 10.7
(No. ofjurors) (87) (38) (54) (34) (29) (19) (261)
1. The Nature of Punishment Deliberations
a. Black jurors in the B1W cases were most likely to believe that the jun
rushed to a verdict, was intolerant of disagreement, and was dominated b a
few outspoken jurors.
We asked jurors: "In your mind, how well do the following words
describe the jury?" The responses from which jurors could choose
included (1) "too quick to make a decision, in a hurry," (2) "closed-
minded, intolerant of disagreement," and (3) "dominated by a few
strong personalities." Mostjurors were reluctant to apply these unfa-
vorable descriptions. Indeed, a majority of the jurors denied that the
jury was intolerant of disagreement (57.9%) or too quick to make its
decision (70.5%). A majority reported that at least to some extent
the jury was dominated by a few strong personalities (56.3%). Black
and white jurors' responses to these three items appear in Table 6,
Panel A.
Black jurors in B/W cases were the most likely to voice each of
these complaints about the jury's decision making. They were several
times more likely than their white counterparts in the same B/W
cases to affirm these characterizations as a description that fit thejury
"very" or "fairly" well. Black jurors were four times more likely than
white jurors to say that the jury was "too quick to make a decision"
(16.7% vs. 3.7%). Further, black jurors were almost four times more
likely than whites to say the jury was "intolerant of disagreement"
(29.4% vs. 7.4%). And blacks were more than twice as likely as whites
to say that the jury was "dominated by a few strong personalities"
(47.1% vs. 23.7%). In all three instances, the greatest divergence ap-
peared between jurors who denied the characterization altogether
(the "not at all" response) and those who gave it at least some cre-
dence (black-white differences of 28.5, 21.1, and 28.0 points, respec-
tively).
In the intraracial cases, we found no consistent tendency for black
jurors to voice these complaints. In fact, in B/B cases, whites were
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more likely than blacks to say it was true, at least to some extent, that
the jury was too quick to make a decision (32.2% vs. 17.7%). In W/W
cases, whites were more likely to complain that the jury was domi-
nated by a few strong personalities (67.1% vs. 44.86%). Therefore,
only in the B/W cases did black jurors make stronger and more con-
sistent claims than white jurors that the jury rushed to a verdict, was
intolerant of disagreement, and was dominated by a few outspoken
jurors. It is in these B/W cases that we have seen the greatest differ-
ences of perspective between black and white jurors on matters rele-
vant to the sentencing decision.
2. Personal Experience as a CapitalJuror
a. Black jurors in B/W cases were least likely to be among the most talkative
during juiy deliberation, most apt to feel like an outsider, and most likely to
wish they had said or done something differently.
In addition to asking jurors to describe the jury, we asked them
about their own experiences as, and feelings about, serving as a capi-
tal juror. These questions included (1) whether "you felt like an out-
sider," (2) whether during jury deliberations "you [were] among the
most talkative, the least talkative, or in between," and (3) whether
"there [is] anything you wish you had said or done differently when
you think back about serving as a juror on the case." Jurors' re-
sponses appear in Table 6, Panel B.
In terms of these personal reactions or experiences, black jurors
in B/W cases are conspicuous in their alienation. They were the
most likely to have felt "like an outsider" on the jury: more than 20%
of black jurors in B/W cases, as compared to less than 5% of white ju-
rors, felt like an outsider, at least to some extent (20.5% vs. 3.8%).
Black jurors were least likely to say that they were among the most
talkative jurors-only half as many blacks as whites in B/W cases said
that they were among the most talkative during jury deliberations
(44.4% vs. 20.6%). Blackjurors were the most likely to say that they
wished they had said or done things differently-six times as many
black as white jurors in B/W cases were haunted by the failure to
have said or done something differently (23.5% vs. 3.7%).
In the intraracial cases, the black-white differences were slight or
erratic. In feeling like an outsider and in wishing they had said or
done something differently, there was little variation between black
and whitejurors. Blacks were more likely than whites to say they were
among the most talkative in B/B cases; in W/W cases, blacks reported
being both most and least talkative and the least likely to say they fell
"in between."
Jurors' responses to these questions about the jury's decision-
making process and their role in that process indicate a failure of the
jury to function properly from the perspective of many black jurors in
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B/W cases. This is hardly surprising in view of their minority stands
on lingering doubt and the defendant's remorsefulness, their depar-
ture from the white majority in their assessments of the defendant's
dangerousness, and especially their reluctance to make
dangerousness a ground for imposing the death penalty. These are
fundamental judgments that black jurors bring to bear on the pro-
found choice between a punishment of life imprisonment or death.
Their failure to be among the most outspoken where they see the
jury as rushing to a decision and not tolerating differences of opinion
is consistent with feeling like an outsider and with uishing, in retro-
spect, to have said or done things differently.
E. A Closer Look at tMe B/IW Cases
The analysis thus far shows the greatest differences between black
and white jurors in cases in which they have comicted a black defen-
dant of murdering a white victim. It is these B/W cases in which
black and white jurors differed most in their stands on the defen-
dant's punishment over the course of the trial (Table 2), in their lin-
gering doubt about the defendant's guilt (Table 3), in their impres-
sions of the defendant's remorsefulness (Table 4), in their
perceptions of his dangerousness (Table 5), and in their experiences
serving as capital jurors (Table 6). These are also the cases in which
jury composition, particularly the dominance of white males and the
presence of black males, strongly influenced whether the jury would
impose the death penalty or a life sentence (Table 1, Panel B). In
light of these findings, we now concentrate in more detail on the
B/W cases to the exclusion of their W/W and B/B counterparts. In
this closer look at the B/W cases, we examine first how jurors' race
and gender together affect considerations of lingering doubt, re-
morsefulness, and dangerousness. We then consider the joint effect
ofjurors' race and the racial composition of the jury with respect to
some of the factors we have examined. When the data were broken
down by jurors' race and gender or by jurors' race and jury composi-
tion, the number of jurors was small enough that only the most size-
able and consistent percentage differences would be statistically reli-
able. This was particularly true for black jurors, who accounted for
fewer of this study's subjects than whitejurors. Therefore, we present
only those data that showed sizeable and consistent patterns in con-
nection with jurors' race and gender (Table 7) and with jurors' race
and jury composition (Table 8).
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1. Jurors' Race and Gender in BIW Cases
The evidence that the sentencing outcomes of B/W cases were
strongly affected by the numbers of black and white males on the jury
(Table 1, Panel B) suggests that the observed differences in lingering
doubt, impressions of remorse, and perceptions of dangerousness be-
tween black and white jurors in these cases may result primarily from
differences between the males of the two races. Perhaps the males of
each race tended to take more extreme positions than the females
and/or were more effective in making their positions felt in the give-
and-take of jury deliberations and in the final punishment decisions.
In this section we return to the issues of lingering doubt, remorseful-
ness, and dangerousness to consider their relation to both race and
gender (Table 7, Panels A-C).
DEATH SENTENCING IN BL-ACK A) Ii7FFE
TABLE 7: Elements of (a) lingering doubts (b) the defendant's re-
morse and identification, and (c) dangerousness and early
release by jurors' race and gender in black defendant-
white victim cases
Jurors' Race and Gender
White White Black Black
Males Females Males Females
A. Lingering Doubts
1. Importance of lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt for you in de-
ciding on punishment
Very - 12.5 26.7 21.1
Fairly 6.9 - 26.7 15.8
Not very 6.9 8.3 - 15.8
Not at all 86.2 79.2 46.7 47.4
(No. ofjurors) (29) (24) (15) (19)
2. When considering punishment, did you think the defendant might not be
the one most responsible for the killing?
Yes 10.3 4.0 60.0 36.8
No 86.2 96.0 40.0 52.6
Not sure 3.4 - - 10.5
(No. ofjurors) (29) (25) (15) (19)
B. Remorse and Identification
1. How well does "Sorry for what s/he did" describe the defendant?
Very well 7.4 20.0 46.7 31.6
Fairly well 7.4 - 33.3 21.1
Not so well 33.3 40.0 6.7 15.8
Not at all 51.9 40.0 13.3 31.6
(No. ofjurors) (27) (25) (15) (19)
2. Did you imagine yourself in the defendant's situation?
Yes 26.7 28.0 53.3 31.6
No 73.3 72.0 46.7 68.4
(No. ofjurors) (30) (25) (15) (19)
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3. Did you imagine yourself in the defendant's family's situation?
Yes 30.0 48.0 80.0 47.4
No 60.0 48.0 13.3 47.4
Not sure 10.0 4.0 6.7 5.3
(No. ofjurors) (30) (25) (15) (19)
C. Dangerousness and Early Release
1. "Dangerous to Other People" describes the defendant...
Very well 63.3 52.0 26.7 42.1
Fairly well 30.0 32.0 53.3 36.8
Not so well 3.3 8.0 - 10.5
Not at all 3.3 8.0 20.0 10.5
(No. ofjurors) (30) (25) (15) (19)
2. How long did you think someone not given the death penalty for a capital
murder in this state usually spends in prison?
0-9 years 30.0 17.6 7.7 7.1
10-19 years 30.0 52.9 30.8 57.1
20+ years 40.0 29.4 61.5 35.7
(No. ofjurors) (20) (17) (13) (14)
a. Black males were most likely to have lingering doubt about the defendant's
guilt, followed by black females. Whites of both genders had little residual or
lingering doubt.
We observed in Table 3 that in B/W cases black jurors were far
more likely than their white counterparts to have lingering doubts
about the defendant's guilt. When we examined lingering doubt by
jurors' gender as well as by race (Table 7, Panel A), it was evident that
more black males than females had lingering doubts about the de-
fendant's guilt (Table 7, Panel A.1) and that their doubts were chiefly
about the extent of the defendant's involvement or responsibility for
the crime (Table 7, Panel A.2). Indeed, 53.4% of black males, as
compared to 36.9% of black females, indicated that doubts about the
defendant's guilt were "very" or "fairly" important considerations for
them in selecting his punishment (Table 7, Panel A.1). (The corre-
sponding figures for white males and white females were 6.9% and
12.5%, respectively.) Consistent with this pattern, more black males
(60%) than black females (36.8%) said that they thought the defen-
dant might not be the one most responsible for the killing (Table 7,
Panel A.2).
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b. Black males were the most likely, and white males the least lihely, to see the
defendant as remorseful and to identify with the defendant's or his family's
situation.
The greatest difference in jurors' impressions of the defendant's
remorsefulness was between those of black and white male jurors.
The same was true of the difference in jurors' identification with the
defendants' situation and with that of his family. Black males ex-
ceeded all other race and gender groupings in the percentage who
answered that "sorry" described the defendant very well (46.7%), and
to an even greater extent, in the percentage who answvered very or
fairly well (80%). White males were the least likely, falling below
white females, to see the defendant as sorry: few white males (14.8%)
said "sorry" described the defendant very or fairly well (Table 7, Panel
B.1). Black males were also by far the most likely to imagine them-
selves in the defendant's situation (53.3%, Table 7, Panel B.2) and in
his family's situation (80%, Table 7, Panel B.3). These figures were
well above those for the other race and gender categories. White
males identified with the situation of the defendant's family less often
than any other race-gender group (30%, Table 7, Panel B.3).
c. White males were the most likely, and black males the least likely, to see the
defendant as dangerous and to believe that he would be released from prison
soon if not given the death penalty.
In perceived dangerousness, like remorsefulness, males of the two
races were at the extremes, but their positions were reversed. White
males were the most likely, and black males the least likely, to see the
defendant as dangerous to others (Table 7, Panel C.1). Whiite males
and black males differed by a substantial gulf of 36.6 points in their
responses to the issue of dangerousness (63.3% and 26.7%, respec-
tively). Moreover, white males were well above the other race and
gender categories in believing that the defendant would be back in
society in less than ten years. White males were almost twice as likely
as white females to believe that there would be an early prison release
(30% and 17.6%, respectively) and four times as likely as black males
or females to believe this (30% vs. 7.7% and 7.1%, respectively). For
their part, black males were the most likely to believe that such de-
fendants usually spend at least twenty years in prison (a difference of
21.5 points compared to white males). Perceptions of dangerousness
and estimates of time before release are a compound prescription for
a death sentence that grossly separated black and white male jurors.
The chief contrasts in these areas were between white males and
black males, especially in the critical areas of impressions of remorse
and perceptions of dangerousness. That is, the black-white differ-
ences in B/W cases shown in Tables 3-5 were even more pronounced
when the comparisons were between males of the respective races.
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Finding the males of each race at the extremes in these punishment-
related considerations is reminiscent of the revelation in Table 1 that
it is the number of males of each race on the jury that most substan-
tially affected the sentencing outcomes in the B/W cases. This find-
ing sets the stage for a closer look at the effects ofjury composition in
conjunction with juror's race, to which we now turn.
2. Jurors' Race and Jury Composition in B/W Cases
The effects of white male dominance and black male presence in
B/W cases, shown in Table 1, Panel B, suggest something more than
the simple aggregation of individual perspectives on lingering doubt,
remorse, and dangerousness. The abrupt changes in sentencing out-
comes at distinct points in the numbers of black and white male ju-
rors is due to more than an additive increase in individual jurors' pro-
life sentence or pro-death sentence inclinations. The existence of
such abrupt changes suggests that jury composition alters the dynam-
ics of decision making and that the perspectives of jurors, both black
and white, may be affected by the numbers of white males and black
males on the jury.
In this section, we look at the impact of jury composition on the
thinking and experience of individual black and white jurors where
white male dominance is present (juries with five or more white
males) and where it is absent (juries with four or fewer white
males) . 65 There was an insufficient number of cases where there
were no black male jurors to permit a comparison of cases with and
without the presence of black males.' Black and white jurors' re-
sponses to selected questions (a) in the areas of lingering doubt, re-
morsefulness, and dangerousness and (b) in their thinking and expe-
rience as capital jurors on cases with and without white male
dominance appear in Table 8, Panels A and B. '65
163 The twenty-four B/W cases divided evenly between those with and without white male
dominance: twelve B/W cases had five or more white male jurors and twelve had four or fewer.
16A In all but four of these twenty-four B/W cases there was at least one black male juror.
165 With black males present in twenty of these twenty-four B/W cases, any differences be-
tween juries with and without white male dominance are largely characteristic of cases with a
black male present and, therefore, relatively independent of variation in black male presence.
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TABLE 8: Elements of (a) lingering doubts, remorsefulness, and
dangerousness; (b) jury decision making on punishment;
and (c) experience as a capital juror by jurors' race in
black defendant-white victim cases
Dominated by White Males Undominated by White
Males
White Black White Black
Jurors Jurors Jurors Jurors
A. Elements of Lingering Doubt, Remorsefulness, and Dangerousness
1. During guilt deliberations, were you or any jurors reluctant to go along
with the majority?
Yes 7.7 50.0 14.8 33.3
No 38.5 31.3 40.7 22.2
No reluctance 53.8 18.8 44.4 44.4
(No. ofjurors) (26) (16) (27) (18)
2. When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that [the de-
fendant] was truly sorry for the crime?
Yes, sure
defendant
was sorry - 12.5 7.1 16.7
Yes, I think
defendant
was sorry - 12.5 7.1 44.4
Not sure, def.
acted sorry but
it may have been
just a show 17.4 18.8 17.9 11.1
No, def. acted
sorry but it was
a show 4.3 12.5 21.4 -
No, def. didn't
even pretend
to be sorry 78.3 43.8 46.4 27.8
(No. ofjurors) (23) (16) (28) (18)
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3. Did you imagine yourself in the defendant's situation?
Yes 25.9 43.8 28.6 38.9
No 74.1 56.3 71.4 61.1
(No. ofjurors) (27) (16) (28) (18)
4. Did the possibility that defendant would be a danger to society in the fu-
ture make you more or less likely to vote for death?
Much more
likely 60.0 7.1 27.3 9.1
Slightly more
likely 10.0 14.3 18.2 9.1
Not more or
less likely 30.0 64.3 50.0 81.8
Slightly less
likely - 14.3 4.5
(No. ofjurors) (20) (14) (22) (11)
5. How long did you think someone not given the death penalty for a capital
murder in this state usually spends in prison?
0-9 years 33.3 6.7 15.8 8.3
10-19 years 27.8 46.7 52.6 41.7
20+ years 38.9 46.7 31.6 50.0
(No. ofjurors) (18) (15) (19) (12)
B. Jury Decision Making
1. Closed minded, intolerant of disagreement
Very well - 6.3 -
Fairly well 7.7 31.3 7.1 22.2
Not so well 34.6 37.5 17.9 27.8
Not at all 57.7 25.0 75.0 50.0
(No. ofjurors) (26) (16) (28) (18)
2. Dominated by a few strong personalities
Very well 3.8 37.5 7.1 16.7
Fairly well 15.4 18.8 17.9 22.2
Not so well 15.4 18.8 25.0 27.8
Not at all 65.4 25.0 50.0 33.3
(No. ofjurors) (26) (16) (28) (18)
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3. You felt like an outsider
Very well - 12.5 - .6
Fairly well 3.8 6.3 - -
Not so well - 12.5 3.6 5.6
Not at all 96.2 68.8 96.4 88.9
(No. ofjurors) (26) (16) (28) (18)
4. Do you wish you had done anything different?
No 96.3 56.3 96.3 94.4
Yes 3.7 43.8 3.7 5.6
(No. ofjurors) (27) (16) (27) (18)
a. On white-male-dominated juries, white jurors, as compared to blach jurors,
were far less reluctant to join the capital murder verdict, much more willing to
reject indications of the defendant's renwrsefulness, and far more likely to say
that the defendant's possible dangerousness made them much more likely to
vote for death.
The responses of black and white jurors to selected questions
about lingering doubt, impressions of the defendant's remorseful-
ness, and perceptions of his dangerousness in B/W cases with and
without white male dominance appear in Table 8, Panel A.
White-male-dominated juries showed a stark racial divide in doubt
about guilt, as reflected in the reluctance of black jurors to join the
capital murder verdict (Table 8, Panel A.1). On such juries, few
white jurors (7.7%) but fully half of the black jurors (50%) said that
they, themselves, were reluctant to vote guilty of capital murder. The
difference between the races was far smaller in cases with four or
fewer white male jurors (14.8% of whites vs. 33.3% of blacks).
On white-male-dominated juries, white jurors were especially
likely to deny the black defendant's remorsefulness by saying that
"the defendant didn't even pretend to be sorry" (Table 8, Panel A.2).
Three out of four whites (78.3%) on such juries, as compared to only
two-fifths of the blacks (43.8%), characterized the defendant as not
even pretending to be sorry, a 34.5-point gap. On juries with no
more than four white males, the difference between black and white
jurors in interpreting the defendant's courtroom behavior this way
was only 18.6 points (46.4% vs. 27.8%, respectively). Identification
with the defendant's situation was also least common among white
jurors on white-male-dominated juries and most common among
black jurors on such juries (Table 8, Panel A.3).
It was white jurors on white-male-dominated juries who were con-
spicuous in saying that the defendant's dangerousness was a major
sentencing consideration (Table 8, Panel A.4). Six out of ten whites
(60%), in contrast to few blacks (7.1%), on such juries indicated that
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the possibility that the defendant would be a danger to society in the
future did or would make them "much more likely to vote for death."
Compared to this 50-point gap between white and black jurors on
white-male-dominated juries, juries with four or fewer white males
showed less than a 20-point difference between white and black ju-
rors who said the defendant's dangerousness did or would make
them much more likely to vote for death (27.3% vs. 9.1%). Further-
more, the critical role of dangerousness in the decision making of
white jurors on these white-male-dominated juries appeared to have
been compounded by their estimates of the time the defendant
would serve if he were not given a death sentence: whites in these
cases were five times as likely as blacks to believe that such defendants
would be back on the streets in less than ten years.
Finally, we turn to the effect of white male dominance on capital
juries, and particularly on black jurors' perspectives of the jury's deci-
sion-making process and their own experiences as capital jurors (Ta-
ble 8, Panel B).
b. On white-male-dominated juries in B/W cases, black jurors were critical of
the jury's decision-making process and especially discontented with their own
experiences as capital jurors.
We have seen that black jurors, compared to their white counter-
parts, believed that the jury was intolerant of disagreement and
dominated by a few strong personalities. These black jurors felt like
outsiders and wished they had said or done things differently (Table
6). We now see in Table 8, Panel B, that these views of black jurors
are foremost the result of serving on white-male-dominated juries.
The concentration of dissatisfaction and alienation among black
jurors on white-male-dominated juries was reflected in their re-
sponses to each of these characterizations of the jury and in their ex-
pressions of personal discontent. Black jurors on white-male-
dominated juries were the most likely to say "intolerant of disagree-
ment" characterized the jury very well or fairly well (37.6%) and to
say that "dominated by a few strong personalities" fit the jury very well
(37.5%). White jurors on white-male-dominated juries were far less
likely to voice such criticisms (the corresponding figures were all less
than 10%).
Equally pronounced were the personal reactions to jury service
that distinguished these black jurors on white-male-dominated juries
from the other categories ofjurors. Eight times as many of these ju-
rors, as compared to both categories of white jurors, felt "like an out-
sider" on the jury at least to some extent (combining the responses
very well, fairly well, and not so well, 31.3%, as compared to 3.8% and
3.6% of whitejurors). Ten times as many black jurors as white jurors
on white-male-dominated juries wished they had said or done some-
thing differently when they recalled serving as a juror (43.8% as
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compared to 3.7% among both categories of white jurors).
Across the board, white male dominance appeared to encourage
intolerance of disagreement; both white and black jurors saw more
such intolerance in juries dominated by white men (differences of
17.3 and 25.1 points, respectively). Moreover, it was particularly the
black jurors on these white-male-dominated juries who reported re-
gretting that they did not say or do something differendy (43.8%
compared to a high of 5.6%). While the far greater regret of black
jurors on white-male-dominated juries was surely encouraged by feel-
ing "like an outsider" and being confronted with intolerance of dis-
agreement, it is also likely due to the much more frequent imposition
of death sentences by such juries.
F. Overview of Statistical Patterns
Heretofore, where system-wide racial bias in sentencing outcomes
has been demonstrated, such bias has been most pronounced in B/W
cases." We now see that both the racial composition of the jury and
the race of the individual juror are implicated in this story. The de-
fendant in a B/W case who draws an all-white jury is much more
likely to receive a death sentence than the defendant who draws a
jury with one or more black males. Juries with five or more white
males are especially likely to impose the death penalty in B/W cases.
We have labeled these opposing influences ofjury racial composition
the "black male presence" effect and the "white male dominance" ef-
fect.
Race also distinguishes the decision-making patterns of individual
jurors. In B/W cases, black and white jurors differ early in the trial
about what the punishment should be and become further polarized
as the trial proceeds. The white jurors are quicker to take a stand on
punishment than their black counterparts. At the time of sentencing
instructions, well over half of white jurors think the punishment
should be death. By the time of the jury's first vote on punishment,
most black jurors think the punishment should be life imprisonment.
This progressive divergence in jurors' stands on punishment in essen-
tially the same cases demonstrates that black and white jurors make
different, apparently race-linked interpretations of the same evi-
dence.
Specifically, these differences of interpretation include the future
dangerousness of the defendant, the defendant's remorsefulness over
the crime, and even the possibility that the defendant is not guilty of
capital murder. Black and white jurors are sharply divided on these
matters in B/W cases. White jurors are particularly likely to see the
defendant as a danger to society, and black jurors are especially likely
16 See supra notes 24-26.
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to see the black defendant as remorseful or to have lingering doubts
about his guilt. In effect, black and white jurors in B/W cases have
different concerns and focus on different considerations, with oppos-
ing implications for the defendant's punishment.
The black jurors' lingering doubts in B/W cases encompass ques-
tions of the defendant's motivation and responsibility for the crime,
as well as his actual involvement in the killing. Their doubts are not
simply afterthoughts but concerns that they manifest in their stands
on guilt prior to the jury's guilt deliberations, at the jury's first vote
on guilt, and in reaching the final guilt determination. Nor are black
jurors' misgivings about guilt confined to the B/W cases. In both
W/W and B/B cases, lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt are
also more common among black than white jurors. Black jurors' lin-
gering doubts appear to reflect a more general mistrust of the crimi-
nal justice process.
Black jurors' greater sense than their white counterparts of the
defendant's remorsefulness in B/W cases appears to be rooted fore-
most in their ability to identify with the defendant or to imagine
themselves to be like him and to see themselves in his situation.
White jurors, in contrast, are especially unlikely to be reminded of
someone by the defendant or to place themselves in the situation of
the defendant's family in such cases. In turn, blacks are most, and
whites least, likely to believe that the defendant deserved mercy on
the grounds of his remorsefulness. In W/W and B/B cases, as well,
more black than white jurors see the defendant as remorseful. In
black defendant cases (i.e., in both B/W and B/B cases), white jurors
are especially likely to see the defendant as lacking remorse and to
deny that the defendant even pretended to be sorry.
The tables turn when it comes to dangerousness. White jurors in
B/W cases are the ones most likely to see the defendant as danger-
ous. Compounding their concern about dangerousness, they are also
the ones most likely to believe that he will serve a relatively short term
in prison if not given a death sentence. Both black and white jurors
in these cases agree that the defendant's dangerousness and his pos-
sible return to society were discussed a great deal in jury delibera-
tions; however, only white jurors are much more likely to vote for
death as a result of their perception of the defendant's
dangerousness. Jurors' responses from all three defendant/victim
racial combinations suggest that white jurors believe black defendants
are more dangerous than white defendants, and that black jurors be-
lieve defendants who killed blacks are more dangerous than those
who killed whites.
The races also differ most in the B/W cases on what they think
about the functioning of the jury and how they experience capital
jury service. Black jurors on these cases are the ones most likely to
see the jury as rushing to judgment, as intolerant of disagreement,
and as dominated by a few strong personalities. They are also the
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most likely to feel like outsiders on the jury and to wish they had said
or done things differently during punishment deliberations. Black
jurors' discontent with the jury and their alienation from their fellow
jurors in B/W cases undoubtedly result from the divergence of their
perspectives from those of the white majority on the issues of linger-
ing doubt, remorse, and dangerousness; issues that are fundamental
to jurors' punishment decision.
Introducing gender into the analysis of the B/W cases reveals fur-
ther that it is the males of both races who are most at odds in percep-
tions of the defendant's remorsefulness and dangerousness. Black
males, to a greater extent than black females, exceed whites of both
genders in lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt. The num-
bers ofjurors are small when broken down by both race and gender,
but the differences between white and black males are larger than
those between white and black females on a number of important is-
sues. These issues include jurors' misgivings about the defendant's
primary responsibility for the murder, the importance of lingering
doubt as a sentencing consideration, jurors' impressions of the de-
fendant's remorse, jurors' identification with the defendant and his
family, jurors' perception of the defendant's dangerousness, and ju-
rors' estimates of the alternatives to a death sentence.
The racial composition of thejury adds a further dimension to the
story of disparities between white and black jurors in B/W cases. On
juries dominated by white males, black-white differences are accentu-
ated. Indeed, such dominance may promote or provoke disparities
between black and white jurors. Blacks and whites on white-male-
dominated juries differ greatly in their perspectives on lingering
doubt, remorsefulness, and dangerousness. On white-male-
dominated juries, white jurors are especially likely to say that the de-
fendant did not even pretend to be sorry, to see him as dangerous in
the future, to think that he would get out of prison relatively soon if
not given death, and to say that his future dangerousness made them
much more likely to vote for death. Black jurors in these cases are
the most likely to say that the jury was intolerant of disagreement
and, not surprisingly, to say that they felt like outsiders on the jury
and wished that they had said or done things differently.
These data leave open questions about the dynamics of jury deci-
sion making. Do the race-linked perspectives on lingering doubt,
remorse, and dangerousness improve understanding and insights or
breed conflict and turmoil? Do these differences encourage or dis-
courage premature stands on punishment? Do black and white ju-
rors collaborate to reach a reasoned moral judgment about punish-
ment, as the Supreme Court supposes,'- or does the white majority
167 See, eg., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (agreeing %ithl defendant's argument
that the jury must be allowed to express its "reasoned moral response' in determining w'ether
death was the appropriate punishment); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164. 184 (1988)
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deceive, intimidate, or manipulate minority jurors, as Ms. Daniels re-
counts in the Hance case? Answers may be gleaned from jurors'
narrative accounts of the decision making in their cases, to which we
now turn.
III. NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS
To provide an alternative examination of black and white jurors'
perspectives of the jury's decision-making process and of their roles
in it, we now turn to jurors' narrative accounts of how the jury
reached its sentencing decision. We have selected excerpts from ju-
rors' accounts that illustrate how black and white jurors viewed the
evidence, the defendant, and one another. These excerpts are drawn
largely from black defendant cases in which both black and white ju-
rors were interviewed.169
We have selected narrative accounts from nine cases for presenta-
tion and arranged them in four groupings to illustrate: (a) black ju-
rors' perceptions of racism in the thinking and behavior of white ju-
rors; (b) the differences between black and white jurors'
interpretations of mitigating circumstances in the same cases; (c) the
steps white jurors took to persuade black holdouts for life sentences;
and (d) the characteristics of successful black holdouts. For each of
these themes we present jurors' accounts from at least two different
170cases.
A. Black Jurors Saw Their White Counterparts as Harboring Racial
Animus, Predisposed Toward a Death Sentence, Impatient
with Dissent, and Indifferent to Mitigating Evidence.
CASE 1: A FloridaJury Recommended the Death Penalty for a Black Man
Who, with One Black and One White Co-Perpetrator, Killed a Police Officer.
The only black male juror on a Florida jury that included six white
male jurors saw the white jurors as bent on the death penalty from
the very beginning. He felt that the white-male-dominated jury
wanted the death penalty because the defendant was a black man and
the victim was white.
(O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a rea-
soned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime." (quoting Califor-
nia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor,J., concurring))).
168 See supra text accompanying note 1.
169 A search was conducted of transcribed interviews with jurors from all cases on which
blacks served as jurors to identify jurors whose comments in response to open-ended questions
reflected racial themes.
170 In the following excerpts from transcribed interviews, "Q" indicates a question from tie
interview instrument, "J" identifies ajuror's response, and "I" indicates an interviewer's words in
an exchange with ajuror.
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Q: In deciding guilt, did jurors think about whether or not the defen-
dant would or should get the death penalty? If yes, what did they say?
J: At first they felt he should have got the death penalty also. They
wanted to burn both of them black boys. I'm serious, tiat's the impres-
sion I got. I felt like, I was the only black male on the jury. There %%-as
one other black woman. I felt like they didn't give a shit one way or the
other. They wanted to go to the football game and they -anted to go
home to their husbands and all this type of stuff, and not worry about
whether these people were gonna die or not. They felt like hell, these
two black boys took a white man's life: "We're going to burn them."
That's the impression I got from a lot of the jurors .... I really felt like
they wanted to burn both those guys because they were black, well be-
cause the white guy in the case [had a plea bargain], and we didn't even
hear his testimony. He was there just as much as the other black guy %as.
Q: Can you think of anything more about the jury that helps to explain
how or why it reached its decision?
J: .... What I'm saying is that they had no respect for a black male and
they didn't know how to really judge him. They w-anted the death pen-
alty, give him the death penalty 'cause he killed a white man. Boom, that
was it.
This black juror had lingering doubt that the defendant on trial
was the one most responsible for the killing.
Q: Can you think of anything more we haven't talked about yet that w%-as
important in understanding the jury's guilt decision?
J: I felt that two people did not pull the trigger, only one did. I dink it's
wrong to try somebody for something somebody else done. I think it was
unjust that he was charged with a capital crime for this .... He tried to
keep this other guy from killing, but he %as too late; the other guy had
already shot before he could say anything .... Every man should pay his
own [dues]-'cause [the defendant] was not holding that guy by the
hand saying you pull [the] trigger or you don't pull [the] trigger.
The words of a white female juror tend to confirm the black ju-
ror's belief that at least some white jurors made the punishment deci-
sion before the sentencing stage of the trial, that they ignored or dis-
counted sentencing evidence and arguments, and that they were in a
hurry to be done with the sentencing decision.
I: When did you first think [the defendant] should be given tie death
penalty?
J: I think when we went in for [guilt] deliberations and we got the in-
structions.
I: So before guilt deliberations, but after you got thejudge's instructions.
And at the same time you decided he was guilty of capital murder?
J: Agreed.
Q: What prosecution evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the
trial was most important or influential, in your mind, and why?
J: Can't remember. [At this point, the interviewer noted, the juror] was
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impatient for the penalty phase to be over. [She] did not know until af-
ter the guilty verdict was announced that [she] would have to sit through
a penalty phase. [They] were sequestered.
Q: What defense evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the trial
was most important or influential, in your mind, and why?
J: [The] defendant had received a certificate from the PTL [Praise The
Lord] Club. We all thought that was hysterical. It was very difficult not
to laugh.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what thejury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did the jury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the major disagreements
and how were they resolved?
J: [We] did not spend a lot of time on it because we were told it was only
a recommendation. [We] wanted to go home. That was the feeling of
mostjurors.
Florida is the only state in our sample in which ajury's vote for the
death penalty need not be unanimous. 7' In this case the jury rec-
ommended the death penalty, despite the black male juror's vote for
a life sentence.
CASE 2: A Pennsylvania Jury was Hung on the Punishment Verdict, and
as a Result, a Black Man Received a Life Sentence for the Murder of Four Res-
taurant Employees Killed by Him and Three Black Accomplices.
A black male juror in a Pennsylvania case recounted that, owing to
what he called "racial overtones," most of the white jurors had already
decided on the death penalty at the guilt stage of the trial. According
to this juror, the white jurors were insensitive to aspects of the defen-
dant's background and upbringing.
Q: Can you think of anything more we haven't talked about yet that was
important in understanding the jury's guilt decision?
J: Racial overtones. Because he's black, it was "automatic."... Some of
the jury had already made up their minds. I think the white jury [mem-
bers] had definitely made up their minds.
I: [What topics] did the discussion among the jurors [at guilt] focus on?
J: Basically his background, his upbringing. We dwelled on that, the
black jurors did .... They figured he deserved a break, because of his
background, where he grew up.
Q: In deciding guilt, did jurors think about whether or not defendant
would or should get the death penalty?
J: Half of them said he should get it. Half of them said he shouldn't get
it because of his environment. He came up living in drug houses, crack
houses, and things like that. He had no guidance, no education.
171 See supra note 125.
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In the portion of the interview devoted to the punishment stage of
the trial, the black male juror was asked about the effect of evidence
on the jury.
Q: What prosecution evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the
trial was most important or influential?
J: I think when the prosecutor staged a dramatic reenactment of the
crime, how the victims were, how they were shot. He got on his knees in
dramatic fashion, and he started crying and talked about how the guy
had two seconds to live and what do "you" think if you only had two sec-
onds to live and "you" had a gun pointed to the back of your head. That
played a big part on everybody. His presentation during his closing ar-
gument. That went over big.
This juror sensed the bleakness of the defendant's upbringing
and was receptive to the mitigating evidence.
Q: [What] thoughts or feelings [did you have] about defendant's family?
J: The mother was a sorry woman, the father was even sorrier. When I
say sorry I'm talking about in respects that she abandoned him. The
mother abandoned him. The father took over and raised him, saying
that they lived in abandoned homes and crack houses and places like
that. And the father was supposed to have been an abusive father toward
the mother, and the mother was a drug addict along with the father ....
When the attorney for [the defendant] brought his father into the court,
in fact they had just brought him from the penitentiary in his prison
clothing. To let everybody know how rotten he was, and how bad he ias.
When asked about the penalty phase of the trial, this juror ex-
plained that, because of the race-linked way that the white jurors
thought about the inner city, black people, and crime, the death
penalty in this case was automatic. According to this juror, the white
jurors did not give serious consideration to the alternative of a life
sentence.
Q: Can you think of anything more we haven't talked about yet that w~as
important in understanding the jury's punishment decision?
J: People got their opinion before the trial actually starts. And it is a
shame to say that, but they have their opinions. Like this guy I told you
of earlier from North Philly had a total different perspective of what
happens in the inner city compared to the guy out in the suburb who
thinks anything about blacks, if it's a black thing, automatic guilty. The
white woman says the same thing. The white woman from Center City.
She gets on the elevator with me, she got a problem. If something went
down, the first thing that's gonna come out of her mouth, "It was a black
guy." It's an automatic thing. And it's a shame to think that way, and
when these jurors hooked up, they were so disinterested, they were more
concerned about what we were gonna have for lunch and how long was
lunch and when we were gonna get out of here.
Q: Can you think of anything more about the jury that helps to explain
how or why it reached its decision?
J: They were impatient and wanted to leave early to go home to their
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families, I guess. Not very understanding, and a hint of racism.
This juror was disappointed and felt alienated by the racism and
the superficiality that he witnessed.
I: You said "racism." Do you mind elaborating?
J: Most of the whites that were there never was exposed to black folks,
probably not even on their jobs, and they felt very uncomfortable ....
They were very, like they didn't want to be there. Me, personally, I was
disappointed. After it was over with, the DA came in the back, along with
the [defendant's] lawyer. They came in the back and made a little game
about it .... I thought that was unprofessional, and I left. I really didn't
want to hear it. And the DA was telling us that he wished he could have
told us that [the defendant] had killed another person .... I left. I
didn't want to have any contact with any of them. I am out of here. I'll
pick up my money whenever. And they were still anxious to run down
and get their little cash.
B. Interpreting the Same Mitigating Evidence, Black Jurors saw a
Disadvantaged Upbringing Remorse, and Sincerity, While White Jurors
saw Incorrigibility, a Lack of Emotion, and Deceptive Behavior.
CASE 3: A South Carolina Jury with Five White Males and One Black
Male Sentenced a Black Man to Death for the Murder of a White Woman.
In a South Carolina B/W case, white and black jurors made dia-
metrically opposed interpretations of the defendant's human quali-
ties and remorsefulness. A white male juror perceived the defendant
as emotionless and said the jury was afraid that he would be danger-
ous in the future.
Q: What defense evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the trial
was most important or influential, in your mind, and why?
J: His mother, really his reaction to his mother's testimony, he was very
unemotional through the whole trial and when his mother got on the
stand and pleaded for his life he didn't bat an eye, not a tear, no emotion
at all, that pretty much put him in the electric chair .... The point was
brought up that our friends and neighbors were expecting us to do the
right thing and if this guy were to ever get out, he was so violent, his epi-
sodes of violence, we were really afraid of what might happen if he is ever
allowed out into society again.
A white female juror echoed and elaborated upon the "coldness
of the man," despite his responsiveness to his girlfriend, and upon his
pretense of being sorry.
Q: Did any of the testimony by defense witnesses at the punishment stage
of the trial "backfire," or actually hurt their case?
J: Well I would have to say the one was putting the girlfriend on the
stand, because she followed the mother .... The girlfriend told about
how good he was with her two children although they were not his chil-
dren, and how, what a good person he was. It was all well and good to
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hear that, but he perked up when the girlfriend got the stand, and even
when she walked off the stand he looked at her and gave her this grin
and winked at her, and I mean he had no response for his mother who
was up there shedding all these tears for him and yet had this response
for his girlfriend, to me it really showed the coldness of the man.
Q: Did defendant testify or make a closing statement at the punishment
stage of the trial?
J: It was poor .... One reason was because he came up to this podium
that they had set up in front of us, very nicely dressed uith a legal, long,
legal pad and a Bible in his hand, and he stood up there, and lie read a
statement that was obviously prepared by his lawyer where lie said how
sorry he was for this family and the other people that had survived, the
trauma that they had to go through, the families of the victim herself,
and he expressed appreciation for his family members and friends and
all that had come out and supported him, but they were not his words. I
mean it was so obvious that they were not his words.
This juror took the paternalistic view that the death penalty %as
probably a good thing for the defendant's mother.
Q: What were the strongest factors for and against a life [or death] sen-
tence?
J: His manner in the courtroom, and I think the fact that I really believe
the justice system does not have a very good rehabilitation record .... I
tell you I also think ... about this boy's mother at that time, to w-atch her
son behind bars for 30 years, I don't know whether that would have been
any less merciful or any more merciful I should say for her than to have
the boy executed and then his life is over with. Time does a healing for
people and their grief, not that she wouldn't have more grief at the time
[of his execution, but it would not] burden her with this boy being be-
hind prison [bars] and what he would go through.
Note that this juror began referring to the defendant as "boy" in
her patronizing explanation of why his execution wotld probably be
good for his mother. She later interrupted the flow of the interview
to say that she was insulted at being asked whether she could be ra-
cially unbiased as ajuror.
J: I want to tell you in the sentencing, excuse me, in die choosing of tie
jury, they, his lawyer asked me if it mattered to me that the defendant sit-
ting here was a black man and the victim was a white woman, would that
make a difference to me that that was the facts in the case. And I
thought that wvas an insulting question for that man to ask. Apparently
he asked that of everybody, but Ijust, a life is a life, and if the man com-
mitted a crime I don't think that those things ought to weigh into it. And
I told him so, I said, I mean, the person that died, whether the person
was white or black or male or female just should not bear into this. And I
don't think it would in my case, and I was insulted.
The black male juror saw the defendant in a very different light
than did the white jurors. He was opposed to the death penalty until
the final jury vote, when he seems to have become convinced that the
law required a death sentence.
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I: In your mind, how [would you] describe the killing?
J: Accidental.
17 2
I: How did [the defendant] appear to you during the trial?
J: Psychotic, dual personality... and a drug addict.
Q: In deciding guilt, did jurors talk about whether or not [the defen-
dant] would, or should, get the death penalty?
J: One person [apparently referring to himself] didn't think he should
get it.
Q: Was there any discussion among the jurors about the meaning of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
J: Defendant would get the death penalty if this was found.
When the questioning turned to the punishment stage of the trial,
he was asked:
Q: Did [the defendant's] mood or attitude change after the guilty ver-
dict was handed down and the focus of the trial shifted to what the pun-
ishment should be?
J: [He] seemed sorry and pled for [his] life.
I. Did [the defendant] testify or make a closing statement at the pun-
ishment stage of the trial?
J: [He] told the jury that he had good qualities and could change.
Q: What did the defense attorney stress most as the reason why [the de-
fendant] should not get the death penalty?
J: Because he was human, not an animal.
According to this lone black juror, the defendant's dangerousness
and the impression that the death penalty was required by law influ-
enced the jury's death penalty recommendation. In retrospect he
wished that he had not been "so vicious" and gone along with the
death penalty.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its deci-
sion about [the defendant's] punishment?
J: What would defendant do if set free? Would [the defendant] kill
again? The law said the defendant must get death .... The prosecutor
explained that this was required by law.
Q: When you think back about serving as ajuror on [this] case, is there
anything you wish you had said or done differently?
J: Yes.
I: What was it?
J: [I] wouldn't have been so vicious, [I] may not have given death.
1 Because this juror was unwilling to have the interview tape recorded, his responses are
relatively brief, as recorded on site by the interviewer.
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CASE 4: A Georgia Juiy Imposed a Life Sentence on a Black Man for the
Murder of a Black Man and Woman.
A minority female juror 5 in a Georgia case described how white
jurors misread evidence of mitigating circumstances because they
were unfamiliar with the kind of background and home environment
that the black defendant experienced as a youth. She expressed frus-
tration at not having communicated better with the white jurors and
at there not being more blacks on thejury.
Q: Can you think of anything more about the jury that helps to explain
how or why it reached its decision?
J: The main problem I had with the jury as a whole uas that they were
not considering what background this kid cane out of. They were look-
ing at it from a white middle-class point of view. Let me give you an ex-
ample. There was one testimony where they said [the defendant] stayed
out until eleven o'clock at nighL Okay, they deliberated this back and
forth for about two hours. To me that was a w,'aste of time, because
maybe in the lifestyle where they come from, kids don't stay out until
eleven o'clock at night. But we're looking at a different kid here. This
kid came from a broken home where there was no structure, no authority
figures, no, uh, authority .... Ya know, hejust came as he wenit; of course
he's going to stay out until eleven o'clock at night! He's going to stay up
beyond that. And they were arguing, "Well, my kid comes in at such 'n
such." And I was frustrated because I felt look, that's why I felt there had
to be more blacks on thatjury. Because I think that was a big factor for
me of frustration. Because they were looking at this thing from a white
middle-class perspective, and you have to put yourself into that black life-
style... this kid came out of. That particular lifestyle. Ad I'm not say-
ing by any means that blacks live like that, that's not what I'm saying. I'm
just saying that that particular lower socioeconomic black lifestyle, that
this kid came out of, where there was not a good home, no supervision,
everybody was not there, there were no, there were no, there were no
authority figures for this kid. So he would probably stay up all night
even. So why waste time on talking about, my god, what time the kid
comes in the house. There were a lot of little instances like that. That's
why I felt like an outsider at times because I felt I should have been more
forceful at trying to get these people to understand. We had to look at it
like the lifestyle he came out of, the background he came out of. But
nobody wanted to listen. They all wanted to talk. I'm not a strong-willed,
I'm not forceful enough, that's why I felt like an outsider. So, rather
than get into it, I didn't say much. I mean, I deliberated, but I didn't say
much about those types of things. So that was a biggie, and it didn't
make me happy. And I felt there should have been more blacks on the
jury to balance that out.
17 The juror identified herself as other than white, black, Hispanic. ur .sian.
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C. White Jurors Who Form a Majority Sometimes Took Extreme
Steps to Break Black Jurors Who Held Out:
Ostracism, Deception, Coaching.
CASE 5: A Louisiana Jury with a Black Female Holdout Imposed a Life
Sentence in a White-on-White Murder.
Differences between black and white jurors sometimes reached
beyond misunderstandings to become mistreatment. One form of
such mistreatment is illustrated in a Louisiana case where a black ju-
ror and a white juror who held out for a life sentence were ostracized
by the other jurors who refused to talk to them or allow them to join
the deliberations. The black juror was not interviewed, but her white
associate told the story.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did the jury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the major disagreements,
and how were they resolved?
J: Well, let me tell ya how it happened. There were.., ten of 'em over
here, two of 'em over here. And they would not even let us in the circle.
And they were deciding, and they were going to put the death penalty.
And I said, "I will not."
I: The ten were deciding the... ?
J: Death penalty. And I said you can have-sit here until doomsday, and
I'm not voting the death penalty. And the black girl says, "I'm not ei-
ther."
I: So let me ask you this, so when those ten jurors, you know, were in the
circle without you all, you didn't discuss anything with them then? Do
you know?
J: We have no idea what they discussed, they left us out. They left us
completely out, the two of us.
I: So they went off and discussed it without you?
J: They went and sat on over in the little corner and discussed it all with-
out, without us. I remember it very well because we were isolated, the
black girl and I were not even allowed to sit with them. We weren't, the
ten of them went off to themselves and got in their little circles, and she
and I sit over here, and I told her, I said, "Well, there's one thing for
sure, I'm not going to vote for the death penalty." And so about three
days and three nights of that, of isolating themselves from us and we was
not going to have anything to do with it. She kind of broke down, and
then I broke down, and I said, "Well, what the heck, I'm not going to sit
up here and send myself to the hospital." And, uh, she got sick to her
stomach about the whole thing and went into the bathroom and was
vomiting. And I went in there to help her, you know, and got a rag and
was washing her face. And they came in and told us to get out of the
bathroom.
I: Oh, you were in there together?
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J: Yes, I said, she is sick, she is vomiting, and she is sick of this whole mess
and I'm sick of it. And I said, if you don't w%-atch yourself we both gonna
walk out of here. It would've been a mistrial, and that's what we planned
on doing.
I: A lot of pressure you were under!
J: Oh, terrible, terrible. You don't know what we went through.
CASE 6: Another Louisiana Jury with a Black Female Holdout Imposed
the Death Penalty for a Black-on-Black Killing.
The account of a black juror who held out in another Louisiana
case bears a strong similarity to the experience of Ms. Daniels. ' Af-
ter telling her that she would not be responsible for the defendant's
death because it was not her who would pull the sitch, the other ju-
rors said he would get the death penalty whether or not she went
along with them.
Q: In deciding guilt, did jurors think about whether or not defendant
would, or should get the death penalty? If yes, what did the, say?
J: [They said] if he gets out, he may do [kill] someone else. I didn't
think so .... They said he should get it [the chair] because [of] ... what
he did, he didn't have to do it .... Because if he get out, he may do
somebody else like that.
I: And you didn't believe that?
J: No.
I: So, it sounds like some of the people felt like he w%-as  danger to soci-
ety. And you didn't feel that wray?
J: No, I didn't. I didn't want to let him out, but then I didn't figure that
they should give him the chair.
I: But eventually the whole jury voted for death. I guess what I'm won-
dering is how you came around to see it their way. How did that happen?
J: Well, let's see now, I, when I was talking they said you got to, because
when you sign up, you and the district attorney, one of them asked you,
could you stand for the, sending a person to the chair if they was guilty.
I: So, duringjury selection they asked you if you could do it?
J: Yes, they asked all of us. Yeah, right.
I: And at that time, you said yes.
J: Yeah, sure, ifa person's guilty, sure.
I: But in this case ... you didn't feel like it was?
J: I didn't feel like, no. It was the right thing? No.
I: So, what happened that you changed your mind?
J: Then everybody else, they said the chair, so I said why not life, why not
1 See supra notes 1-4 and accompan)ing text.
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life in prison?
I: So they tried to convince you?
J: Yeah, yeah,... they said, oh yeah ... you're not doing it, you're not
pulling it [the electrocution switch].
I: So they said you're not responsible for his death.
J: Yeah, right. Well, they said that I'm not responsible for it, no. They
[also] said, whether you go along with us or not, that's what he's gonna
get.
I: They said that no matter which way you voted, he was going to get the
death penalty?
J: Yes, they said he's gonna get that.
I: Who said that?
J: Thejurors, all of them, you know.
I: And so for a while, you did not want it, but then they convinced you?
J: No, I didn't want it, for him to get the chair. We went around a couple
times .... They say, you said you could give him the chair, give a person
the chair if he was guilty, and they said he is guilty.
This juror also felt that the white jurors wrongly saw black wit-
nesses' mitigation testimony as deceptive and as a "put on."
Q: What defense evidence or witness at the punishment stage of the trial
was most important or influential, in your mind, and why?
J: Well, there was, I mean, his sister and brother, then his mother too
because I felt for her, because, well, she didn't say nothing, she couldn't
say nothing because the hurting, but I felt for her, she crying, you know.
And the brother, he went to crying.
I: So, the brother was crying also, and that had a big effect on you. Do
you think it had a big effect on the other jurors also?
J: Yeah, we talked about that. But they didn't believe it was real, they be-
lieved it was put on, they believed it was puttin' on. They believed that
old lady was faking, you know, her chest pain. They believed that, but I
didn't believe it, I believed it was real, myself... especially for the
mother.
CASE 7: A Georgia Jury Imposed the Death Sentence in a White-on-White
Murder After "Coaching" a Reluctant Black Male Juror.
The jury foreman from a different Georgia capital case gave yet
another account reminiscent of Ms. Daniels's. This white jury fore-
man described how the jury prepared a reluctant black male juror to
respond when the judge polled the jury.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did the jury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the major disagreements,
and how were they resolved?
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J: We talked for quite a while about the fact of the problems sonic of the
jurors had with being responsible for putting somebody to death ....
Everybody finally decided, with the exception of the older black gentle-
man, he was still very unsure until the last, I would say up until the last 30
minutes. He was very upset about saying "yes" to the death penalty. And
I was afraid that when we went back out and the judge asked each one of
us how we, how we pleaded, I was afraid he was gonna say "not sure" or
"no," but he did say .... I told him when the judge talks to you, just say
"yaassir" .... I don't want to use the word we coached him into saying
"yes," but I guess in reality we did.
The reluctant black juror wras not among the four jurors inter-
viewed by the CJP investigator, so we do not know how he perceived
what the white foreman characterized as "coaching."
D. Successful Black Male Holdouts for Life Sentences Exhibited
Exceptional Characteristics: Resoluteness, Charisma.
CASE 8. A South Carolina Jury Inposed a Life Sentence in a Black-on-
Black Murder.
A staunch black holdout who "stonewalled" for life blocked a
death sentence, but not without hostility. He evoked antagonism
from pro-death white jurors and attracted one white juror to a vote
for life imprisonment. This white juror said that he would not have
been able to vote for life if he had not had the cover of the black
holdout. A pro-death white malejuror w%-as asked:
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did thejury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order;, what were the major disagreements,
and how were they resolved?
J: Wejust decided we'd go around the table and throw up something to
discuss-any ideas for or against or whatever. The one guy, the dude, the
black dude in beginning wouldn't open his mouth. He wouldn't discuss
nothing. He knew what he was gonna do. We sent it around, it was like
eight and four the first time. We knew he wasn't going nowhere. That
was when we started freakin'. This guy wouldn't even discuss it.
I: The guy said he wouldn't give the death penalty under any circum-
stances?
J: He wouldn't talk, he wouldn't say nothing. He wouldn't discuss it. He
just sat there, the whole second part.
I: This is the guy you thought was really dumb first off?
J: Yeah, if he couldn't make a decision about how lie felt. Yeah, because
he should... if... if he couldn't make a decision about how he felt, I
mean because of earlier something he said, lie was sayin' about he'd al-
ready decided. Why even go to the sentencing-we shouldn't even went
there because he couldn't make an impartial, impartial judgment any-
way. He wasn't going to. He was gonna say "no" the whole time. He
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wasn't going to be the guy [who would] give the death penalty no matter
what. You couldn't sway him. And he wasn't even gonna discuss it. I
mean you could have hung it up from there; if they had any sense they
would have just [kept their] mouth[s] shut and left there because this
guy wasn't going to change his mind.
I: How did he get people to come around to his side to decide then?
Why was it that you went from thinking of giving him the death penalty
into going to giving him a life sentence?
J: Because they would hem and haw. You have a bunch of older ladies in
there. They all would have said [death] at any other time, but they didn't
want to take responsibility of doing it themselves .... The majority
wanted the death penalty, then there was a couple that could have been
swung, one guy wasn't gonna move.
I: So because he didn't move, everyone decided to go with him?
J: It was either that or stay there forever or call a hung jury. So we sent
out to find how long the guy would be in jail and if he would have no pa-
role. They said he wouldn't get out ofjail until [age] sixty-five and would
never get to be paroled-to ease everybody's conscience. And this black
dude, like I said, wouldn't [discuss anything]. That's when [the fore-
man] freaked, he was P.O.'d. We stayed in there forever; it seemed so
long. We spent more time in the second stage then we did in the first.
But it was getting late-dark, dark.
The black male holdout was not interviewed, but a white juror
who joined him explained that he would not have stood up for a life
sentence without the black holdout's resolute stand.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did the jury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the major disagreements,
and how were they resolved?
J: I can't tell you all this, but what I do remember is the biggest majority
wanted to give him the death sentence to begin with. But I was one of
them that was not in the majority to begin with. I was in the minority.
I: You wanted to give him [a] life sentence to begin with, you wanted to
go for mercy?
J: I wanted to go for mercy in the sentencing phase of it, on account of
his mother. When they presented her and explained that all the other
sons had been killed, that change[d] my mind from the death sentence
to a life sentence .... Now, I wasn't going to be a lone holdout. In other
words, I wouldn't have caused another trial [to] come about. But we had
a Negro, black, or whatever you want to call it, that was on the jury, and
he would have been a holdout, and he did hold out, and he said [there
was]no way he could consider a death sentence. And I don't know if he
explained his reason for feeling that way or not, but I believe he did. But
I went along with him on it mainly because of the boy's mother.
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CASE 9: A California Jury Sentenced a Black Man to Life Imprisonment
for the Murder of a White Man.
An exceptional black juror may be able not only to block a death
sentence, but actually to convert the majority to a life sentence. One
"charismatic" black juror won the consent, rather than simply the ac-
quiescence, of his white fellow jurors, as the self-described last white
holdout for death explained.
Q: In your own words, can you tell me what thejury did to reach its deci-
sion about defendant's punishment? How did the jury get started; what
topics did it discuss, in what order, what were the major disagreements,
and how were they resolved?
J: I was the final person [to vote for life].
I: What persuaded you?
J: Another black juror.
I: And he/she persuaded you?
J: His manner and charisma, his compassion and his articulation did
move me so much .... Here's a black man who was almost in the same
situation [as the defendant] without the atrocities and the abuse and eve-
rything but black, poor, lower middle class from the South. [He] lead a
very compassionate [life in the] army .... Finally, I guess after nothing
more than a benefit of the doubt and compassion, I agreed it would be
life without parole. (Inaudible). He's a wonderful guy, have you met
him? He's wonderful. He's a wonderful, wonderful soul, such a person.
E. Overview of Themes inJurors'Narratives
Black jurors believe that their white counterparts come to the trial
of black defendants having already made up their minds in favor of
the death penalty. Black jurors see evidence of this predisposition in
white jurors' advocacy for the death penalty even at the guilt stage of
the trial. They see it in white jurors' indifference to mitigating evi-
dence, in their impatience to get the penalty stage over ith, and in
what they see as white jurors' often unconscious preconceptions
about black people and the circumstances of their lives. For their
part, white jurors mistrust black defendants' professions of remorse
or sorrow: they do not believe black witnesses who they see as "put-
ting on."
Black and white jurors' difference of perspective is manifest in
their accounts of how they interpret evidence and testimony offered
in mitigation at the penalty stage of the same trial. WhIere a white ju-
ror sees black witnesses as faking or "putting on," a black juror sees
them as sincere. Where a white female juror interprets the black de-
fendant's demeanor as hard and cold, a black male juror sees him as
sorry. Where a white female juror sympathizes with the anguish of
the black defendant's mother, she blames the defendant for it and
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rationalizes that his execution will be in his mother's best interest.
The black juror in the same case sees the defendant as genuinely
sorry and wishes he had stood up for life.
Black jurors see mitigation where whites see aggravation. Black
jurors have doubts about the defendant's responsibility for the killing
and believe he is remorseful despite his impassive demeanor. White
jurors see him as dangerous and use this to persuade blacks to vote
for death. Black jurors feel that the white jurors do not understand
black defendants' background and the environment in which they
live; they believe their white counterparts therefore render judgments
on the basis of racial preconceptions or stereotypes.17 These differ-
ences in perspective are sources of resentment for black jurors and
grounds for believing that the deck is stacked against a black defen-
dant.
The white majority on a jury sometimes takes extraordinary steps
to "encourage" black pro-life sentence jurors to vote for death. In
some cases such persuasion includes manipulation and intimidation.
This type of persuasion takes the form of isolating a holdout juror,
claiming that the law requires a death sentence for the defendant's
crime, asserting that the holdout will not be responsible for the de-
fendant's execution, and telling the holdout that the death sentence
will be imposed even if he or she does not vote for it. The white ju-
rors in the majority may even "coach" initially pro-life sentence black
jurors about how to respond to the judge's question when he or she
polls the jurors about their punishment votes.
These tactics notwithstanding, some black holdouts exhibit a reso-
lute commitment to a life sentence. This resolve may frustrate pro-
death sentence white jurors, but it also may liberate outnumbered
pro-life sentence white jurors who would not otherwise speak out or
vote for life. In addition, some "charismatic" black holdouts convince
initially pro-death sentence white jurors that a life sentence is the
right punishment.
175 In some instances jurors are conscious of their racism. For instance, a white female juror
in a North Carolina black-on-black case says her attitude would have been different if the de-
fendant and victim had been white people:
Q: Were any of the questions you were asked during the jury selection especially hard
for you to answer? If yes, which question(s); why were they hard; who asked them?
J: [If] they had asked me ifI was prejudice, that would've been hard for me to answer.
I: Did they ask?
J: No. But if they had, I would've had to say yes. Anybody that was born and raised in
the South when I was born and raised in the South and says they're not prejudice is a
liar. I try very, very hard to get over it. Every time I get somewhere I meet a nigger, and I
don't like white ones any more than I do black ones. That's the way it is. And what dif-
ference between me and anybody else is I admit it .... I mean, like, when I heard about
the killing, I thought, well, they're just wiping each other out again. You know, if they'd
been white people, I would've had a different attitude.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS
The CJP data from capital jurors themselves unmistakably demon-
strate the influence of race in capital sentencing. As we have seen,
this influence is felt foremost in the B/V cases, where the death pen-
alty has long served to reinforce the color line. ' Historical analysis
suggests that these are the kinds of crimes that have been lightning
rods for the expression of white rage over the crossing of racial
boundaries. The death penalty in these cases has been the vehicle for
demonstrating white racial dominance."' These cases most poign-
antly represent what Gunnar Myrdal, in his epochal examination of
America's race problem, identified as the "American Dilemma."'
The make-up of the jury, we now see, is integral to this racial in-
fluence. When juries were all-white and all-male, as they were for
most of our nation's history, it was impossible to see this bias through
the lens of jury racial composition. Now that the racial and gender
composition of juries varies, we can see what difference it makes to
have (and not to have) blacks or women on a capital jury. In fact, we
have seen that the chances of a death sentence for a black defendant
whose victim is white are dramatically affected by the race and gender
of his jurors.' 9 The death penalty is three times as likely for the de-
fendant in a B/W case who draws five or more white male jurors as
for the one who draws fewer. A life sentence is twice as likely for the
defendant who draws a black male juror than for the one who fails to
do so. 80 These are far from trivial odds in this sizeable sample of sev-
enty-four B/W cases from fourteen different states. Indeed, the role
that a juror's race plays in this sample of cases is significant well be-
yond a chance occurrence in a sample of this size. 
11
Why jury composition matters in these B/W cases becomes appar-
ent in the decision-making patterns of individual jurors. In such
cases, black and white jurors grow farther apart in their thinking
about what the punishment should be as the trial proceeds. Com-
176 Darnell Hawkins, Boond Anomalies: Rthinking the Co:nfliel Pcrtdpecwe on Race and Cnrimnal
Punishment, 65 SOC. FORCES 719,726-27 (1987) (arguing that black-on-white crime represents a
threat to white authority, that lesser punishment for whites who kill blacks conforms to a value
system that allows whites to injure blacks, and that whites may believe that whites and their
property are more valued than blacks and their property).
For general discussions of the death penalty's function in 'majority group protection."
"minority group oppression," and "repressive response," see BOWERS, LEGcL HOMIICIDE. supra
note 5, and BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 5.
- 2 GUNwAR MYRDAi, AN AMERICA.N DILEmA 550-57 (1944).
179 This association between jury racial composition and sentencing outcomes for cass ith
various defendant/victim racial combinations is also demonstrated by Baldus in this Issue. &e.
eg, Baldus et al., Use of Perempto " Challengeas supra note 87, at figs.8-9In effect, the luck of the draw has now replaced the injustice of an all-white. all-male jury.
The black defendant's chance of being condemned to death in such a case is akin to his luck in
draving from a deck of race and gender cards, as stacked by the prosecution and the defense.
181 Both the white male dominance and the black male presence effects are significant be-
yond the .01 probability level in B/W cases. Sesupra note 103.
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITU7TIONAL LAW
pared to the decision patterns of black and white jurors in the W/W
and B/B cases, the progressive polarization of jurors' punishment
stands in B/W cases is unique. By the time of the jury's first vote on
punishment, two out of three whites believe the punishment should
be death and two out of three blacks believe it should be life impris-
onment.'82 With black and white jurors this far apart at the jury's first
vote on punishment, it goes without saying that the final punishment
verdict will be strongly influenced by their respective numbers on the
jury.
Why black and white jurors follow divergent decision-making
paths in B/W cases is explained by the fact that they see the same de-
fendants, the same evidence, and the same arguments in the same
cases quite differently. In the twenty-four B/W cases where we have
interviews from both black and white jurors, whites more often than
blacks see the defendant as likely to be dangerous to society in the fu-
ture and as likely to get back on the streets if not sentenced to death.
Blacks in these cases more often see the defendant as remorseful and
therefore deserving of mercy, and even wonder whether the defen-
dant was the actual killer or at least whether the killing was a capital
murder.' 3 Furthermore, on these matters of doubt, remorse, and
dangerousness, the males of each race take more extreme stands than
do the females. 1 4 In these twenty-four B/W cases, black-white differ-
ences in opinion concerning lingering doubt, remorse, and
dangerousness are independent of variation between cases and of ju-




Beyond these statistical patterns, jurors' narrative accounts yield
further insights into their decision making. They reveal a lack of re-
ceptivity to mitigating evidence among white jurors when the defen-
dant is black. White jurors often appear unable or unwilling to con-
sider the defendant's background and upbringing in context. As one
minority juror put it: "they [the white jurors] were not considering
what background this kid [the defendant] came out of. They were
looking at it from a white middle-class point of view .... We had to
look at it like the lifestyle he came out of, the background he came
out of. But nobody wanted to listen."'86 Another black juror said,
"[t] hey [the white jurors] had no respect for a black male, and they
didn't know how to judge him. They wanted the death penalty, give
him the death penalty, because he killed a white man. That was it.'
8 7
Indeed, what black jurors see as mitigating circumstances, white ju-
182 See supra tbl.2.
183 See supra tbls.3-5.
IM See supra tbl.7.
185 See infra Appendix B.
186 See supra Part 11I.B, Case 4.
187 See supra Part III.A, Case 1.
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rors often see in a contrary light. Where a blackjuror said the defen-
dant "seemed sorry and pled for his life," a white juror saw "the cold-
ness of the man." r  Evidently, a predilection of whites to see black
defendants as arrogant, frightening, or dangerous, blunts or blocks
their receptivity to mitigating evidence and arguments, especially
their willingness to see the defendant as remorseful. The failure of
jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence in their decision making
on punishment runs contrary to the Supreme Court's conception of
the role of mitigating circumstances in the sentencing decision as ex-
pressed in Lockett v. Ohio' and to its rulings concerning qualifications
for capital jury service as articulated in Morgan v. Illinois
What is more, these data paint a picture at odds ith the notion of
a "deliberative jury"'9' that scrupulously weighs aggravating and miti-
gating considerations to arrive at what the Supreme Court has ex-
tolled as "a reasoned moral response."'- In their narrative accounts,
black jurors report that their white fellowjurors came to the trial with
their minds made up about punishment and that they treated evi-
dence of mitigation as trivial or ignored it. According to the statisti-
cal data, black jurors feel that the jury wras in a rush to reach a verdict
and intolerant of disagreement; and they feel more emphatically so
in cases with five or more white male jurors. Further, these white-
male-dominated juries appear to exacerbate the fissures between
black and white jurors in lingering doubt, remorse, and
dangerousness. Uniquely, jurors' narrative accounts reveal tactics of
ostracism, deception, and intimidation in the B/W cases. The white
jurors ostracize blacks, tell them their votes won't matter, and "coach"
them, reminiscent of the treatment of Ms. Daniels. These decision-
making dynamics appear to be driven by a determination to impose a
particular verdict, not by a commitment to reach consensus by review-
ing and deliberating about the evidence.' 3 Jurors' accounts reflect
tension, hostility, mistrust, and misunderstanding between black and
white jurors. The decision-making process is evidently far from the
necessary reasoned moral judgment.
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Turner v. Mulray' that in
&S ee supra Part HILB, Case 3.
" 438 U.S. 586,597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require the consideration of mitigating factors in capital cases); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (vacating a death sentence imposed wthout consideration of
mitigating factors as required by Lodrt).
504 U.S. 719, 728-39 (1992) (holding that a capital defendant is entitled to an impartial
jury and that ajuror who fails to take into account mitigating circumstances does not meet this
imnpartiality requirement).
I See generally JEFFRE" ABRA.iSO\,, wE, THE JUR: THE JURY S r__%T AND THE IDEAL. OF
DFMOCRAACY (1994).
'92 See supra note 167.
193 What jurors describe corresponds more to a -verdict dn'en" than an 'evidence driven"
decision process.
1% 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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B/W cases, jurors' racial sentiments are likely to confound the capital
sentencing decision, and the Court ruled that "a capital defendant
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of ra-
cial bias."' 95 Thisjudgment, the Court declared, was "based on a con-
junction of three factors: the fact that the crime charged involved in-
terracial violence, the broad discretion given the jury at the death-
penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper
sentencing in a capital case."' Notably, the Court's thinking in
Turner about how racial sentiments might come to bear in the sen-
tencing decision of capital jurors in B/W cases foreshadowed the pre-
sent findings.
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to ajury in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate
but remain undetected .... [A] juror who believes that blacks are vio-
lence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in
deciding whether petitioner's crime involved [such] aggravating factors
.... Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward [a] peti-
tioner's evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance.
More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a
juror's decision .... Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by
the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror to favor the
death penalty.
197
The Court emphasized that the sentencing determination is espe-
cially vulnerable to the influence of racial attitudes and prejudices
because "[ i]n a capital sentencing proceeding before ajury, the jury
is called upon to make a highly subjective, unique, individualized
judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person de-
serves."'98 The Court explained, "we are convinced that such discre-
tion gives greater opportunity for racial prejudice to operate than is
present when the jury is restricted to factfinding."'9 It continued,
"[a] s we see it, the risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an
entirely different order, because the decisions that sentencing jurors
must make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are
deciding guilt or innocence."
2
10
Yet, the present research shows that reliance on voir dire ques-
tioning to detect such deeply ingrained and often unconscious racial
195 Id. at 36-37.
19 Id. at 37-38.
197 Id. at 35.
198 Id at 33-34 (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
199 Id. at 36 n.8. With respect to factfinding, Justice O'Connor has also recognized the likeli-
hood that "conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority
defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or
innocence." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
Turner, 476 U.S. at 38 n.12.
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attitudes was wishful thinking. The failure of Turner to purge sen-
tencing decisions of race-linked attitudes and their consequences is
demonstrated in this research by the fact that virtually all of the cases
examined in the statistical and qualitative analyses of the CJP data
were tried after Turnerbecame effective. "
Other remedies may be advocated, such as jury selection proce-
dures to counter the biasing effects of peremptory strikes on jury
composition or instructions to the jury to recognize and to overcome
the influence of racial bias in sentencing. Critics have advocated
various affirmative selection schemes designed to improve the
chances that minority jurors will be represented on trial juries.i Al-
though affirmative jury selection could be expected to ensure the
presence of minority jurors, including for instance black males,
within the limits set by the composition of the venire, such proce-
dures are largely irrelevant to the pro-death penalty bias owing to
white male dominance on the capital jury.:3 Indeed, the ability of
these schemes to ensure a place for designated venirepersons on the
jury would enable the prosecution in some cases to see that a white-
male-dominated jury is seated. But even effective improvements in
jury selection fail to grapple with the more fundamental roots of the
problem: race-linked differences in how jurors think about the
crime, the defendant, the victim, and even about the other jurors
with whom they are trying to make the life or death decision. That is
to say, strictures on jury composition alone are not designed to neu-
tralize the stark differences of perspective between individual black
and white jurors that appear to block receptivity to mitigating evi-
dence on the part of whites and to render the punishment decision a
matter of conflict and wrangling between the races, quite short of a
reasoned moral judgment.
Instructing jurors to confront and suspend their own racial atti-
tudes, stereotypes, and hostilities, and to openly address and over-
come their own and otherjurors' racial prejudices during jury delib-
201 The sample includes cases tried on or afterjanuary 1. 1988. in all states except IKntucky,
where one case was tried in 1986 and one in 1987. Bowers, supra note 94, at 1079 n.19S.
-02 See Hans Zeisel, Affirmative PeremplmJurorSLrdion, 39 STAN. L REV. 1165 (1987). Other
authors have advocated abandoning peremptories in favor of more affinrmatie techniques. Se.
eg., Coke, supra note 13, at 277; Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and thefJuy: Ir Dtre,
Peremptory Chaleng, and the Review ofJury Verdirs, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 153. 19596 (1989); Debo-
rah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Aneient Custom of Trial byJutir de ,tdtelate Linguae. A Hs-
toijnd aProposalfor Change, 74 B.U.L REv . 777 (1994).
In this Issue Baldus and his colleagues compare the effectiveness of affirma'.e jury selec-
tion with the effectiveness of eliminating peremptory strikes, which are often used in a dis-
criminatory manner by opposing counsel. Se Baldus et al.. Use of Premptoy Challeng. supra
note 87 at 107-16. Their study finds (using Philadelphia data) that for die purposes of creating
more representative juries, the abolition of peremptory strikes would be superior to affirmative
selection. While doing away with peremptory challenges would eliminate thejockeiing for ad-
vantage injury selection, it would also make the final composition of the jury-and hence the
character of racial influence on the thinking and decision making of jurors--solely dependent
on the luck of the draw of the venire.
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erations, is a laudable proposal for neutralizing racial conflict be-
tween black and white jurors."°4 However, because much racism is in-
grained, unconscious, and denied, this form ofjury instruction would
likely prove inadequate. Jurors who are conscious of racism in them-
selves or recognize that race shapes their thinking about crime and
punishment are likely to reveal that it is too ingrained simply to be set• ,205
aside. jurors whose racism is unconscious and denied are likely to
take offense at the suggestion that race has any influence on their de-
cision making, as did a juror who thought it was "insulting" to be
asked whether "it mattered to [her] that the defendant sitting here
was a black man and the victim was a white woman. 20 6 Instructions
from the bench may be attractive as a judicial remedy, perhaps be-
cause they are simple to apply and appeal to the ideal of an obedient,
dispassionate, and highly rational jury.0 7 Yet, the empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of such judicial instructions is mixed, even indi-
cating in some instances that alerting jurors to concerns they must
disregard or ignore actually backfires.
The distinctive perspectives of black and white jurors are, no
doubt, shaped by their personal experiences and lead black and
white jurors to hold fundamentally different assumptions about the
causes of crime and about the trustworthiness of the criminal justice
process. These perspectives are manifested in black and white jurors'
different attributions of levels of dangerousness and remorsefulness
to the black defendant, and in their holding different degrees of lin-
gering doubt about his guilt. Beyond these differences in black and
white jurors' experiences and in their perspectives on crime and the
criminal justice process, there are also race-linked stereotypes that are
likely to poison the deliberative process with mistrust and to undercut
relations between black and white jurors. The deliberation process
Cf Carol S. Steiker, Proposed Instruction, 3 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 276 (2001) (proposing such
an instruction).
20a See, e.g., supra note 175.
206 See supra Part III.B, Case 3.
207 Instructions may also be attractive because they reinforce the judge's authority and domi-
nance as the source of whatever correctives may be needed for the conduct of a "fair trial." See
Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Proc-
ess, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 589 (1997) (reviewing the research literature on the effects of
judicial instructions and concluding that "the bulk of empirical research indicates that jurors do
not adhere to limiting instructions").
2W See, e.g., Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadnissible Evidence on the Decisions of SimulatedJurors: A
Moral Dilemma, 3J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973). Studies have found that inadmissible
evidence accompanied by a strong judicial admonitions to ignore the evidence will often cause
jurors to accentuate the prohibited considerations. Id. at 602. Kassin and Studebaker attribute
this "paradoxical boomerang effect" to the fact that people not only find it difficult to actively
suppress salient information upon instruction, but also to a reactance effect that makes people
react against efforts to restrict their decision-making freedom. Saul M. Kassin & Christina A.
Studebaker, Instructions to Disregard and the Jury: Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL
FORGETTING: INTrERDISCIPLINARYAPPROACHES 413, 424 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. Mac-
Leod 1998).
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itself will then be contaminated with race-linked hostility and invec-
tive. Deliberations will take on the character of a struggle to subdue
opposition by means such as the intimidation and deception exer-
cised upon Ms. Daniels by the other members 
of the Hance jury.!'
Improved jury selection and sentencing instructions, while construc-
tive, are, we submit, patchwork remedies that will fail to counter the
deep-seated and enduring character of the malady.
The evidence of racial influence in the CJP data goes a critical
step beyond what Baldus and his colleagues were able to show.!"'
They demonstrated that the likelihood of juries imposing the death
penalty differed depending upon the race of defendant and victim; in
particular, they showed that jurors were most likely to impose death
sentences when the defendant was black and the victim w-as white, as
in McCleskey v. Kemp.21' Further, Baldus showed that the greater use of
the death penalty in such cases could not be accounted for by ,any
one or all of a vast and comprehensive set of legally relevant consid-
erations. He thus established that the race of defendant and ictim
were implicated in the sentencing decisions of jurors. He did this,
however, without being able to show how jurors' race or race-linked
attitudes figured into their decision-making process. The majority in
McCleskey complained that the Baldus data linking defendant and vic-
tim race to sentencing outcome did not impeach the exercise of sen-
tencing discretion by capital jurors, -32 and that statistica patterns of
sentencing outcomes were no substitute for knowing how individual
jurors focus their collective judgment- 
2
11
That is precisely what we have here-data not merely on the race
of the defendants and their victims, but on real black and white ju-
209Judgments on the part of blackjurors that the jury is rushing to a verdict intolerant of dis-
agreement are symptomatic of something beyond a deliberative process. That these differences
are exaggerated between males of both races and on juries with a large number of lhite nale
jurors adds to the suggestion that something more than rational deliberation toward a reasoned
moral judgment is at work.
210 Baldus showed, controlling for some thirty-nine other legally relevant and statistcally sig-
nificant factors contributing to the imposition of the death penalty. that death sentences were
4.3 times more likely to be imposed in B/W cases. See BA.DL'S ET AL., supra note 25. at 395-419.
211 McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S 279 (1987).
212 Id at 291 n.7 ("Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include
the assumption that the study shous that racial considerations actually enter into any srnitenc-
ing decisions in Georgia."); id. at 312 ("At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race.").
Is at 292-97 (explaining why statistical evidence was not sufficient to show purposeful dis-
crimination in that case). The Court's reluctance to impeach jury decision making on the
strength of statistical data without evidence on real jurors in actual cases as manifest a )ear
earlier in Lockhart v. McCre when the Court asserted that tie behavior of mock jurors is no sub-
stitute for knowing how real jurors will behave when deciding actual cases. Sre Lockhart v
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986). The trouble with the empirical studies, the Court com-
plained, was that the study participants "were not actual jurors sworn tnder oath to apply the
law to the facts of an actual case involving the fate of an actual capital defendant. [The Court
has] serious doubts about the value of these [mockjury] studies in predicting the behavior of
actualjurors." It
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rors in actual cases who have made the life or death sentencing deci-
sion. These data flesh out the ways in which the race of individual ju-
rors and the racial composition of the jury, in connection with the
race of defendant and victim, figure into the capital sentencing deci-
sion. These data show that the races differ substantially and signifi-
cantly in how they view the crimes and the defendants when the de-
fendant is black and the victim is white. These are differences of the
kind that the Court in Turner said would constitute an unacceptable
risk of race-linked arbitrariness in the sentencing decisions of capital
jurors. "' Perhaps the Court in McCleskey held that the evidence of ra-
cial bias, though significant, did not impeach the decision making of
capital jurors because it imagined that its decision a year earlier in
Turner had remedied the risk of racial bias precisely where the Baldus
data in McCleskey showed it to be most exacerbated-in the sentenc-
ing decisions in B/W cases. Yet the evidence here shows that gross
race-linked differences in the basic sentencing considerations of lin-
gering doubt, remorse, and dangerousness are most manifest and
egregious precisely in the cases where the Court in Turner said they
would be found. The consequence is that the decision-making proc-
ess is an egregious departure from the Court's "repeated recognition
that the 'qualitative difference between death and other penalties
calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is im-
posed.' 
2 15
Clearly, the differences in sentencing outcomes by race of defen-
dant and victim that Baldus and his colleagues were able to show in
McCleskey are far from the full stor of racism and arbitrariness in the
sentencing of capital defendants. 21 We now see that the race of indi-
vidual jurors, as well as the race of defendant and victim, infects the
capital-sentencing process. The evidence of race-linked arbitrariness
now goes well beyond what the 5-4 majority in McCleskey ruled was in-
sufficient. The time has come to rethink McCleskey in light of Fur-
man's mandate that arbitrariness in sentencing is fatal to the death
penalty.
21 Turner, 476 U.S. at 35-38 (discussing racial prejudice in capital sentencing cases).
2 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(opinion of Burger, C.j.)).
See supra notes 210-213.
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APPENDIX A. CLASSIFICATION OF CASES BY
RACE OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM
In the CJP interviews, jurors were asked to provide information
(race, sex, age, education, occupation, marital status, etc.) for each
defendant and each victim of the crime. With respect to race, they
were asked to indicate race in four categories (white = 1, black = 2,
Hispanic = 3, other = 4). Jurors' responses to the race question were
used as the basis for classifying cases in terms of the race of defen-
dant(s) and victim(s). The classification of cases by defendant and
victim race has proceeded in two steps. First, the information %-as
consolidated in cases of three or more defendants or victims. Sec-
ond, the resulting forty defendant/victim racial combinations were
reduced into a classification scheme that distinguished white-on-white
killings (W/W cases), black-on-white killings (B/W cases), black-on-
black killings (B/B cases), and a residual category of killings not sub-
sumed under these categories.
The consolidation of information in cases with three or more de-
fendants or victims is shown in Table A.1. We represent the cases by
a one- or two-character racial designation. The first character indi-
cates the race of the first-named defendant or victim, and the second
character indicates the race of additional defendants or ictims, if
any. Where additional defendants or victims are all of the same race
as the first named, the second character is the same as the first.
Where any of the additional defendants or victims are of a different
race than the first named, the second character indicates this differ-
ent race. In one instance we have needed three characters to repre-
sent the race of additional victims. The distribution of the capital
cases in the sample in terms of the forty distinct defendant/ictim ra-
cial combinations identified in step one appears in Table Al below.
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217 Key to abbreviations: "W" = white, "B" = black, "0" = other, including Hispanic (grouped
in this tabulation), "NA" = not available, unknown. In multiple defendant or victim cases, the
first W, B, or 0 indicates the race of the first identified defendant or victim; the second indi-
cates the race of additional defendants or victims. Where the race of additional defendants or
victims differs from that of the first named, this race is indicated whether or not there were also
additional defendants or victims of the same race as the first named.
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Multiple mixed race defendants and/or victims killings
Same race defendant(s), Mixed race defendants,
mixed race victims # % same race victim(s) # %
W BW 1 .3 WW3 N 4 1.2
B WB 2 .6 WB WWIV 2 .6
B WO 3 .9 BW O 1 .3
B BW 3 .9 OW W 1 .3
B BWO 1 .3 OB W 1 .3
B OW 1 .3 OB B 1 .3
BB BO 1 .3 Subtotal 10 3.0
0 OW 1 .3
Subtotal 13 3.9
Missing data on race of victim(s)
# %
w NA 1 .3
B NA 1 .3
Subtotal 2 .6
Nearly three out of five cases were one-on-one killings (57.8%).
Of these, the ratio of intraracial to interracial killings was two to one
(39.1% vs. 18.7%); half of the one-on-one killings were W/W and a
quarter were B/B crimes (29.5% and 14.5%, respectively). Of cases
involving more than one defendant or victim (42%), again almost
two out of three were strictly intraracial, involving only defendants
and victims of the same race (27.3%); and most of these (18%) were
white-on-white killings (W/WW 11.7%; WW/W 3.6%; WWV/WWV
2.7%). Far fewer of the killings with same-race defendant(s) and/or
victim(s) crossed racial lines (7.2%). Cases with mixed-race victims
(3.9%) and mixed-race defendants (3%) were relatively rare. There
were no cases in which both defendants and victims were multi-racial.
The race of the defendant(s) wk-as determined in all cases, and that of
the victim(s) was determined in all but two cases (.6%).
The second step was to collapse these forty distinctions into four
categories representing W/W, B/W, and B/B killings, and a residual
group of cases. Except in a few instances of mixed race victims or de-
fendants, this was a straightforward process. We based the classifica-
tions on the race of the first-named defendant and victim in all cases
where the first-named was white (W) or black (B). In effect, we as-
sumed that in cases with both black and white defendants or victims,
the first-named defendant or victim %-as the one who figured most
prominently in the case and in jurors' minds. It was possible for the
jurors in a given case to list the victims in different orders, but that
usually happened only when there were three or more victims and
typically among the last-named rather than first-named victims. In
the few cases with mixed-race defendants or victims, where Hispanic
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or other was named first, we took the later-named black or white as
the basis for classification.1
21$ This occurred in the following four cases: OW/W = W/W; B/OW = B/W; OB/w = B/W;
OB/B = B/B. All cases involving exclusively Hispanic or other defendants or victims were
treated as a residual category, and therefore excluded from the analyses presented in the text of
the article.
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APPENDIX B: INDEPENDENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RACIAL
DIFFERENCES IN LINGERING DOUBT, IMPRESSIONS OF
REMORSE, AND PERCEPTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS
Our statistical comparisons of white and black jurors in Tables 3-5
could conceivably misrepresent the true differences between the
races, because the samples on which they were based may not be
adequate to support a statistically significant inference of racial dif-
ferences, or because race is associated with other factors that may ac-
tually be responsible for the observed differences. Race is, of course,
associated with other conditions in society, such as wealth, income,
education, and occupational status, which might account for the ob-
served black-white differences. Despite our restriction of the analysis
to cases from which we have interviewed jurors of both races, the
black jurors in these samples tended to come disproportionately from
cases for which there were more black jurors and, likewise, the white
jurors from cases ith more whites. Hence, even within these re-
stricted samples, the white and black jurors could, on average, have
been exposed to different kinds of trial and deliberation experiences.
We thus tested the observed racial differences in Tables 3-5
against these challenges. To assess the statistical significance of black-
white differences in Table 3-5 in light of these possibly confounding
sources of variation, we conducted a set of four regressions for each
variable listed in these tables treated as the dependent or predicted
variable. The four regressions for each item in Tables 3-5 consist of
the following independent or predictor variables: (a) jurors' race
alone (without controls for SES or case variation); (b) jurors' race
controlling for case variation; (c) jurors' race controlling for SES;
and (d) jurors' race controlling for both SES and case variation. The
measure of SES was a nine-category additive combination of educa-
tion and income (each in five categories). The control for case varia-
tion was the introduction of dummy variables for the cases from
which jurors were interviewed..2 ' 9  For each of the three defen-
dant/victim racial combinations, Table B.1 shows the significance of
race (i.e., the p-values from the t-test) in the four regressions (a-d)
conducted with each of the variables from Tables 3 through 5.
219 This adjusts statistically for variations in the types of murder, trial, and deliberation expe-
riences to which jurors were exposed.
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TABLE B.1: Regression tests of the statistical independence and
significance of race effects (black-white differences) in
Tables 3-5 for selected defendant-victim racial combi-
nations
Statistical significance (T test) of race in regressions with the following pre-
dictors:
(A) race* alone
(B) race and case dummies**
(C) race and SES*** (socio-economic status)
(D) race, SES, and case dummies



























































* race (white = 1; black = 2)
** case dummies (unique values assigned to all jurors from each of the respective cases in our
sample)
** SES (an additive combination of education and income, each in five categories)
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Table 5 Variables
A.1 .233.175.155.112 .037.024.103.128 .789.773.254.712
A.2 .645.844.471.665 .015.032.089.287 .601.667.681.562
A.3 .727.348.779.357 .049.052.065.015 .806.677.424.810
A.4 .299.178.539.923 .084.371.444.183 .160.185.705.740
B.1 .544.994.512.838 .436.541.567.529 .328.309.573.330
B.2 .831.360.848.360 .540.499.827.427 .320.326.868.600
C.1 .980.655.809.439 .000.000.001.000 .427.999.687.718
The racial differences in B/W cases were statistically significant (p
< .05) in most instances where we identified and discussed such dif-
ferences in our tabular analysis, and they typically remain so ith the
controls for SES and case variation. With respect to lingering doubt
and related variables (Table 3), in only one instance (Table 3, Panel
B.3) does the black-white difference lose statistical significance at the
conventional p < .05 level: in the presence of both SES variables and
case dummy variables, the p-value was .067. Regarding remorse and
related variables (Table 4), the significance value %%-as less than .05 for
race alone and under the various controls, except in two instances
(Table 4, Panels B.2 and B.3) that reflected identification with the
defendant ("imagined yourself like the defendant" and "imagined
yourself in the defendant's situation"). In these instances, blacks ex-
ceeded whites in identification with the defendant, but by less than
fifteen points (in Table 4): the p-values failed to reach the .05 level
in any of the four equations for either -ariable.
Concerning the defendant's perceived dangerousness and release
from prison in B/W cases, the initial (uncontrolled) black-white dif-
ferences were significant (p < .05) for three of the four measures
(Table 5, Panels A.1-A.3), and not far off for the fourth (p = .084, Ta-
ble 5, Panel A.4). The two items that explicitly used the phrase "dan-
ger in the future" (Table 5, Panels A-1 and A.2) failed to reach the
.05 probability level in the presence of the SES index (equations C
and D). Although differences in social class standing as reflected in
the SES index of education and income did marginally weaken the
effects of race as a predictor of the defendant's dangerousness, by no
means did they substitute for the effects of race.2 Although esti-
mates of the death penalty alternative (Table 5, Panel A.4) were sub-
M Technically this variable is the combination of two linked but separate questions: (1) was
anyone reluctant to go along with the majority vote on the defendant's guilt. and (2) if so, were
you at all reluctant to do so? As such, this questioning sequence with a contingent question
does not strictly represent an ordered set of response categories. For the regremion runs con-
ducted here, the variable -was coded: no one was reluctant = 1; someone %,as reluctant, but not
the respondent = 2; the respondent was reluctant = 3.
22 The p-values for SES in equations C and D are, respectively, .360 and .713 for iariable .. 1,
and .322 and .744 for variable A.2. These values are well above both the criucal .05 probability
level and the corresponding p-values for race in these equations.
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
stantively consistent with concerns about the defendant's release
from prison (Table 5, Panel A.3), unlike such concerns, they were
not sufficiently associated with race to be predicted by that variable at
a statistically significant level in this sample of B/W cases.
As expected, black-white differences in jurors' reports of danger-
ousness as a subject of punishment deliberations (Table 5, Panels B. 1
and B.2) were not statistically significant. These data served to estab-
lish that the level of discussion of dangerousness and related matters
was greater in the B/W than in the W/W or B/B cases. However,
they did not show that there was a difference in what black and white
jurors in the same kinds of cases reported about the role of
dangerousness in punishment deliberations. Finally, the black-white
difference in the likelihood that the defendant's dangerousness
would or did make jurors more apt to vote for death (Table 5, Panel
C.1) is a highly significant and independent racial difference in B/W
cases.
In the W/W sample, none of the black-white differences with re-
spect to lingering doubt were significant at the .05 level when we con-
trolled for both SES and case variations. In three instances, however,
the greater tendency of blacks than whites to have lingering doubt
approached significance: Table 3, A.1, having doubt about the capi-
tal murder verdict (p = .055); Table 3, C.1, thinking about the possi-
bility of mistaken identity during punishment deliberations (p =
.082); and Table 3, C.4, thinking that the defendant might not be the
one most responsible for the killing, again during punishment delib-
erations (p = .076). In perceptions of the defendant's remorse, black-
white differences were significant with controls for SES and case
variation in two instances: Table 4, A.2, the defendant appearing re-
morseful during the trial (p - .044) and Table 4, C.1, seeing remorse
as a grounds for mercy (p = .038). Concerning dangerousness, no
black-white differences reach the .05 level of significance, with or
without controls for SES and case variation.
In B/B cases, despite some sizeable black-white differences, very
few were statistically significant, owing to the small sample, especially
the small number of black jurors (ranging from 19 to 16 in Tables 3-
5). In fact, none of the black-white differences alone (equation A)
reached the p < .05 probability level in B/B cases. The observed dif-
ferences were simply not large enough to be statistically significant
with black and white samples of this size. In only one instance, that
the defendant appeared remorseful during the trial (Table 4, A.2),
did the p-value drop below .05 (to p = .028), with controls for SES
and case variation (equation D). Notably, with both controls this
variable significantly separated black and white jurors in cases of all
three defendant/victim racial combinations.
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